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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
A Political Theory of Wonder:  
Feelings of Order in Modern Political Thought 
 
by 
 
Kye Anderson Barker 
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019 
Professor Joshua F. Dienstag, Chair 
 
 
 How has wonder, an emotion tied to religion and philosophy in premodern European 
political thought, been used in the context of a modern, supposedly disenchanted politics? The 
past few decades have seen a dramatic reassessment of the importance of the emotions in the 
history of political thought. However, this broad reassessment has yet to address how canonical 
political thinkers conceptualized and deployed wonder in their theories of politics. I argue that 
we find in the writings of Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, Karl Marx, and Hannah Arendt a 
subterranean debate on the proper conceptualization and political use of wonder in modernity.  
 When Western political thought departed from a vision of the world as pre-structured by 
a divine, admirable order, there was no longer a readily available interpretation of the meaning of 
the potentially disruptive experience of wonder. Competing individuals and groups could make 
claims for wonder to be directed towards emerging aspects of political life as the foundation of 
political order. By using wonder to channel disruptive feelings of novelty into the cognition of 
order, these claims could structure the realm of possible actions. Moreover, a feeling of wonder 
 iii 
could be used to secure temporal stability within the fundamentally precarious conditions of 
modernity. Thus, I argue that Hobbes responded to the political use of divine signs during the 
English Civil War by incorporating wonder into his design for the emotional apparatus of the 
sovereign state; that Kant argued for a transformation of the feeling experienced by political and 
religious enthusiasts into a form of wonder befitting a republican and cosmopolitan order which 
became possible after the French Revolution; that Marx argued that the rise of capitalism was 
accompanied by a re-enchantment of political life through an affective attachment to the 
commodity form; and that Arendt attempted to redirect the wonder of political theorists and 
citizens towards the unexpected events and deeds of political life. In each of these political 
interventions, ancient Greek and Roman texts were used as a resource for rethinking wonder. 
Understanding this history helps us navigate the wonders of modern political life. 
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 1 
Introduction 
The Problem of Wonder in Modern Politics 
Are passions, then, the pagans of the soul? 
Reason alone baptized? Alone ordain’d  
To touch things sacred? 
 
Nothing can satisfy but what confounds 
Nothing but what astonishes is true. 
- Edward Young, Night Thoughts 
 
1. From Signs to Wonder 
Before he was crushed in battle, tortured, and executed, Thomas Müntzer, the firebrand radical 
Reformer and important leader of the German Peasants’ War of the 1520s, spent his final days 
preaching about the sign of the rainbow. According to the testimony of Hans Hut, 
On Sunday [May 14, 1525] before the day on which the peasants were defeated, 
Müntzer preached publicly in Frankenhausen: the lord God almighty would now 
purify the world; he had taken power from the rulers and given it to their subjects, 
whereupon the rulers would tremble. In their infirmity the rulers would beg them 
[for mercy], but they should not be trusted for they would not keep faith with [their 
subjects]. God was on the subjects’ side, for the peasants had painted a rainbow on 
every banner which they displayed, to which Müntzer explained: that is the [sign 
of the] League of God. After three days’ preaching to that effect, a rainbow 
appeared in the sky around the sun. Müntzer pointed to that rainbow, declaring to 
the peasants: you see the rainbow, the league, the sign that God is on your side. 
You must fight valiantly and be bold!1  
Although Müntzer’s invocation of the rainbow as a sign of God was not followed by the end he 
intended, this invocation gives us a glimpse into the use of signs when “the understanding of 
things as signs, and as signs addressed to us by God” saturated sensibilities towards the world, 
which was taken to be an unfolding of “God’s speech act.”2 The sign of the rainbow could be 
                                                          
1 Hut quoted in (Scott and Scribner 1991, 290). For an incisive reading of the significance for political thought of 
Müntzer and his role in the German Peasants’ War, see (Colas 1997, 311-320). 
 
2 (Taylor 2007, 325). 
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interpreted to reveal an order of the world built upon a divine firmament. The saeculum, or order 
of worldly time, could be shown to touch the eternity of the divine. For Müntzer, the rainbow 
hearkened back to the covenant of God with Noah at the end of the flood, when it signaled that 
the earth would never again by destroyed in a deluge. Yet in the words of the African American 
spiritual, “God gave Noah the rainbow sign, No more water, the fire next time!" In other 
contexts, the rainbow has also been interpreted as a form of communication between the eternity 
of the divine and the mortal world. In Norse myth, the rainbow served as the Bifrost, the rainbow 
bridge, which connected the realm of the gods to the earth. For the ancient Greeks, the rainbow 
was divinized as Iris, a messenger of the gods. To Plato, “the man who said Iris was the daughter 
of Thaumas seems to have been doing his genealogy not at all badly.”3 This is so, as the rainbow 
is an object of wonder – thaumazein (θαυμάζειν) – the paradigmatic experience at the beginning 
of not theology, but philosophy. 
 What could this have meant? To see a rainbow is to see a strange twist of light curve over 
the sky.4 The clouds begin to disperse; the rain slows to a halt. And from the darkness our eyes 
catch the sight of a rainbow. We’ve seen them before, but each new rainbow is experienced as a 
singularity. We can thoroughly know the causes of the rainbow – that it is nothing but a 
reflection, refraction, and dispersion of light through water droplets – yet to experience the 
dawning of it anew is to be enchanted by it. There is, as Walter Benjamin would say, an aura that 
envelops the moment: “a strange tissue of time and space: the unique apparition of a distance, 
however near it may be.”5 In each occurrence of a rainbow we endure, without any choice of our 
                                                          
3 Theaetetus 155d. 
 
4 For a sustained and extraordinary reading of the wonder of the rainbow, see (Fisher, Wonder, the Rainbow, and the 
Aesthetics of Rare Experiences 2003). 
 
5 (Benjamin, Selected Writings: Volume 4 -1938-1940 2003, 104-105). 
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own, a kind of wonder. And when we endure this passion which beckons us to find knowledge 
beyond the capacity of our senses – perhaps from gods or some other supernatural source – we 
suffer a thirst that knowledge alone cannot quench. In wondering we feel a need for the sense of 
things, for meaning. And that demand for sense in wonder, as Müntzer’s example dramatizes, is 
eminently political. Yet Müntzer’s example is distant from our condition today. In modernity, 
there is no ‘author’ of the things that strike us as ‘signs.’ Given that modernity is defined in part 
as secular, or, relatedly, as disenchanted, how then has the passion of wonder functioned 
politically in this moment of time?  
Wonder has long been claimed as the beginning of philosophy, but what if it also has a 
constitutive role in politics? In Theaetetus 155d, Plato wrote that “wonder is what the 
philosopher endures most; for there is no other beginning [ἀρχὴ] of philosophy.”6 With some 
modifications, Aristotle follows Plato at the beginning of the Metaphysics, where he claims that 
all human beings by nature desire to know the causes of things, and that this desire to know is 
felt as wonder.7 Wondering and learning about things is a pleasurable experience, since it brings 
the human soul “into one’s natural condition” – a state of knowledge of things.8 Wonder might 
begin as an ordinary passion that could occur at any surprising moment, but, through philosophy, 
this initial passion leads one to questions of the soul and, eventually, of the cosmos as a whole. 
By forcing one to feel and follow the causes of moments of disorder, wonder would allow one to 
gain a fuller sense of the order of things. Yet for Aristotle, when one reaches this condition of 
                                                          
6 The Greek is “μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν: οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη.” 
 
7 (Aristotle 2001), and (Rhetoric 1371a25-30). 
 
8 (Rhetoric 1369b30-35). 
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knowledge, “we must end in the contrary state”, meaning that wonder ceases once the causes of 
things are known.9 
When aspects of ancient Greek philosophy were later incorporated into Christian thought 
through the efforts of Neo-Platonist writers such as Augustine and Boethius, this wonder towards 
the cosmos was transformed into a wonder towards all of divine creation.10 In this sense, wonder 
was, as it was for Plato, an arche (ἀρχὴ) of thought, both beginning and guiding principle. The 
cosmos was subsequently perceived as wonderful, or admirable, as an effect of its divine creator, 
expressed in a hierarchical ‘great chain of being’ ascending from peasant to king and from 
emperor to God.11 According to this view, ultimately, “to the true God alone the power to grant 
kingdoms and empires” is ascribed.12 On the other hand, the kind of wonder described by 
Aristotle was incorporated into philosophy as a kind of curiosity limited only by what was 
understood as sacred.13 In the thirteenth century Albertus Magnus wrote in his Commentary on 
the Metaphysics of Aristotle that wonder “springs from an unfulfilled desire to know the cause of 
that which appears portentous and unusual; so it was in the beginning when he, up to that time 
unskilled, began to philosophize…Now the man who is puzzled and wonders apparently does not 
know. Hence wonder is the movement of the man who does not know on his way to finding 
                                                          
9 (Aristotle 2001, 693). 
 
10 (Augustine 1972, 971-979); and (Boethius 2002, 67-90). 
 
11 See the chapter on monarchy in (Fried 2015); (Kantorowicz 2016); (Knuuttila 1981); (Lovejoy 2009); (Oakley 
2006, 87-157); and (Taylor 2007, 209). Dante expresses an exemplary vision of this order in idealistic terms in both 
(Alighieri, The Divine Comedy 1954); and (Alighieri, Monarchy 1996). 
 
12 (Augustine 1972, 215). 
 
13 See (Blumenberg 1983, 279-324); and (Daston and Park 1998, 120-126). 
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out.”14 Albertus’s most famous student, Thomas Aquinas would largely follow this reading of 
wonder which Albertus took from Aristotle, but would modify it to reconcile it to Christianity:  
The astronomer does not wonder when he sees an eclipse of the sun, for he knows 
its cause. And so, a certain event is wondrous [mirum] to one person, but not so to 
another. So, a thing that has a completely hidden cause is wondrous in an 
unqualified way, and this the name, miracle, suggests; namely, what is of itself filled 
with admirable wonder, not simply in relation to one person or another. Now, 
absolutely speaking, the cause hidden from every man is God.15 
According to this interpretation, all wonders that endure are miracles. They escape our grasp as 
they are of a supernatural origin. Yet through that origin, they remain a part of the admirable 
order of creation. 
The political consequences of this ordering were evident in the more or less stratified 
social and political organization of medieval political life. Early humanists, however, began to 
see man as having a special place in this order of being. According to Giovanni Pico Della 
Mirandola, man is a “great miracle and wonderful creature” due to its character and place on the 
“universal chain of being” as a “creature of indeterminate nature” defined by free will.16 Human 
beings still had a place in the admirable order of existence, but it was a space defined by 
freedom. William Shakespeare has Hamlet express a similar attitude, in saying “What a piece of 
work is man, How noble in reason, how infinite in faculty, In form and moving how express and 
admirable, in action how like an Angel, in apprehension how like a god: the beauty of the world, 
The paragon of animals.”17 It would even be within human capabilities to strive as a beneficent 
                                                          
14 Quoted in (Greenblatt, Marvellous Possessions 2017, 81 & 176-177n79). 
 
15 Quotation from Summa Contra Gentiles, 3.101.2 in (Daston and Park 1998, 122). 
 
16 (Mirandola 1948, 223 & 224). 
 
17 Of course, Hamlet, who murders the hypocritical humanist Polonius later in the play, follows these sentences with 
“And yet to me what is this quintessence of dust? Man delights not me – nor woman neither” in Act II.2, 273-278 of 
(Shakespeare 2001, 53). 
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prince to imitate the “wonderful archetype” at the top of the chain of being as a “living likeness 
of God.”18 Yet when Western political thought moved away from a vision of the world as pre-
structured by a ‘great chain of being’ or an ‘admirable order of existence’, there was no longer a 
ready interpretation of the significance of wonder within the world. This is not to say that no one 
in the modern world would experience a wonder for the world as divinely created and ordered, or 
that every single person in the ancient and medieval West would experience wonder in the same 
way.19 It is rather that there would no longer be an implicitly agreed upon interpretive structure 
that could incorporate the potentially disruptive experience of wonder.20 Yet the capacity to 
wonder endured, as a passion that makes us think, even as order became understood as 
something which could only be achieved through human initiative.21 
2. Wonder in Modernity 
It is the argument of this dissertation that in the modern world there is a programmatic 
redirection of wonder away from the world as it appears without the influence of human 
initiative – whether that might mean from divine effort or natural, inhuman processes – and 
towards political institutions or capabilities which center human activity and control. Competing 
individuals and groups would make claims for wonder to be directed at differing and newly 
emergent aspects of political life. The consequences of these claims are not only alterations of 
                                                          
18 (Erasmus, The Education of a Christian Prince 1968, 158 & 157). 
 
19 Take, for instance, Charles Taylor’s project in (Taylor 2007). For a treatment of the different senses of wonder in 
medieval Europe, see (Bynum 1997). 
 
20 For quite disparate examples of disruptive kinds of wonder that confronted the late medieval and early modern 
world see (Burns 2002); (Crawford 2012); (Cohn 1970); (Greenblatt, Marvellous Possessions 2017); (Hall 1990); 
(Knoppers and Landes 2004); (MacGregor 2007); (Platt 1999); and (Shaw 2006). 
 
21 “When the constituting factor is nothing other than such common action – whether the founding acts have already 
occurred in the past, or are now coming about it immaterial – we have secularity” (Taylor 2007, 194). 
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individual perspectives on the proper order of the political world, but the endurance of these 
attitudes in time. As dramatized by Müntzer above, in wonder we feel that we not only go 
beyond our limits of knowledge, but also experience something beyond our moment in time. 
Therefore, wonder could be enlisted in projects of political ordering when wonder is directed 
towards objects that are not diminished in time, or that may renew themselves. By using wonder 
to channel disruptive feelings of novelty into the cognition of order, these claims structure the 
realm of possible actions, and, in a sense, ‘enchant’ the political world. Thus, the struggle over 
wonder in modernity is a struggle over the body and its place in the ordering of the world. 
Modern political thought has responded to the destabilization of wonder in the world by 
incorporating it into the fabric of modern political life. 
 To develop this argument, I turn to four central figures in the history of modern political 
thought: Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, and Karl Marx, and Hannah Arendt. Each make 
claims upon wonder in the name of newly emergent and politically salient entities in the modern 
world: the sovereign state, the morally autonomy self, the market order, and political action. 
Although each of these entities resemble, to different degrees, pre-modern phenomena, they are 
not exactly structural repetitions. They are, in some definitive ways, newly emergent entities and 
thus objects of wonder. Each theorist presents us with a robust articulation of how the feeling of 
wonder towards a specific entity can be used to produce and reproduce a form of order in the 
world. These orders are then taken to be the legitimate foundations of action. Understanding the 
way that these claims of wonder are made is crucial to contemporary political life, since these 
entities have become central aspects of modern political life. To understand the way that they can 
– and according to some, should – induce wonder is to better understand the contours of the 
passionate life of political modernity. The composite of these views is somewhat discontinuous, 
 8 
as each author gives us a framework for understanding experiences directed towards different 
objects, but they are overlapping experiences in all being responses to the problem of wonder in 
modern politics. 
From a critical perspective we can read these four authors as providing examples of 
objects that confront us as wonderful, or over-aweing, in order to structure our activities 
accordingly under conditions in which there is no single proper object of wonder that can be 
determined by procedures exterior to politics. There is instead, to use a term from Hans 
Blumenberg’s The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, a struggle for the “reoccupation” of the 
recipient of wonder in the conditions of a ‘disappearance of order’ in the modern world.22 
Blumenberg defines this disappearance of order as a “presupposition of a general conception of 
human activity that no longer perceives in given states of affairs the binding character of the 
ancient or medieval cosmos, and consequently holds them to be, in principle, at man’s 
disposal.”23 Here Blumenberg argued against the claim that modern secular thought is no more 
than an illegitimate transformation of theological thought.24 Blumenberg argued that the cosmic 
order that was accepted in the medieval world was not eliminated by a historical ‘wrong’, – the 
Faustian European spirit did not triumphantly destroy the “beautiful world” – but that the 
intellectual bases for the cosmic order of the middle ages were eliminated by contradictions 
internal to Christianity. Furthermore, the modern world does not have a ‘debt’ to medieval, 
                                                          
22 (Blumenberg 1983, 137). For previous engagements with Hans Blumenberg by political theorists, see (Bennett, 
The Enchantment of Modern Life 2001, 72-75); and (Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization 1995, 2-3). 
 
23 (Blumenberg 1983, 137). According to Blumenberg, and later Gillepsie, a complex of problems internal to the 
medieval world and then contemporary Christian thought raised by the nominalist revolution opened a space for the 
emergence of modern thought in the late middle ages. See also (Gillespie 2008). 
 
24 In particular, Blumenberg responded to claims made by the legal theorist Carl Schmitt in (Schmitt, Political 
Theology 1985) and (Schmitt, Political Theology II 2008), the philosopher Karl Löwith in (Löwith 1949), and other 
German thinkers who argued that the secularization of modern political life is in itself illegitimate. 
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theological propositions. The modern age has not illegitimately appropriated theological 
concepts for its own purposes but has responded to a condition in which the medieval vision of 
the cosmos was no longer persuasive through what Blumenberg calls “self-assertion.” The “self-
assertion” of modernity is “an existential program” in which “man posits his existence in a 
historical situation and indicates to himself how he is going to deal with the reality surrounding 
him and what use he will make of the possibilities that are open to him.”25 The institutions and 
orders of modernity are therefore grounded on a new understanding of human initiative shorn of 
the necessity of divine order. 
However, according to Blumenberg, fundamental questions that existed in one epoch do 
not simply disappear in another. Rather, they often remain as lingering questions that still 
demand answers. The process which has been called secularization should be understood not “as 
the transposition of authentically theological contents into secularized alienation from their 
origin but rather as the reoccupation of answer positions that had become vacant and whose 
corresponding questions could not be eliminated.”26 Yet Blumenberg also admits that some 
questions that persist across epochs do so because of “residual needs.”27 As we can see by 
reading closely major figures in the history of political thought, there was a “residual need” to 
incorporate the human experience of wonder into a world that human beings order according to 
their own self-assertion.28 In modern conditions in which given states of affairs are 
fundamentally at the disposal of human activity, the ‘residual need’ of wonder must be satisfied 
                                                          
25 (Blumenberg 1983, 138). 
 
26 (Blumenberg 1983, 65). 
 
27 (Blumenberg 1983, 65 & 114). 
 
28 Martha Nussbaum even calls the “cognitive distinction-making” of wonder “an original need” in (Nussbaum, 
Upheavals of Thought 2003, 189). 
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by those human activities themselves. As we can see through the reconstructions contained in the 
following chapters, the struggles to appropriate wonder exhibited in the works of Hobbes, Kant, 
Marx, and Arendt are all in some sense illustrations of responses to this residual need. 
However, I amend Blumenberg’s analysis of modern self-assertion in two ways. First, I 
find that the reconsideration in modernity of what Blumenberg calls the “central affect of 
consciousness,” curiosity, not only gives rise to a positive evaluation of theoretical curiosity in 
the sciences, but also a transformation of the passion of wonder in political life.29 It is 
unfortunate that Blumenberg limits his study to the development of the sciences in modernity; 
this constitutes a failure to think of the beginning of philosophy for the ancient Greeks – wonder 
– as not just a search for knowledge, but also implicated in the demand for meaning and 
significance. This leads Blumenberg to only focus on scientific development in modernity since, 
for him, theoretical curiosity is primarily non-political and only later comes to infiltrate or 
structure political domains.30 However, as I show, the structuring of political domains by wonder 
has been a consistent concern of modern political thought. 
Second, I find, in each instance analyzed in this dissertation, a turning to ancient thought 
to help make sense of the passionate life of the modern world. This is partly due to the 
definitively humanist spirit of this dissertation. As the medieval, Christian view on the proper 
understanding and role of the passions in political life diminished, Hobbes, Kant, Marx, and 
Arendt all benefitted from their humanist education and more than incidental interest in the 
                                                          
29 (Blumenberg 1983, 232). 
 
30 See (Blumenberg 1983, 232, 400, & 437). 
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ancients.31 In a sense, this dissertation documents a part of the long history of the humanist 
revival of interest of modern writers in antiquity, though this revival began well before what we 
today call modernity.32 In these writings, including by ancient Greek historians, Plato, Aristotle, 
Epicureans, and Stoics, the writers at the heart of this dissertation found resources for rethinking 
wonder in the modern world. Since the focus of the dissertation is on the significance of wonder 
in modernity and not antiquity, the specific ways that ancient writers treat wonder in their 
writings will be dealt with in the substantive chapters of the dissertation. For the purpose of this 
study, what is significant about the ancient texts is revealed by the questions of the modern 
authors subjected here to interpretation.33  
What I will say here generally, is that ancient authors provide a way to understand the 
passion of wonder when it is not understood as responding to ‘signs’ given by the author of 
nature. Moreover, through their accounts of wonder, they offer an embodied portrait of the 
activity of thinking that can make sense of the ways that the world impinges upon the mind. In 
the words of the great humanist Desiderius Erasmus, “life here below is best described as being a 
                                                          
31 Charles Taylor thinks of this process as a movement away from a condition in which self is understood as living 
in an enchanted, porous world of spiritual forces to a condition in which the self is understood as fundamentally 
buffered from the forces of the world, but subject to occasional passions which could be met with disciplinary tactics 
of self-formation. See (Taylor 2007, 25-89). 
 
32 See, for a few classic examples on the significance for political thought of the resurgence of interest in antiquity, 
(Baron 1966); (Burckhardt 1990, 120-184); (Pocock 2016, 49-80); and (Skinner, The Foundations of Modern 
Political Thought 1978). I am, however, not claiming that humanism is exclusively pagan in origin and exclusively 
civic, as Gillespie accuses others, especially Baron and Burckhardt, to incorrectly believe in (Gillespie 2008, 69-
100). To Gillespie, Francesco Petrarca’s intense Christianity proves this to be an incorrect assessment of the 
humanism of the Renaissance and of the origins of modernity in general. In any case, this controversy is tangential 
the point of the dissertation. What is important here are the effects of passion in the modern world as it presents 
itself to us, and how the effects of those passions are deeply implicated in politics. Genealogy does not determine the 
full scope of ontology. And it is simply a fact that modern writers found recourse to ancient pagan authors to 
understand the effects of passions – as did Erasmus for that matter, the ‘crowning glory of Christian humanists.’ 
 
33 (Gadamer 1975, 325-344). 
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type of continual warfare.”34 For Erasmus, the passions, elucidated by the ancients, posed a 
threat to the possibility of salvation; for us moderns the passions, are simply a fact of everyday 
political life, which we can either understand or blithely ignore. Although modernity might be 
defined in part by its self-assertion, the reflexive understanding of modernity relied in another 
part on ancient knowledge to make sense of the role of the passions in that self-assertion. It is not 
without irony that Marx, whose understandings of class struggle, the relation between production 
and politics, and so much more, were profoundly immersed in the thought of the ancients, wrote 
that “the tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the 
living.”35 Even in their attempts to go beyond the humanist tradition of classical wisdom, the 
humanist tradition, broadly construed, remained indispensable to the authors in this study for 
making sense of the ‘brave new world’ of modernity. 
It is my contention that there is a residual need in the modern age for interpretive 
structures that are able to incorporate the potentially disruptive experience of wonder while still 
accounting for the perceived ordering of the world. Wonder always exists at the edge of 
knowledge, but one can either respond to it by trying to eliminate it by understanding what 
caused it or by accepting and prolonging it as an enduring wonder. The examples that I will 
analyze are primarily attempts to prolong and sustain wonder through the establishment of 
interpretive structures that surround and, in a sense, capture it. Although the capture of wonder 
can never be total – in the same way that ideology, according to Gramsci, can never be complete 
- it had been fulfilled by the Ancient Greek wonder toward the cosmos, or the medieval wonder 
toward the great chain of being as a creation of God. I will say here that I believe that the 
                                                          
34 (Erasmus, The Handbook of the Militant Christian 1993, 40). 
 
35 (Marx 1975, 103). 
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thematic examples that I focus on all express, but only incompletely, their modernity. These 
authors, consciously or not, grapple with the disjointed worldview of modern life, and, with the 
possible exception of Arendt, all settle on a singular sense of politically salient wonder towards 
newly emergent objects within the social world - toward the sovereign, the autonomous moral 
law, the market order, or political action. In so doing, they all express something profound, yet 
incomplete, about modern life: the dangerous freedom of deciding what to see, and how to see it.  
I should be careful to note, that I not making in this dissertation a normative argument 
that we should always wonder at something, and that we should do so in an unreflective way. 
Instead I am claiming that we simply do wonder at things that are new and that profoundly 
challenge the way that we see the regular order of the world. The modern sovereign state is itself 
a wondrous and awe-inspiring entity, as is the modern belief that actions can be morally 
autonomous. In a similar way, the seemingly spontaneous way that the market allows for people 
to coordinate their actions is itself a cause for wonder as well for better and, to Marx, for worse. 
Yet, there is no reason that we should take these as unassailable and singular foundations for 
political order. If my dissertation succeeds, then it will have supported a critical sense of 
differentiated wonder toward the world. It will have stressed the importance of responsiveness to 
changing circumstances and times. Most important, it will have supported the view that the 
political world has no singular and predictable source of wonder that must necessarily be the 
foundation of order.  
The fact that there is not a single interpretive structure for wonder in the modern world, 
but a multiplicity, provides us with both serious dangers and profound opportunities. I believe 
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that they both show the importance of wonder for democratic political life.36 The dangers lie in 
the fact that wonder can be used to claim that certain orders of the world exist or should be 
created, and the opportunities lie in the fact that wonder is not only the beginning of awe, but of 
questioning as well. These opportunities are fundamentally democratic in nature. The lack of an 
agreed-upon object of wonder means that there is no single legitimizing principle that can be 
established by procedures exterior to politics. It also does not mean that any of those objects of 
wonder are impervious to doubt and question. To describe this trend in a cognitivist way, one 
could say that the openness of wonder gives an epistemological basis to democratic political life.  
Nevertheless, even if we accept that wondering towards a multitude of irreducible events 
and objects is a fact of modern life, it is still necessary to ask whether it is good that we wonder. 
Is wonder itself legitimate? Might it be better to adopt the admonition of the ancient Stoics and 
Epicureans: nihil admirari, to acquaint ourselves so well with human affairs that we might 
marvel at nothing? Here I must admit that this dissertation will likely be animated by a relatively 
naïve belief in the capacity of citizens for a more reflective sense of wonder to which we should 
aspire. Here I claim, and argue implicitly and explicitly throughout the dissertation, that 
wondering is simply a fact of life, whether in modernity or elsewhere. There is some truth to the 
arguments of Hobbes, Kant, Marx, and Arendt, in that the objects that they describe do in fact 
have the capacity to inspire wonder – even if that wonder remains on the level of ignorance and 
never inspires questioning inquiry. It is therefore necessary that we become reflective about the 
sources of wonder in political life if we are to cope with the modern conditions in which we live. 
This comes through a thoughtful responsiveness and a bit of cunning. To allow oneself to 
wonder at political affairs – to adopt as a motto admirari aude – can give a fuller experience of 
                                                          
36 The connections will primarily be explored in the chapter on Arendt, which I briefly outline below. 
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the strange multiplicity of modern life, which, I would say, is for the better. As I note in a 
subsequent chapter, wonder might not help us to prevent disasters, but it will force us to try to 
understand them. To refuse to acknowledge the pull of wonder altogether is akin to dwelling in 
ignorance.37  
3. Wonder in the History of Political Thought, Secularization Studies, and the Study of 
the Emotions 
This dissertation is staged at the intersection of the history of political thought, secularization 
studies, and the broad reassessment of emotion in political theory. I engage with other historians 
of political thought in each individual chapter, but not as a part of the general argument of the 
dissertation. At the same time, and often through the same arguments, I engage with classical and 
contemporary literature on the effect of ‘secularization’ upon political life in western countries. 
The argument here is more general, and I attempt to show how the processes that have been 
understood under the label of ‘secularization’ gain their political relevance not only through the 
changing balance between political and religious institutions, and the emancipation of 
philosophy from theology, but also through a shifted affective relationship to the world focused 
in the passion of wonder. The key here is in seeing a reoccupation of wonder in modern political 
life. In conversation with the third group of scholars, those political theorists concerned with 
emotion and affect in modern political life, I show how a struggle over wonder is endemic to 
modernity. Moreover, wonder has a central role in the relation between affect and cognition, as 
well as the generation and perpetuation of order.  
                                                          
37 I return to the moral problems of wonder in the conclusion, which come to light in the preceding chapter on 
Arendt in the fact that the novel events of her century – particularly total domination under totalitarian regimes – 
which most forcefully made one think were not good, but evil. 
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What happened to the role of the emotions in politics with the rise of secularism in 
modernity? One of the most important and influential descriptions of the affective life of 
modernity was offered by Max Weber in the early twentieth century, who famously sad that “the 
fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the 
‘disenchantment of the world.’ Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated 
from public life either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of 
direct and personal human relations.”38 Reason, in principle, comes to fundamentally structure 
public life. To Weber, this is the result of a process that has taken millennia but has crystallized 
in modernity.  
Charles Taylor, in his recent magnum opus, A Secular Age, largely agrees with this 
description of the affective life of modernity. Under modern, secular conditions, “it is the estate 
of the human being as such, as agent of rational control…to obey the commands of rational 
disengagement.”39 This is a dramatically opposed to the “enchanted, porous world” of pre-
modernity, in which the self was vulnerable to being suffused by malicious spirits, and it was 
only by the power of the “good magic” of the church, in the form of divine grace, that one could 
cope with such affective conditions.40 Mark Lilla has also argued in his Stillborn God that a 
result of the ‘Great Separation’ in modern thought between political theory and theology was a 
concerted effort to found political order on an anthropological view of human beings which had 
no need for the theological or for cosmological speculation.41 
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39 (Taylor 2007, 249). 
 
40 (Taylor 2007, 42). 
 
41 (Lilla 2008).  
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Contrary to the various descriptions of secularity by Blumenberg, Taylor, and Lilla, 
others, such as Michael Gillespie, Karl Löwith, and Carl Schmitt have argued that theological 
structures and problems have persisted in modernity.42 Michael Gillespie’s book The Theological 
Origins of Modernity is a retelling of the secularization story of modern disenchantment. 
According to Gillespie, “what actually occurs in the course of modernity is thus not simply the 
erasure of disappearance of God but the transference of his attributes, essential powers, and 
capacities to other entities or realms of being.” In this interpretation, “the so-called process of 
disenchantment is thus also a process of reenchantment in and through which both man and 
nature are infused with a number of attributes or powers previously attributed to God.”43 The 
theological content of the medieval world was not so much secularized as it was simultaneously 
retained and concealed in the modern world.  
Although I will not focus on the theological arguments that all these authors make 
through their stories of secularization, I would suggest that the manner in which they tell this 
story conceals a crucial part of the political relevance of the supposed secularization thesis: how 
it changed the way that people felt about their world, and how they responded to this feeling in 
word and deed. Gillespie’s study, along with others, attempts to explain the modern break with 
tradition and theology in the western world, but my study will seek to understand not why this 
break happened, but the meaning that it has had, and continues to have, for emotional political 
subjects. The interesting question here is not whether there is a concealed theological core to 
modern politics, but whether the kinds of questions that we ask about modern politics themselves 
conceal the lingering emotional needs that persist in the modern world and the political appeals 
                                                          
42 (Gillespie 2008); (Löwith 1949); (Schmitt, Political Theology 1985); and (Schmitt, Political Theology II 2008). 
 
43 (Gillespie 2008, 274). On my discussion below, see Kirstie McClure’s question to Gillespie of “what is it that 
transference transfers?” in (McClure 2010, 703). 
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to them. However, given the fact that the emotions of human beings in modernity are directed 
towards institutions which themselves are new, Blumenberg’s theory of modernity as a kind of 
‘self-assertion’ provides the most useful framework, with notable amendments, for answering 
my question. 
Thus, I argue that we should revisit the secularization thesis with a different framework, 
one which considers the struggle over wonder a crucial part of politics. In actual lived political 
experience, there are no theoretical models that render the world completely knowable. There 
have always been things that we feel and perceive as wonders, and therefore disrupt the order 
that we find the world to have.44 These wonders can either be used to strengthen the order that 
they at first disrupt or be used as foundations upon which to build new orders entirely. To put it 
another way, this dissertation will take a new perspective on the old story of disenchantment. On 
my take of this story, the ‘disenchantment of the world’ has not resulted in a decline in the 
experience of wonder as such. Charisma perhaps has been routinized, but one still wonders at 
those social domains that are ordered by routine – the state, the market economy, and spaces of 
political action. Indeed, if wonder is a fundamental human emotion, then it simply does not make 
sense for it to disappear entirely  
  In this dissertation I also argue that wonder is used in modern political thought to 
provide stability to the fundamental precarity of secular time which has lost contact with 
eternity.45 As J.G.A. Pocock wrote, a part of the movement away from the general Christian 
world-view of the middle ages was the “supersession of that world-view by one more temporal 
                                                          
44 To be specific about modernity, the prevalence of the discourse on wonders in modern political thought goes 
against the thesis of modern Gnosticism of (Voegelin 1952). 
 
45 For sociological theories of the precarity of modern secular time which bring the political stakes to the forefront, 
see (Koselleck 2004) and (Rosa 2013). See also (Blumenberg 1983, 116). 
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and secular”46 This means that ordinary time – time how we experience it in our everyday lives – 
wipes out the ‘duality’ of modes of time which existed in medieval Europe. God’s eternity is no 
longer incorporated into the political order through religious sanctification of political 
institutions and the wide variety of festivals meant to allow the participation in an ‘eternal time’ 
set apart from ordinary, temporal affairs.47 However, I find that the authors in this study describe 
wonder as an experience which participates in a non-theological ‘higher time.’ Wonder bestows 
a kind of immortality on political objects or makes into a political project the achievement of a 
political condition in which wondrous capabilities, such as freedom for Kant, are made secure 
within the world. For example, the sign of the rainbow served Müntzer as a point where the 
eternity of God touched the earthly realm.48 To speak in general terms, miracles and wonders 
could be understood as revelations from a temporal order beyond the ordinary temporality of 
human life. Although the ancient Greeks held to a notion of time which was cyclical rather than 
the linear notion of Christianity, they too viewed wonders as, in some sense, beyond ordinary 
time. For Homer, wonder is regularly associated with the appearance of the immortal Olympian 
gods.49 For Herodotus and Pericles, according to the account of Thucydides in his History of the 
Peloponnesian War, the wondrousness of deeds inherently demands praise so that the glory of 
those deeds might be everlasting.50 Yet modernity finds itself in need of some temporal stability, 
                                                          
46 (Pocock 2016, 8). For a classic statement on how worldly time was brought some stability though its political 
relation to the eternal in the middle ages, see (Kantorowicz 2016, 273-313). 
 
47 (Taylor 2007, 54-59 & 264-266). See also (Blumenberg 1983, 37-51). For the reading to which Blumenberg was 
responding, which claims that modern secular time is only an immanentization of higher, sacred time, see (Löwith 
1949). 
 
48 It is important to note here that Müntzer’s use of the sign occurred at a disjunctive moment in which the 
ecclesiastical authority of the Roman Catholic Church had lost control over what should count as a wonder. This is a 
problem which we will see Hobbes take up in the next chapter, and, in varying ways, the authors of the subsequent 
chapters. 
 
49 (Arendt, Thinking 1978, 142-143). 
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or “self-reassurance,” given that it “sees itself cast back on itself without any possibility of 
escape.”51 
 Thus, in wonder, modern political theorists find a way to extend in time the institutions or 
project of order. For Hobbes, this means the endurance of the sovereign state so long as it can 
keep the dutiful attention of its subjects held in awe. For Kant, the wonder of the moral law 
exerts itself in history as a project to be realized politically. For Marx, the wonder towards the 
commodity form keeps those living under conditions of capitalism attached to this form of 
economic organization, even as the contradictions under its surface lead it to crisis. Finally, for 
Arendt, political action in modernity is ineluctably tied to the capacity to start new things, most 
paradigmatically in the foundation of new republics. To Arendt, these foundations are only as 
tenacious as they are felt as, in a sense that I will develop below, a wonder.52 All these 
techniques of wonder function in quite different manners, but in each case, we shall see a passion 
used for its unique ability to stabilize political structures in the fundamentally unstable 
conditions of secular time. As William James wrote in his study of religious experience, 
“religious rapture, moral enthusiasm, ontological wonder, cosmic emotion are all unifying states 
of mind, in which the sand and grit of selfhood tend to disappear.”53 These unifying states of 
mind, as the authors under consideration show, is not only a unity of personality, but a gathering 
of time. 
                                                          
50 (Herodotus 1972, 3); and (Thucydides 1919, 331). See (Hunzinger 2015); and (Priestley 2014, 58-108). 
 
51 (Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 1995, 7). 
 
52 More than the other authors, Arendt seems self-aware of this modern problem of time, and returns to the ancient 
historians in such a manner. 
 
53 (W. James 1983, 240). 
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Accordingly, I believe that we should return to the question of secularization but within 
the framework of the study of the emotions and affect in politics. In the past two decades there 
has been a steady stream of important work on the importance of the emotions in political life. 
This has included work on the political relevance of fear,54 love,55 despair,56 ‘ugly feelings,’57 
and on the emotions in general.58 In a related vein there has also been a notable wave of theorists 
who look to Hume and other sentimentalists to reconsider the role of sympathy in politics.59 
These works have shown the close connection between cognition and emotion in both the way 
that citizens make evaluative appraisals of certain objects, but also in sustaining certain kinds of 
political cultures. This dissertation makes a case for wonder being considered as a significant 
emotion for politics. 
Over the past few decades, there have been great leaps in the study of wonder and its 
history.60 However, this dissertation fills a significant gap in the treatment of wonder, by 
systematically bringing politics into the picture.61 Conversely, I hope to bring to political theory 
                                                          
54 For example, (Evrigenis 2008); and (Robin 2004). 
 
55 (Hanley 2017); and (Nussbaum, Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice 2015). 
 
56 (Marasco 2017). 
 
57 (Ngai 2005). 
 
58 For examples see (Fisher, The Vehement Passions 2002); (Kingston 2011); (Marcus 2002); and (Nussbaum, 
Upheavals of Thought 2003). There is also a growing literature in political psychology focusing on the relation 
between cognition and emotional appraisal. 
 
59 (Frazer 2010); (Krause, Civil Passions 2008); and (Panagia 2013). 
 
60 Some of the most important texts include (Bishop 1996); (Bynum 1997); (La Caze 2013); (Cohen 2012); (Daston 
and Park 1998); (Deckard and Losonczi 2011); (Fisher, Wonder, the Rainbow, and the Aesthetics of Rare 
Experiences 2003); (Greenblatt, Resonance and Wonder 1990); (Greenblatt, Marvellous Possessions 2017); 
(Holmes 2008); (Kareem 2014); (Lloyd 2018); (Malpas 2006); (Onians 1994); (Rubenstein 2008); (Vasalou, 
Practices of Wonder 2013); and (Vasalou, Wonder: A Grammar 2015). 
 
61  For tentative reflections on wonder and politics, see (Lloyd 2018, 155-182). Here I do not want to overlook the 
excellent works on wonder and ethics. See in particular, (Greenblatt, Marvellous Possessions 2017, 119-158); 
(Irigaray 1993); (La Caze 2013); (Rubenstein 2008, 61-132); and (Young 1997). However, for all their insight, these 
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a better understanding of the uses and historical transformations of wonder not only in the 
history of political thought, but in contemporary politics as well. The fact that wonder does not 
appear to us as immediately political in the same way as fear or sympathy is, I would argue, a 
great oversight on our part. Wonder is the emotion at the hinge between affect and cognition, 
making it crucial for the way that the political world is both felt and perceived. 
In order to make this argument, my approach will highlight the ambiguous position that 
wonder has between affect and cognition in order to show how political projects relying upon 
wonder take place on the edge between the two. Wonder is generally treated in the history of 
philosophy and political thought as an emotion that one feels towards something that is just 
beyond cognition. Yet, at the same time, the feeling of wonder is also generative of certain kinds 
of cognition. The way that one experiences wonder is not tenuously connected to the cognition of 
objects and the world, but is a moment in which the border between feeling and thinking is 
blurred. Accepting the ambiguity between affect and cognition allows us to recognize the 
political struggle that takes place on the level of affect and at the same time to allow for the 
possibility of politically responding to those affects. In the work of Hobbes, Kant, Marx, and the 
traditions that flow from their works, one can see the struggle to respond to and control flows of 
affect. What we can see now, in the wake of the turn to affect and the acknowledgement of 
emotion in the history of political thought, is that the effort to channel wonder into various 
political projects has been a constitutive component of modern political thought and political 
struggle.62  
                                                          
works are primarily ethical rather than also political, in that they do not analyze the objective conditions which give 
rise to wonder, but instead focus on ethical relations between subjects. 
 
62 Here my project attempts to partly accept and fully learn from the critique of affect theory by (Zerilli, The Turn to 
Affect and the Problem of Judgment 2015). 
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Wonder is a passion that is poised at the threshold between affect and cognition – it is an 
affect that causes us to think, and how we respond to it can determine how we think. According 
to Susan James, early modern thinkers accepted wonder as the foundation of knowledge, but also 
held a “deep anxiety about the wisdom of depending on passion to gain scientia.”63 The 
cognitive patterns that the subjects of this dissertation suggest in interpreting the emotion of 
wonder are techniques for guiding affect into cognition. To focus on the example of Hobbes, 
when the sovereign state controls the conditions of possibility for things to legitimately evoke 
wonder, the state also controls a fundamental aspect of how citizens cognize the order of the 
political world. The state would therefore hold effective political sway over the way that feeling 
affects cognition. This is not only a condition that affects cognition, but also how one feels 
certain things to be possible, and others not, shaping the realm of action. The same can be said 
for Marx in his critique of political economy, Kant’s normative depiction of freedom, and so 
forth. 
My project will also therefore be engaged with affect theorists such as Brian Massumi, 
who argue that affect is not the same as emotion. Affect is an intensity that escapes confinement 
to individual bodies, and thus eludes the old distinction between subjects and objects. It is in this 
sense that Massumi calls it autonomous, since it cannot be completely perceived and controlled 
by individuals. Emotion, on the other hand, “is qualified intensity” that is localized in subjective 
experience.64 By focusing on affect rather than emotion, Massumi is able to consider the 
continuity of the processes that take place inside and outside of subjective experience. This 
follows from what Massumi calls “the Bergsonian revolution,” which reverses what Massumi 
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64 (Massumi, Parables for the virtual 2002, 28 & 35). 
 24 
takes to be the standard hierarchy of position over movement. The central problem is therefore 
“to explain the wonder that there can be stasis given the primacy of process.”65 My project will 
attempt to follow this line of thought in the sense that I take affect and the generation of orders to 
be intricately connected. Political order is not something which is set outside of oneself, to which 
one is only abstractly connected by cognition. It is something which affects us and forces us to 
wonder when it does not fit with our cognitive schemes. Moreover, the way that we cognize 
emergent affects into recognizable emotions towards predictable actions and events is not 
politically neutral but is subject to political struggle. 
Yet I will diverge from some affect theorists, especially Massumi, by attempting to avoid 
hypostatizing affect and the processes of which it is a part. It would be a great error to take affect 
as completely autonomous. Doing so comes dangerously close to simply reversing the rationalist 
project of purging reason of affect.66 Neither position is completely accurate, nor very helpful in 
actual politics.67  Let me dwell here for a moment on two specific theorists of affect, Jane 
Bennett and William E. Connolly. In both The Enchantment of Modern Life and Vibrant Matter, 
Bennett encourages what she calls an enchanted materialism that supports an affective 
engagement and generosity towards wonderful things that are often treated in modern life as 
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66 See (Zerilli, The Turn to Affect and the Problem of Judgment 2015). 
 
67 Here I think that Arendt’s reflections in the last section of The Human Condition, “The Vita Activa and the 
Modern Age,” are quite illuminating. There Arendt describes how in modern theory the wonder that theorists had 
once experienced towards eternal models, in the fashion of homo faber, is now experienced towards “the processes 
of inner life, found in the passions through introspection” (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 299). According to 
this account, affect theorists have made the same mistake of directing wonder toward a single ‘object’, but have 
made the quite inventive and paradoxical move of directing wonder towards affect itself. This appears to me to be an 
attempt to create order out of chaos, again quite paradoxically, by accepting processual chaos as orderly. To this I 
repeat my claim that there is no proper order, or no proper way to experience wonder in modern politics. 
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lifeless and inert.68 In The Enchantment of Modern Life this is mostly focused on the affective 
engagements of subjects and in Vibrant Matter the focus is shifted to non-human actants. The 
Enchantment of Modern Life contests the disenchantment thesis that has been argued by 
important theorists like Max Weber and Hans Blumenberg. Bennett takes Blumenberg’s position 
to be one of “disenchantment without regret” which gives a story of modernity that is “not 
founded on a fundamental loss” of a theological world, but on the self-assertion of modernity. 
Yet Blumenberg also, according to this reading, adopts a stance of “bland indifference” to nature 
in his acceptance of “the demise of disenchantment” and rejection of an orientation of “wonder-
at-matter.”69 Bennett’s defense of wonder in political life is an important contribution to political 
theory, but it seems that this stance on Blumenberg’s disenchantment story occludes a crucial 
aspect of it for a treatment of wonder as a modern political emotion. 
Specifically, Bennett’s ethical use of wonder as a form of resistance to the story of 
disenchantment misses the central role that the rehabilitation of ‘theoretical curiosity’ in 
modernity plays for Blumenberg. I make this point not merely to argue with Bennett, but to point 
to the space that exists for a political account of wonder that shows its transformation and 
persistence in modernity. For Blumenberg, “naïve curiosity…[is] the constant; but at the same 
time it is the substratum around which historical articulation and focus set in.”70 Blumenberg 
does not reject this “central affect of consciousness,” but looks at how it was historically 
articulated in the modern world after the reliable affective ordering of the medieval interpretive 
framework was gone. Curiosity did not disappear; indeed, it remained as a residual need. The 
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69 (Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life 2001, 74).  
 
70 (Blumenberg 1983, 234). 
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development of the modern sciences responded to this need.71 This need is not only addressed in 
the modern sciences, but also in the way that political phenomena are incorporated into cognitive 
schemes by major political theorists. Both are driven by what Blumenberg calls the “modern 
age’s elementary theoretical claim: the lawfulness of nature, and then also of society and the 
state, as protections against arbitrariness and accident, against the fact that man’s fate is not 
entirely at his disposition.”72 Ultimately, this dissertation takes much from Bennett’s account of 
wonder, but I depart from this account significantly. 
Connolly has also been engaged with the dimensions of affect in politics and the 
necessary contestability of fundamental perspectives in the modern world. With regards to affect, 
Connolly stresses the degree to which our appraisal of the world happens at an intense, affective 
register which forms “an infrasensible subtext from which conscious thoughts, feelings, and 
discursive judgments draw part of their sustenance.”73 With regards to fundamental perspectives, 
Connolly offers a form of pluralism which relies on what he calls a “bicameral orientation to 
citizenship.”74 On the first level there is the faith, doctrine, creed, ideology, or religion that one 
necessarily adopts as a participant in the world.75 On the second level there is an engaged 
receptivity toward others. Here Connolly combines ‘ontopolitical contestation’ with ‘agonistic 
respect’ for others. A sustained focus on wonder can embody the concern that Connolly has on 
both affect and contestation, while also addressing a concern that some commentators have had, 
                                                          
71 For my purposes, Blumenberg’s notion of a “naïve curiosity” is roughly analogous to how I conceive of wonder. 
Here I think that Daston and Park’s story in (Daston and Park 1998) of the dialectical relation between wonder and 
curiosity in the history of science can be read productively alongside Blumenberg. 
 
72 (Blumenberg 1983, 354). 
 
73 (Connolly, Why I am not a secularist 1999, 27). See also (Connolly, Neuropolitics 2002, 50-79). 
 
74 (Connolly, Pluralism 2005, 5). 
 
75 As Connolly notes, he does not “distinguish sharply between these,” (Connolly, Pluralism 2005, 4). 
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particularly with the first level of the bicameral orientation to citizenship; that the affective 
grounding of the faith which Connolly adopts leads one to question whether there could be any 
way to live without faith.76 A sustained focus on the ambiguous position that wonder has 
between affect and cognition can help us to understand the formation and perpetuation of the 
‘faith, creed, ideology, or religion’ that one adopts as a political participant. Additionally, it can 
help us to do so in a way that can make us more reflective about those attachments. 
Both Connolly and Bennett seek to “cultivate little spaces of enchantment.”77 Against this 
interpretation of affect and enchantment in the modern world, I argue that it is the duty of theory 
to look for sites of wonder not as fragile moments that “endure alongside a cynical world of 
business as usual, nature as manmade, and affect as the effect of commercial strategy.”78 Rather, 
I suggest that we look to the wonder that is imbued into those ordinary domains of modern life, 
and that sustains them. The extraordinary is not something that exists alongside the ordinary, as 
debris that must be collected and assessed. What is extraordinary is that we take the ordinary to 
be ordinary at all. It might be that it is ultimately appropriate to treat the affective force of 
wonder with “ethical generosity,”79 but initially, the wisest thing to do is to follow the lesson that 
Walter Benjamin takes from the fairy tale – to face the affective force of wonder with “cunning 
and with high spirits.”80 Since, as I hope to show in the dissertation, wonder affects politics in 
multiple and irreducible ways, none of which having absolute priority over any other, it is 
                                                          
76 (Dienstag 2009). 
 
77 (Connolly, Why I am not a secularist 1999, 17). 
 
78 (Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life 2001, 8). 
 
79 Ibid, 3. 
 
80 (Benjamin, Selected Writings: Volume 3 - 1935-1938 2002, 157). 
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necessary to respond to the effects of wonder politically; that is, tactically and courageously. To 
reflectively engage the effects of wonder is not only necessary but might help us to more 
tactically engage in the political task of thinking. 
4. Outline of the Dissertation 
This dissertation will not attempt to provide a comprehensive account of the different ways that 
we may experience wonder or an exhaustive history of the emotion in political thought, or even 
in modern political thought. That is beyond my abilities and the confines of a single dissertation. 
Rather, it is an analysis of wonder in the thought of four exemplary modern theorists who 
analyzed how wonder is a constitutive feature of four central aspects of modern political life: the 
sovereign state, the capacity for freedom, the market economy, and political action. These 
theorists’ writings will be treated in a historically conditioned manner and in a way that indicates 
the endurance of the type of wonder that they described.81 Additionally, these subjects were 
selected in part for the prevalent perception of their work as ‘rationalist’ and generally opposed 
to the passions. Their writings on wonder help to undermine this dichotomy in their work, and, at 
the same time, the supposed dichotomy of reason and passion in modernity. Further on the 
selection, I have noticeably avoided Romanticism and a more literary focus in this dissertation, 
even though works of literature do occasionally make an appearance.82 The reason for this is my 
desire to assess the passions towards institutions and experiences which are already a part of the 
                                                          
81 I should also note that my use of the term ‘conditioned’ is indebted to how Hannah Arendt used it in The Human 
Condition. There Arendt claims that humans are “conditioned beings because everything they come in contact with 
turns immediately into a condition of their existence,” (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 9). This means that not 
only the words in the discursive contexts of these authors are important to me, but also the things which they 
encountered in their historical moments. For example, this leads me to consider how things in early modern Europe, 
such as cabinets of curiosity, advances in optic technology, and the discovery of the New World; in modern Europe, 
such as the French Revolution; or in the nineteenth century, the influx of commodities, might have affected the 
conditions of possibility for wonder. I will further interpret the meaning of conditioned thinking in chapter four. 
 
82 For studies of wonder in Renaissance aesthetic theory, see (Bishop 1996); (Cunningham 1951); and (Hathaway 
1968). 
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everyday experience of modern life.83 To put it bluntly, where Romanticism seeks enchantment 
to reverse the supposed hollowing of modern political life, I find enchantment to profoundly 
shape the institutions and experiences at the core of what we consider to be modern.84 This is 
also why I have neglected, even in places where it might be expected such as the chapter on 
Kant, to consider the modern discourse on the sublime.85 Here I will only note in passing that 
Longinus’s Perì Hýpsous, the translation of which kickstarted the interest in the literary sublime 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, holds that great writing, which is the subject of the 
text, “is the object of our admiration and wonder.”86 All that being said, I reiterate my intention 
                                                          
83 Another line of inquiry that I also do not take up in this dissertation is the intensification of wonder by technology. 
This line of inquiry would have passed primarily through the first Frankfurt School. We have also seen in modernity 
an intensification of all the kinds of wonder that I survey below, except perhaps Kant’s, through technological 
innovation. Take, for the most obvious example, the revolution of the passionate contours of political life that has 
occurred through social media. There is perhaps no better funnel for the passion of wonder than the screen. As 
recent elections in the United States and around the world have shown, states are expert manipulators of the passions 
of fear, rage, and sympathy through information technology. They are just as effective at grabbing our attention and 
not letting go through the inexplicable, the unbelievable, and the ineffable. The same, of course, goes for business 
interests, which operate across social media in much the same fashion. At the same time, the passionate networks of 
action have never been so accelerated. 
 
84 To unfaithfully borrow and alter a phrase of Nikolas Kompridis’s, there is already a potentially suppressing 
romanticism embedded in everyday modern life, (Kompridis 2006, 274-276). 
 
85 For a persuasive reading of the Romantic focus on the sublime as obscuring wonder, see (Lloyd 2018). 
Additionally, I find Fisher’s position persuasive on the unfortunate shift in focus in aesthetics from wonder to the 
sublime: “With the sublime we have for two hundred years built up a more and more intricate theory for a type of art 
that we do not actually have and would not care for if we did have it” (Fisher, Wonder, the Rainbow, and the 
Aesthetics of Rare Experiences 2003, 3). 
 
86 (Longinus 1991, 48). In the century before Perì hýpsous was first published in English in 1652, the Roman vision 
of the studia humanitatis was on the rise in England (Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes 
1996, 23-25). It was in the wake of this focus on rhetoric in the English Renaissance that Perì hýpsous was first 
published in English in 1652. This was fitting, since the treatment in the book of its subject was “primarily 
rhetorical” (Monk 1960, 12). This is made evident by the English titles that were given to the early translations. The 
1652 translation by John Hall was called Περὶ ὕψους, or Dionysius Longinus of the Height of Eloquence. The next 
English translation, in 1680 by J. Pultenery, follows this genre categorization by naming the book A treatise of the 
Loftiness or Elegance of Speech (Martin 1967, 10-11). Yet these translations were not what established Perì hýpsous 
in the modern world. Rather it was the 1674 translation into French by Despréaux Boileau as Traité du sublime ou 
du merveilleux dans le discours, traduit du grec de Longin that “was the turning point of Longinus’s reputation in 
England in France,” and was reprinted in the eighteenth century alone over a dozen times (Monk 1960, 21; Roberts 
1935, 249). Boileau’s terms focused his interpretation of the text on the sublime itself, rather than on rhetorical style 
(Monk 1960, 32). Roughly from here on out the translated title of the book almost strictly included the word 
‘sublime.’ 
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is not to set the extraordinary apart from the ordinary, but to find how the passionate forces of 
the extraordinary function within ordinary political life.87 
There is, however, a narrative arc to the dissertation – even if it is expressed episodically 
– in how the selected theorists respond to the affective force of the problems of their times. In 
each of the chapters, the incitement to wonder is one of the shocks of the world to thought which 
political theory has long canonized. These are: for Hobbes, the radicalization of religious sects in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; the French Revolution for Kant; the rise of capitalism for 
Marx; and the horrors of the twentieth century for Arendt. From these shocks, Hobbes redirects 
wonder to the state above politics; Kant towards autonomy underlying politics; Marx towards 
History behind politics; and Arendt towards, so she claims, politics itself. In a sense, the arc of 
the dissertation is the movement of the significance of things returning to their surface. Although 
only the first two chapters are broadly drawn from familiar territory for studying secularization, 
all the chapters study the transposition of wonder from religious contexts to secular domains, 
through recourse to the theories of the passions and wonder in ancient Greek thought.  
The dissertation begins in a moment not too dissimilar to Thomas Müntzer’s. It is a 
moment in which England is still wracked by the controversies of the Reformation. Thus, the 
first chapter presents a reading of the use of wonder in the political philosophy of Thomas 
Hobbes as a response to the political use of signs for propagandistic purposes during the English 
Civil War. In this chapter, I argue that not only did Hobbes incorporate the ancient conception of 
wonder into his design for the emotional apparatus of the modern sovereign state, but that when 
                                                          
87 (Kareem 2014, 3-4) shows how a major strand of eighteenth-century literature invited “readers to discover wonder 
within the quotidian.” In a sense, this dissertation aims to do the something similar, in drawing our attention to the 
wonder inducing structural features of modern political life. My avoidance of Romanticism in this study is in part 
due to this aim. 
 31 
he did so he also transformed it and other related concepts. Previous scholars have paid close 
attention to Hobbes’s confrontation with ancient philosophy, but there has been no sustained 
study of Hobbes’s use of wonder, which was a concern of his over the entire course of his 
authorship. More broadly, this study opens up a place for the study of wonder in contemporary 
political theory as part of the broader reassessment of emotion. The wondrous world in which 
Hobbes wrote was strikingly different from the contemporary world. Yet, I argue that the 
“pathetic apparatus” that I describe in this chapter is one which the state must adopt if it wishes 
to fully achieve its sovereignty.  
The second modern author I consider is Immanuel Kant. The standard view of Kantian 
politics is that it completely rejects any role for the emotions, determining or otherwise. 
Although in recent years this view has been challenged, with consideration of the non-cognitive 
aspects of Kant’s ‘impure’ ethics and writings on aesthetic political judgment, this reassessment 
has still not adequately touched upon two necessary but dangerous elements with which Kant 
supplements politics: enthusiasm and wonder. This chapter is an examination of enthusiasm and 
wonder throughout Kant’s works. In a theoretical sense, I argue that both enthusiasm and wonder 
are crucial for addressing the supposed motivational deficit in Kantian, rational politics. Together 
they supplement an impulse to order the world in accordance with practical reason grounded in 
the moral law. This analysis is based both within the immediate revolutionary context of Kant’s 
writings and in reference to the enthusiastic movements of the late medieval and early modern 
period. I show how Kant a similar operation to Hobbes’s transformation of wonder as it was used 
by competing groups during the English Civil War. In a historical sense, I argue that Kant took 
upon himself the task of transforming the wonder experienced by enthusiasts into a form of 
wonder befitting a republican and cosmopolitan order. In doing so, he relied at multiple stages on 
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prominent theses of ancient Stoic philosophy, and, in this, was in conversation with other 
prominent figures of the Enlightenment who were also engaged in the reassessment of the 
passions.  
The third chapter is a study of Karl Marx’s thought and, in it, wonder, which was an 
emotion through which order was experienced in the nineteenth century by social theorists and 
revolutionaries. By this I mean wonder for the social order formed by the capitalist production 
and distribution of commodities. In this chapter, I argue that Marx gives us a framework for 
understanding how capitalism conditions how the ordering of the world is felt and the conversion 
of that feeling into an ideological representation of the world as it is. Wonder towards 
commodities and the system that they embody attaches one to the capitalistic order of private 
property in not just disconnected consciousness, but through conditioning an affective 
disposition towards the perceived economic order. In response, Marx offers an Epicurean attitude 
towards the troubling wonders of capitalism. The historical thrust of this argument will be that 
we can only understand Marx’s critique of political economy if we see it as emerging out of the 
context of sentimental concerns of the early- and mid-nineteenth century. This then means that, 
theoretically, Marx’s writings should be reconsidered in contemporary political theory as having 
an affective, and not merely cognitive content. 
 Due to the critical nature of Marx’s depiction of wonder, this chapter appears at first to 
stand apart from the rest of the dissertation. However, this is only an appearance, and this chapter 
most exemplifies the overall argumentative thrust of the dissertation. Although this chapter, as 
well as the rest of the dissertation, is written with a similar intent as that of the Frankfurt School 
– in the service of the ‘unfinished project of modernity’ an immanent critique of rationality with 
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respect to its conditions of possibility as well as countervailing tendencies to it88 – I adopt an 
approach which does not seek to banish the emotions from the political world, but rather to 
understand them and their dangers. Although I, like the theorists of affect, recognize and seek to 
show the inescapable, pre-cognitive events which suffuse the political world, I do not think that 
making these events present to theory means abandoning, or severely demoting, reason or 
critique into obsolescence. 
 Indeed, making present these events is a critical affair, since critique is always a practice 
of uncovering the conditions of possibilities for certain forms of reason.89 In this spirit, I agree 
with Lauren Berlant’s claim that “affect theory is another phase in the history of ideology 
theory.”90 However, it is my aim to show that theorists of affect still have much to learn from 
Marx, particularly when care is given to the significance of his work within his own context.91 
To achieve that aim in this chapter, I read Marx as a theorist of the sensuous who never fully, 
even with the so-called “epistemic break” of his work on political economy, put aside his early 
humanism. What Marx’s early and late works reveal to us is precisely the affective conditioning 
of capitalism on those who live within it and how similar sentimental attachments which 
                                                          
88 See (Habermas, Modernity versus Postmodernity 1981), (Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 
1995), and the essays in (d'Entreves and Benhabib 1997). 
 
89 For a similar approach to affect theory see (Zerilli, A Democratic Theory of Judgment 2016, 239-261) and, even 
though I have strong reservations with the treatment of wonder as ‘non-eudaimonistic’ therein, see also Nussbaum’s 
treatment of emotions as judgments of value in (Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought 2003). 
 
90 (Berlant 2011, 53). 
 
91 Due to the emphasis on Marx in his own context, I put aside Freudian readings of Marx, which, of course, are 
only possible after Freud. Marx is staged in this dissertation as an inheritor of the Enlightenment reassessment of the 
passions, who does not, and could not, rely upon the Freudian dichotomy between the conscious and unconscious 
mind. For some prominent examples of the Freudian approach to Marx, see (Althusser 2005); (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004); (Fromm 1962); (Laclau and Mouffe 2001); (Marcuse 1964); (Wolfenstein 1993);and (Žižek 2009). My 
thanks to Davide Panagia for pressing me to make explicit my interpretive approach to Marx in this regard. 
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appeared in the theologically saturated medieval world were displaced onto modern 
phenomena.92 
 The dissertation will conclude with a chapter on Hannah Arendt, who, of all the selected 
authors, wrote most explicitly on the topic of wonder. Wonder is a consistent theme in her work 
on political theory, yet there is no major study which analyzes the full scope of that theme. I 
argue that Arendt both offers a model for the experience of wonder by political theorists towards 
the field of political contestation, as contrasted to the wonder experienced by traditional 
philosophy, as well as describes a way that wonder can be institutionalized in human affairs to 
give the critical attention necessary to sustain spaces of political freedom. This argument is 
framed historically through Arendt’s break from German philosophy, and through her critique of 
the major political ideologies of the mid-twentieth century. In both cases, Arendt finds a refusal 
to see and endure, in the sense of pathos, the real activities of human affairs. As a part of this 
analysis, Arendt takes up a systematic dismantling of different modes of wondering rooted in 
ancient Greek thought. Once we clearly grasp the full import of Arendt’s writing on wonder, we 
will not only better understand the fraught relation between political philosophy and politics, but 
add further to our understanding of how secularization has affected the role of emotions in 
political life. This historically grounded analysis of wonder in Arendt’s political thought will also 
provide a way to explore Arendt’s often overlooked perspective on the involvement of emotions 
in politics, allowing us to see Arendt’s place in the history of the emotions in political thought. 
 Although I described the character of modernity above largely in terms set down by 
Blumenberg, this project owes a significant debt to Arendt’s understanding of both modernity 
                                                          
92 For an understanding of critique as “a disclosive practice, revealing the background assumptions, ontological, 
epistemological, and political, and so forth, that are hidden within a text, a cultural practice, a political institution,” 
see (Kompridis 2006, 254). 
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and its relation to thinking. The persistence of wonder as a significant theme in Arendt’s works 
betrays the importance that Arendt gives to recognizing and reconciling oneself to the novelty 
that characterizes modernity. This novelty is, for Arendt, set against a historical background of a 
past whose tradition has been fragmented, which thinking can dismantle and from which it can 
retrieve ‘thought-fragments,’ such as the reflections of the ancients on wonder.93 However, I 
depart from Arendt by finding that this practice of retrieving ‘thought-fragments’ from the past is 
implicit in the long history of humanism starting with Francesco Petrarca’s program to return to 
the sources (ad fontes). This spirit, if anything, most definitively animates both the subjects and 
author of this dissertation. The movement of this spirt is not to find some ‘purity’ at the sources, 
but only to find tools to help clarify our own experiences. 
 Even though each chapter may be read in isolation, there is a development between them, 
in the sense that the problems which are put aside by one author are taken up by the next. As 
Hobbes argues to transmute the wonder of miracles and the admiration of individuals towards the 
artifice of the sovereign, diminishing the ‘light’ of subjects, Kant argues that the new order of 
republics is partly sustained by the wondrous capacity of each citizen to make laws for 
themselves. Thus, the wonder that was redirected towards the state is made to incorporate the 
wonder which one might feel towards the actions and deeds of one’s fellows. However, this 
wonder is transformed by Kant into a wonder for the capacity which one’s fellows have to live 
under laws which they make for themselves, and thus is universalized. As such, the 
wondrousness of subjects, now as citizens, is incorporated into the state order. In the following 
chapter, the order of republics is show by Marx to leave aside the material foundation of the 
political order. In this sense, the political revolution which Kant interprets in terms of wonder 
                                                          
93 (Arendt, Thinking 1978, 210-212). 
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puts aside the problems of economic and social organization, and what those problems mean for 
the possibility of freedom. Thus, Marx confronts the wonder inducing economic order of 
capitalism that developed during the nineteenth century, in the wake of the political revolutions 
of the eighteenth century.  
 Finally, Arendt argues that all these turnings can distract theorists from the always 
unpredictable activities of political life: if we focus all our passionate attention on some human 
artifice like the state, some non-immanent idea of human freedom, or the movements of political 
economy, we might fail to think about the unexpected novelties of the world. And this does not 
mean to hold those novelties in reverence – often quite the opposite – but rather to wonder about 
them; to question what they might mean to us. In broad strokes, my depiction of this 
development is not at all new for the history of political thought, but my depiction of how 
wonder has been a crucial consideration by key figures at crucial turning points is new. Through 
it, I hope to make clearer the stakes of not just wonder in the history of political thought, but also 
of the choices which theorists make of what they wonder about today, whether it be the state, 
morality, political economy, or political action. 
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Chapter One 
The Admirable Order of Leviathan: Hobbes and the Sovereign State 
 
Nature proceeds little by little from things lifeless to animal 
life…there is observed in plants a continuous scale of ascent 
towards the animal. 
- Aristotle, History of Animals, VIII, 1, 588a 4-12 
O favorable Spirit, propitious guest, 
Well hast thou taught the way that might direct 
Our knowledge, and the scale of Nature set 
From center to circumference, whereon 
In contemplation of created things 
By steps we may ascend to God. But say, 
What meant that caution joined, If ye be found 
Obedient? 
- Adam to the Archangel Raphael in John Milton, Paradise Lost, V, 507-514 
 
1. Wonder, What 
In 1651, the year in which Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan was first published, a pamphlet appeared 
entitled The Levellers Almanack: For, The Year of Wonders, 1652. This short pamphlet was 
published at the end of the English Civil War (1642–1651) and at a moment of victory for anti-
royalist forces. It contained not only predictions of natural wonders, but also linked these natural 
wonders to the catastrophic end of monarchy in Europe. It claimed that one such wonder, a 
“great Eclipſe” would foretell “general madneſs and confuſion to all such Kingdoms, Common-
wealths, Countries, Cities and Towns.”94 This pamphlet and the stories in it were not out of 
place. After the death of Charles I, royalists told stories of God’s wrath in the form of unusual 
                                                          
94 (The Levellers Almanack: FOR, The Year of Wonders, 1652. 1651, 4-5). 
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tides, monstrous births, and three “bloody suns.”95 Parliamentarians and Puritans told stories of 
comets and signs from the heavens, confirming the rectitude of their rebellion. One such 
pamphlet from 1642, A Blayzing Starre seene in the West, tells the story of a royalist man who, 
before he could assault a parliamentarian woman, “was Struck with a Flaming Sword” which 
issued forth from a “Fearful comet...to the Terrour and Amazement of all the Country 
Thereabouts.”96 The church and state took seriously reports such as these. After the battle of 
Edgewater, a number of people claimed to see celestial armies re-enacting the battle in the night 
sky over the battlefield, and, according to historian William E. Burns, “so accurate was this 
image, which persisted for several weeks, that not only did the [justice of the peace] confirm it, 
but it was claimed that the king himself had sent two of his officers to view it.”97 These stories 
and others like them were used by political and religious figures, and made up an important part 
of the historical context for Thomas Hobbes. In fact, Hobbes gathered together a list of such 
events in chapter 12 of Leviathan: men are led to believe by prognostications and conjecture that 
they should find their fortunes “sometimes in Monsters, or unusual accidents; as Ecclipses, 
Comets, rare Meteors, Earthquakes, Inundations, uncouth Births, and the like, which are called 
Portenta, and Ostenta, because they thought them to portend, or forshew some great Calamity to 
come.”98 There is another term which encapsulates all of these: wonders.99 
                                                          
95 (Burns 2002, 12); and (Cressy 2004). See also the essays in (Platt 1999). 
 
96 (Burns 2002, 13-14, 26n.8) 
 
97 (Burns 2002, 14). 
 
98 (Hobbes, Leviathan 1996, 81-82). 
 
99 On ‘Ostenta,’ ‘Portenta,’ and ‘wonders’ see (Hobbes, Leviathan 1996, 300). 
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To counteract the prognostications and conjecture by charlatans and religious leaders 
within his model of the unitary, sovereign state, Hobbes reached into his vast humanistic 
learning, which has been documented by Leo Strauss and Quentin Skinner, for another 
understanding of wonder: that of the ancients. It should be no great surprise that Thomas 
Hobbes, the clever and errant student of humanism, should so effectively use concepts from 
ancient philosophy within his own political setting. 100 When Hobbes reached back into ancient 
philosophy for a conceptual apparatus to counteract the wonders of his own age, he found the 
emotion at the foundation of ancient philosophy. This chapter will track the structural 
movements made by Hobbes regarding wonder and argue that Hobbes both incorporated the 
ancient concept of wonder into the pathetic apparatus of the sovereign state, and, that in doing 
so, he reconfigured that concept.101 Although Hobbes rejected much of ancient philosophy, not 
all of that rejection was by annulment; some was by reconfiguration. 
The importance of fear in Hobbes’s political philosophy is glaring and so well established 
in the secondary literature that many take Hobbes to believe that fear is the most essential human 
passion.102 Yet wonder and awe remain underappreciated, despite being crucial points of 
reference in seventeenth century treatments of the passions and being what Hobbes calls “proper 
to Man.”103 Hobbes was a member of a discursive community, which included such figures as 
Francis Bacon, René Descartes, Benedict Spinoza, and Nicolas Malebranche that sought to 
                                                          
100 On Hobbes’s humanism see (Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes 1996); (Skinner, Hobbes 
and the studia humanitatis 2002); and (Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes 1936, 30-43). 
 
101 On “pathetic apparatus” see (Sissa 2009, 283-293). 
 
102 See, for example, (Bilts 1989); (Gillespie 2008, 208); (Robin 2004, 30-47); and (Strauss, The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes 1936).  
 
103 (Hobbes, Leviathan 1996, 42). An important exception is (Deckard 2008). Amongst other differences between 
this chapter and Deckard’s treatment of Hobbes, this chapter explores how Hobbes treated wonder as a passion 
essential to the theory of sovereignty. 
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understand the place of wonder in new accounts of the human passions.104 To be precise, Hobbes 
calls “admiration” what is “proper to Man.” As I will establish below, “wonder” and 
“admiration” are functionally identical for Hobbes. These emotions were objects of concern for 
Hobbes over nearly his entire writing career, appearing as early as his 1627 poem De Mirabilibus 
Pecci and as late as the Latin translation of Leviathan in 1668. For Hobbes, fear, the 
“anticipation of future evil”, may direct men’s actions toward the formation of the state and away 
from breaking the law,105 but it is wonder and awe that keep the citizens of the commonwealth 
united and held together under the sovereign.106 Order in the modern world must be achieved by 
human initiative. Thus, the state for Hobbes is an artifice that is constructed to best prevent 
challenges to the fragility of order, which can only be sustained by the ingenuity of its human 
artificers.107 Hobbes’s assertion of order requires measures to constrain or contain the potentially 
disordering passions that animate civil life. 
Not only does Hobbes’s political philosophy aim to control the conditions of possibility 
for wonder toward any human creation other than the artifice of the sovereign state, it 
psychologically sublates – in other words, isolates, transforms, and incorporates – the experience 
of wonder into his political philosophy through means which I contend can mostly be found in 
ancient philosophy. In the absence of an assumed divine ordering of the human passions, ancient 
philosophy provides Hobbes resources for making sense of the passions in order to incorporate 
                                                          
104 On the significance of the Baconian program for thinking about the relation between wonder and the sciences, 
see (Daston and Park 1998, 253). See also (James 1997). 
 
105 (Hobbes, On the Citizen 1998, 25); and (Hobbes, Leviathan 1996, 206). 
 
106 See the use of the phrase “keep them in awe” or “keep them all in awe” in (Hobbes, Leviathan 1996, 88, 102, 
117, 118, 120, & 163).  
 
107 On order being an achievement of human artifice in modernity, see (Blumenberg 1983, 219-221) and (Taylor 
2007, 194 & 249). 
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them into his new order of sovereign states. Although Hobbes boasted that “civil philosophy” is 
a science “no older…than [his] own book De Cive,”108 and that the supposed philosophy 
practiced in the universities of his day was “not properly Philosophy…but Aristotelity,” 
grounded on an interpretation of Philosophia prima which was called “Metaphysics,”109 Hobbes 
relied in his own work on the treatment of thaumazein as it appeared in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. 
This should surprise us, given the fact that many of Hobbes’s contemporaries held as closely as 
possible to the ancient maxim Nihil admirari – wonder at nothing. Quite remarkably, a 
fundamental emotion of Hobbes’s political philosophy rests in close proximity to the passion at 
the beginning of both Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. It is important to note that I am not 
making a general argument for a hidden appropriation of Aristotle’s political philosophy by 
Hobbes, but an argument regarding distinct elements of Aristotle’s general philosophy. 
This chapter will be broken into two major parts. The first will consider the place of 
wonder in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. The second will consider the chronological 
development of its place in Hobbes’s political philosophy. Between these two parts will be a 
short discussion of the changing conditions of early modernity which disclosed a space for the 
political appropriation of wonder by Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes was not the first to write on the 
connection between wonder and the political apparatus of power. Many before him wrote on the 
majesty of royal power and the sanctity of the political body.110 However, Hobbes was the first to 
treat the artificial state – a creation of man alone – as worthy of wonder. Thus, he opens up the 
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problematic of this dissertation: the use and reconfiguration of ancient notions of wonder to 
make sense of and, in some cases, order politics around new phenomena of modern political life.  
Although this chapter will be focused on Hobbes, I conceive it to be conversant with 
three strands of contemporary political theory. First, it addresses those who are concerned with 
‘enchantment’ in modern political life such as Jane Bennett, Michael Gillespie and Mary-Jane 
Rubenstein; and, second, those who refocus the gaze of political theory from the sovereignty of 
states to non-sovereign forms of power and action, such as canonical authors like Hannah 
Arendt, and Michel Foucault, but also contemporary theorists like Giorgio Agamben, Wendy 
Brown, Sharon R. Krause, Patchen Markell, and Linda Zerilli.111 To the first group I suggest that 
the Hobbesian sovereign state is a form which, despite its centrality in modern, secular politics, 
retains an ‘enchanted’ core, and to the second I present a reading of Hobbes which shows how 
the state can manipulate the awe and wonder of its citizenry in a way that diminishes their 
capacity to be receptive to and participative in non-sovereign politics. This chapter will also be 
of interest to a third group: those involved in the reassessment of emotion in political life.112 
Although the political aspects of fear have been heavily studied, wonder has been mostly 
ignored.113 The function of wonder within sovereign states, which this essay reconstructs from 
Hobbes’s political philosophy, might serve as a structural foundation for studies in the field. 
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2. Thaumazein in Ancient Greek Philosophy 
As noted in the introduction, it is thaumazein (θαυμάζειν), or wonder, that both Plato and 
Aristotle mark as the beginning of philosophy. This feeling makes its famous appearance in 
Plato’s Theaetetus during a general discussion between Socrates and the young mathematician 
Theaetetus on the role of perspective in identity and change. Within that general discussion, 
which focused on rather idiosyncratic debates in ancient Greek thought, Socrates considers the 
difference between relative and absolute change, and states that his consideration of the topic 
commits him to say things which are “extraordinary and absurd” (θαυμαστά τε καὶ γελοῖα).114 
The paradox of these statements leaves Theaetetus in wonder. He is dizzy and isolated; he has 
lost his way. It is here that Socrates makes the famous statement that philosophy has “no other 
starting-point” but in wonder. According to Socrates, Theaetetus, in silently losing his way in 
wonderment, has shown his “natural gifts” for philosophy.  
Following Socrates’s approval of Theaetetus’s wonder, Socrates makes a gnomic 
reference to the gods: “the man who said Iris was the daughter of Thaumas seems to have been 
doing his genealogy not at all badly.”115 The reference to Thaumas, whose name sounds like the 
Greek word for wonder, is not so obscure. But the allusion to Iris, goddess of the rainbow, who 
takes the place of philosophy in the reference, is more difficult to place.116 Paul Stern has 
suggested two possible meanings that Plato might have wished for the reference. The first is that 
Iris’s station as the messenger of the gods emphasizes philosophy’s mediation between the 
human and the divine. The second comes from Hesiod’s description of the power allotted to Iris 
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“when quarrel and strife arise among the immortals.”117 In these times “if one of them that 
dwells on Olympus speaks false,” Zeus sends Iris to make the offending immortal “breathless 
and voiceless.”118 Stern parses this as Isis’s “power to render her fellow gods speechless if they 
should be caught in a lie.”119 Stern’s exegesis may seem esoteric, but it does illuminate some of 
the aspects of Plato’s concept of wonder and its place in his philosophy, which may be 
summarized by the following: Philosophy, issuing from the silent wonder at the contradiction 
between things which endure (like the divine things) and those that pass away (like human 
things), is charged with the task of finding and bringing to speech the hidden truth from out of 
that contradiction, and silencing what is false.120 
Aristotle followed Plato in defining the experience of wonder as the beginning of 
philosophy, but made significant alterations to the description of it. These alterations would be 
critical for Hobbes. Wonder, for Aristotle, begins first with obvious perplexities, and then 
progresses to greater matters which are more extraordinary. It can also be spurred on by 
seemingly spontaneous natural wonders, which appear to the observer as new and 
inexplicable:121 
It is through wonder that men now begin and originally began to philosophize; 
wondering in the first place at obvious perplexities, and then by gradual progression 
raising questions about the greater matters too, e.g. about the changes of the moon 
and of the sun, about the stars and about the origin of the universe.122  
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At the moment of rupture, of wonder, a person will sense “that he [or she] is ignorant.”123 
For Aristotle, it is the task of philosophy, though admittedly beginning in Socratic ignorance, to 
eliminate that ignorance which allows for wonder and to “produce the direct contrary to its 
beginning.”124 If a person were to completely understand the world philosophically, that is, 
understand the principles according to which the world moves, then there would no longer be 
any room for the experience of wonder.  
Both Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy are spurred on by what Martha Nussbaum calls 
a “hatred of being at a loss in the world,” a hatred of being in a condition in which one is 
ignorant of the world, and in which the world seems to function in a way that is alien and 
arbitrary.125 Wonder is the passion that moves a person out of this condition and sets him or her 
along the way out of that original ignorance and towards wisdom. For Aristotle, this means the 
discovery and understanding of the primary causes. Where Plato sought to bring out of the initial 
moment of wonder the truth hidden in contradictions, Aristotle’s philosophy attempts to 
eliminate the initial condition of ignorance by passing through wonder toward an extraordinary 
and comprehensive grasp of the world, by attaining an understanding of the primary causes of its 
appearance.  
Yet there is an additional twist in Aristotle’s account of wonder. Immediately after he 
described the ignorance that a person feels at the moment of wonder, he notes that “the myth-
lover [φιλόμυθος] is in a sense a philosopher, since myths are composed of wonders.”126 Martha 
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Nussbaum interpreted this statement to mean that there is a natural continuum between story-
telling and philosophy since in both “we seek to expand the comprehensiveness of our grasp.”127 
Philosophy and stories both enrich our understanding of the world. From here we turn to the 
specifically political function that Aristotle gives to stories, and especially to tragedies. 
This turn depends on a rather curious Greek term. Although I have been rather 
unambiguously translating thaumazein as wonder, there is another ancient Greek word that is 
often translated as that which inspires awe or wonder, although it is distinct in Aristotle’s 
philosophy. That term is deinon (δεινόν). According to Nussbaum, deinon is “somehow strange, 
out of place; its strangeness and its capacity to inspire awe are intimately connected.”128 The 
word also suggests terror and fearsomeness. In Aristotle’s Poetics deinon is intricately linked 
with, but delineated from phobos (φόβος), which is generally translated into English as fear. 
Aristotle defines phobos in the Art of Rhetoric as “a kind of pain or disturbance resulting from 
the imagination of impending danger.”129 This emotion has a special place in Aristotle’s 
discussion of tragedy, which Aristotle describes as a kind of mimesis (μίμησις), or imitation, 
which is concerned with the emotions of pity and fear (phobos). A tragedy accomplishes “by 
means of pity and terror (phobos) the catharsis of such emotions.”130 It is this catharsis of the 
emotions, fear being the most important for the present study, which constitutes the political 
function of tragedies.131 
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What is the function of catharsis here?  To rephrase the effect of tragedy described 
above, we might say that the viewing of things which are deinon in a tragedy brings about the 
catharsis of the fearfulness of the spectator. According to Nussbaum’s reading, catharsis is best 
translated as “clarification.”132 This makes the most sense for the case of fear, since Aristotle 
finds that phobos, “makes men deliberative, yet none deliberates about hopeless cases.”133 What 
is therefore needed is a clarification of the emotion of fear, so that it might be the most 
appropriate to a given situation, and cleared of excesses. Aristotle claims that in the experience 
of art “souls are changed,” and, in the case of good art one is educated in how to “judge 
correctly” so that one’s soul might be open to deliberation.134 Stanley Cavell has put it as a 
matter of “purging attachment from everything but the present” in order to “make us practical, 
capable of acting.”135 Through viewing tragedies, we learn the proper objects of moderated pity 
and fear through our experience of such passions.  
Ultimately, Aristotle’s philosophy provides clear distinctions between phobos, deinon, 
and thaumazein. As I will attempt to show below, Hobbes reconfigured these three emotions 
from the clear, ancient distinctions by blending them, specifically deinon and thaumazein, as he 
incorporated them into the pathetic apparatus of the great Leviathan. I mean ‘pathetic apparatus’ 
here in two related senses. The first is as a structure of sovereign governance. In this sense, these 
three emotions are redirected toward the structure of sovereign state. The second is in the sense 
of pathetic apparatus of a system which itself creates the conditions of possibility for a certain set 
                                                          
132 (Nussbaum 2001, 388-391). 
 
133 (Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric 1991, 155). 
 
134 (Aristotle, Politics 1998, 1340a11-40).  
 
135 (Cavell, Must we mean what we say? 2002, 338 & 347). 
 48 
of passions.136 In this sense, these three emotions are incorporated into the structure of the 
sovereign governance. Through these two senses of the term, the modern apparatus of the 
sovereign state is self-reinforcing. 
3. Hobbes and Modern Wonder 
In order to fully appreciate the importance and aptness of Hobbes’s appropriation of the ancient 
account of wonder, it must be understood that Hobbes did not appropriate the ancient notion of 
wonder in a vacuum, but did so in a way that was thoroughly conditioned by his time. As 
previous scholars have noted, the early modern period was one generally obsessed with 
wonders.137 The following interlacing trends all provided a significant background for Hobbes’s 
thought on wonder and politics. The immediate form of wonder that left its mark on Hobbes is 
the kind of wonder used during the English Civil War, illustrated at the beginning of this essay. 
This can take the form of the interpretation of signs in political propaganda, like in the examples 
given in the introduction, or the form of religious teachings which are meant to force citizens to 
certain political practices. Hobbes noted that common people would be “terrified and amazed by 
Preachers with fruitlesse and dangerous doctrines” by the fact that these same preachers claimed 
to hold the keys to eternal life, and the power to condemn to eternal damnation.138 Although 
certainly not limited to seventeenth century England, this old practice of prognostication was 
transformed by the Reformation. With the prevalence of sects, the power to seize upon 
phenomena as wondrous, religious signs became a practice less constrained by authority.139 At 
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the same time, miracles became more ambivalent phenomena, with major political and religious 
thinkers laying the ground for doubting the existence of contemporary miracles and the 
supernatural in the world.140 
Wonder was also experienced towards material objects, either a “rare work produced by 
the Art of a man,” a new mechanical invention, or a curiosity of nature, which could be 
possessed.141 All of these curious objects could be found in the Kunstkammer, Wunderkammer, 
or ‘cabinet of curiosities’ of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.142 These collections 
preceded the development of public museums in Europe and housed natural, technological, and 
artificial rarities. The ‘cabinets’ in Britain took a different form from those on the Continent, and 
started to appear later in time. For the most part, early British ‘cabinets’ were private, and not as 
rigorously ordered as their Continental counterparts.143 Although Charles I did inherit the 
collection of his older brother Henry, Prince of Wales, after Henry’s death, Charles focused 
almost exclusively on adding more paintings and sculptures to the cabinet rather than expanding 
it in all areas.144 Nevertheless, this Kunstkabinett was a part of the prestige of the 
government.”145 Hobbes also left evidence that he consciously noticed the Kunstkabinett in his 
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1673 essay “Concerning the Virtues of an Heroic Poem,” in which he wrote that a “poet is a 
painter” who must paint with the most choice words. If this is not done nicely, the work “will not 
be worthy to be placed in a cabinet.”146  
Another form of wonder was inaugurated by the incredible advances in optics at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century. Wonder is, after all, a way of seeing and experiencing the 
world. These advances were most clearly encapsulated in the invention of the telescope, which 
presented to the human eye previously unseen celestial bodies. The universe itself became 
strange and new. These advances had the clearest effect upon Hobbes’s writing career, as can be 
seen in his concern with optics in such books as Tractatus Opticus I (1640), II (1644), and A 
Minute or First Draught of the Optiques.147 The revolutions in optics showed that one may be 
led to see wonders by a change in perspective brought about by a new medium. 
Hobbes was also conditioned by and took part in the seventeenth century philosophical 
debates on the use of the passion of wonder and the rising assault against late medieval 
Aristotelian metaphysics. According to the Aristotelians, each body had an inherently proper 
conatus or inclination to move toward a particular point, such as heavy objects having a natural 
inclination to move toward the center of the cosmos.148 Hobbes calls the small and occasionally 
insensible beginnings of internal motions, or passions, endeavor.149 This term was a translation 
of the Latin conatus, which Hobbes adopted and revised in his polemic against the late 
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Aristotelians to be a form of motion rather than an inclination to move.150 Although Hobbes 
believed that the human body “sustains certain patterns of internal motion,” these internal 
movements are fully conditioned by and respond to exterior movements.151 The specific passions 
are the loci of these patterns of internal movement. With this fundamental transformation of 
Aristotelianism in place, Hobbes proceeds, as I noted above, with “liberal borrowings” of 
Aristotle’s accounts of the specific passions.152 This placed him squarely within the camp of 
seventeenth century philosophers who rejected Aristotelian metaphysics, but differed on how the 
passions should be reincorporated into modern philosophy, and what of Aristotle should be 
retained. 
Within this general camp, including at least Hobbes and Descartes, there was a general 
agreement that wonder was a useful passion in that it, as Plato and Aristotle claimed, spurred on 
the development of philosophy.153 To Descartes, wonderment was a fundamental passion in 
which “the soul is suddenly taken by surprise, which causes it to consider attentively the objects 
that it finds rare and extraordinary” and therefore enabled “us to learn and retain in our memory 
things of which we were formerly unaware.”154 However, it also put Hobbes at odds with 
Spinoza, who took the curious position that wonder is not a passion at all.155 It seems then that 
the neo-Stoicism of the age, which held there to be a strong distinction between reason and 
passion, was more radically adopted by Spinoza than by Descartes. Hobbes, on the other hand, 
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took a position on the relation between passion and thinking much closer to Aristotle than thoses 
influenced by neo-Stoicism would dare. Ultimately for all these thinkers, there was also an 
anxiety about depending on a passion as a foundation for philosophy. Therefore it, like many 
other passions, should be simultaneously used and controlled.  
These new forms of wonder and the reconsideration of Aristotelian philosophy 
conditioned Hobbes’s appropriation of ancient wonder for his theory of the state. To adumbrate 
for the following discussion of Hobbes’s political philosophy, I will point to three specific 
consequences of this historical condition. The first is that wonders, and purportedly miraculous 
events, were eminently political. Wonders were taken to be supernatural signs, used as political 
propaganda by opposing forces, or as an affirmation of a particular ruler or order. Crucially, for 
the purpose of this dissertation, these wonders could be taken not only as the confirmation of a 
divine order, but as a tool for establishing an order. In short, wonders could be used for political 
purposes. Second, since wonder was such a powerful, but dangerous, passion it needed to be 
controlled by a single, central authority. This could be done by gathering all wonders and 
wondering into one location. Third, ways of seeing could be altered by artifice; one could be led 
to see wonders by a change of perspective brought on by a new medium, much as how 
astronomers were struck by wonder by all the new and strange celestial bodies that they could 
suddenly see.156 As we will see below, these consequences of Hobbes’s historical condition 
helped set the stage for Hobbes’s breaking of the strict distinctions that Aristotle set for phobos, 
deinon, and thaumazein. Of course, they did not determine Hobbes’s appropriation of 
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thaumazein, but they conditioned it. But altogether, they set the stage for wonder to be used by 
an artificial human institution to establish and preserve its political order. 
a) De Mirabilibus Pecci  
The three concepts of phobos, deinon, and thaumazein appear in Hobbes’s political philosophy 
in a way that is both clearly indebted to ancient philosophy, and transformed through Hobbes’s 
historical condition. Hobbes’s concern in this area begins with one of his earliest confirmed 
texts, a poem from around 1627 titled in Latin De Mirabilibus Pecci, Carmen, or, in English, Of 
the Wonders of the Peak, a Poem.157 For approaching this work, and Hobbes’s appropriation of 
thaumazein in general, it is important to know that this term was commonly translated into Latin 
as admiratio. Although there is some differentiation, this term was then translated into English as 
admiration or wonder.158 Quentin Skinner has also discussed the place of admiration in Hobbes’s 
works, but in the context of the classical theory of laughter. Skinner’s account does not consider 
the relation between this Latin term and thaumazein in Aristotle’s Greek philosophy. Thus it 
does not consider the role of thaumazein in Hobbes’s account of admiration and wonder. 
Skinner’s genealogy brilliantly captures the joyous side of admiration, but misses the aspects of 
admiratio which rely upon ancient Greek philosophy.159 
 The importance of wonder in this poem is quite obvious, since it is in the title itself, but 
the operative definition of wonder within it is more difficult to parse. The poem describes a trip 
from Chatsworth to the nearby town of Buxton and the natural wonders that the narrator 
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encounters on the trip. Wonder first appears near the beginning of the poem: Miranti similis 
portam praeterfluit amnis, / hic tacitus, saxis, infra supraque, sonorus.160 The anonymously 
written translation of the cited edition of the poem, which does not exactly follow the line 
structure of Hobbes’s Latin verse, translates the above lines as “Here silent, as in Wonder of the 
place, but does from the Rocky precipices move in rapid streams below it, and above.”161 Here 
“miranti,” the dative present active participle of miror, mirare, translates roughly to ‘in wonder.’ 
It is modified by “hic tacitus,” which means ‘silent in this place.’ Together they give the sense of 
silent wonder. Although this is not a clear reference to wonder as it is described by Plato or 
Aristotle, it retains the quality of silent stillness. Later in the poem Hobbes expresses wonder and 
amazement at the great torches of the heavens, and praises the eternal arts of the heavenly 
Geometer.162 What is interesting here is that wonder is toward all of creation, at everything that 
exists. Wonder appears at various other points in the poem, but most of them are only to apply it 
to various sights on the journey, without doing much to describe the emotion. Yet the fact that 
wonder is directed toward natural sights, separated from human affairs, shows that at this point 
Hobbes’s concept of wonder was not affected by the three consequences of the historical 
condition that I described above. At this point, in 1627, he was using a form of wonder which 
was directed towards the admirable order of existence, putting him squarely within the 
mainstream of late medieval and early modern thought. Although this text establishes that 
Hobbes was concerned with admiration and wonder from the beginning of his writing career, it 
was only in the political works that he turned wonder to his own purposes. 
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b) The Elements of Law 
The Elements of Law: Natural and Politic, finished in 1640, was Hobbes’s first major work of 
political philosophy after his early humanism. My discussion of this book will show it as a 
middle point between Hobbes’s treatment of wonder in his early poem and in Leviathan. 
Although admiration appears in Hobbes’s early poem discussed above, The Elements of Law was 
the first work wherein Hobbes started to spell out his system of the passions. Therefore we 
should pay very close attention to the description of admiration that Hobbes gives in Part 1, 
Chapter 9, Section 18 of The Elements of Law, wherein he started to make minor adjustments to 
ancient wonder.163 
At the start of this section Hobbes describes the beginning of the increase in knowledge. 
He writes,  
forasmuch as knowledge beginneth from experience, therefore also new experience 
is the beginning of new knowledge, and the increase of experience the beginning 
of the increase of knowledge; whatsoever therefore happeneth new to a man, giveth 
him hope and matter of knowing somewhat that he knew not before.164 
Hobbes calls this “hope and expectation of future knowledge from anything that happeneth new 
and strange…that passion we commonly call admiration” which, when considered as an appetite, 
is called curiosity.165 This passion and appetite are what allow new experiences to proceed to 
new knowledge. Without them, human beings would be incapable of knowing anything new or, 
really, anything at all. It could be said that “wonder caught the attention; curiosity riveted it.”166 
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This passion leads one to “looketh for the cause and beginning of everything that ariseth new 
unto him.”167 The beginning of the increase of knowledge not only leads human beings to make 
sense of the world by the “invention of names,” but also to find the causes of those new and 
strange things. Then “from this beginning is derived all philosophy.”168 This passion 
distinguishes humans from beasts; for a beast, which is incapable of admiration, will not give 
names to or try to find the causes of “anything new or strange” but instead would only seek to 
discern whether that new or strange thing would serve or hurt him, and thus whether it would be 
best to approach or flee from it.169 Beasts, according to Hobbes, may only desire or fear the new 
and the strange.  
We can see from the very beginning of Hobbes’s work on political philosophy the 
importance of Aristotle’s account of thaumazein. Like Aristotle, Hobbes sees admiration, or 
wonder, as the beginning of philosophy. Like Aristotle, the ground of this beginning, the initial 
ignorance necessary for wonder, is diminished by the means of philosophy. An example that 
Hobbes will use in Leviathan is that of the rainbow, which resonates with the anecdote that Plato 
uses regarding Iris the messenger of the Greek gods and the personification of the rainbow. “The 
first Rainbow that was seen in the world, was a Miracle, because the first; and consequently 
strange; … But at this day, because they are frequent, they are not Miracles, neither to them that 
know their naturall causes, nor to them who know them not.”170 Like Aristotle, Hobbes takes this 
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beginning as a basis for seeking what both he and Aristotle would call the causes.171 Yet Hobbes 
slightly changes the drift of this beginning. The fact that these events are new does not separate 
Hobbes and Aristotle.  For Hobbes, this wonder begins when something new and strange is 
experienced. It is important that Hobbes uses the word “strange.” Aristotelian wonder, on the 
other hand, is an ordinary wonder which arises from difficulties close at hand. Although Aristotle 
thought that the lovers of myths, which in their tragic form were concerned with that which is 
strange or frightening (deinon), were in a sense also philosophers, it was because, as Nussbaum 
pointed out, in both philosophy and storytelling “we seek to expand the comprehensiveness of 
our grasp.”172 It was not, for Aristotle, because philosophy begins with what is strange. Here we 
can see thaumazein beginning to take on characteristics of deinon.  
We also can start to see phobos, or fear, being integrated into this account. In part 1, 
chapter 7 of The Elements of Law, fear is described as a motion which “retires” from expected 
displeasure.173 If, like a beast, one makes no attempt to remove one’s own original ignorance, 
one will likely respond to strange events with fear. This will have a compounding effect, since it 
is fear which makes the admiration of the new and strange impossible, as it leads one to recoil 
from an expected displeasure. To be sure, this is only a possible response to new or strange 
things, and a response that Hobbes thinks is more befitting to a beast than to a human. Yet, this 
will be important once we come to Leviathan. 
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 Admiration also appears in Part 1, Chapter 9, of The Elements of Law, in the discussion 
of vainglory. It is here that Hobbes begins to adopt and transform the function of catharsis, and 
to show how it can go awry.174 Vainglory occurs, according to Hobbes, “when a man imagineth 
himself to do the actions whereof he readeth in some romant, or to be like unto some other man 
whose acts he admireth.”175 Admiration here is concerned with the actions of others, but may go 
astray if one ascribes to oneself what was found in another.176 While Aristotle’s Athenians might 
have experienced a ‘clarification’ of their pity and fear through their spectatorship of tragedies, 
and thus have been able to act properly, Hobbes’s readers of romances confuse themselves with 
the imitations that they read. Mimesis, it seems, goes wrong. Rather than sympathetically 
experiencing the imitations of the arts, the vainglorious refashion themselves after those 
imitations. Therefore the “signs of vain glory in the gesture, are imitation of others, 
counterfeiting attention to things they understand not, affectation of fashions, capitation of 
honour from their dreams, and other little stories of themselves.”177 The vainglorious hold these 
various imitations before themselves at all times, and thus keep all kinds of attachments, except 
for an attachment to the present. A certain reading of Don Quixote supports this characterization 
and was in the background of Hobbes’s 1640 text.178  
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 Instead of pity or terror, Hobbes takes admiration to be the stance that one takes toward 
stories that one wishes to emulate, and he finds it to be potentially disastrous. Crucially, Hobbes 
takes from Aristotle the way that stories can either promote or diminish certain types of 
emotions. Hobbes does not so much disagree with either Plato or Aristotle on whether stories are 
necessarily good or bad for political life, but he does take from them the concern over how 
stories can be dangerous, and must be dealt with in some manner. 
c) Leviathan 
It is in Leviathan that Hobbes makes use of the roots of ancient philosophy, transforms them in 
ways reflective of his historical condition, and redirects them toward the state. By doing so he 
creates a conceptual framework for the pathetic apparatus of the state and the emotional makeup 
of the citizenry. Although many of the parts were present in The Elements of Law, they were not 
yet put into place. In the beginning of chapter 46 of Leviathan Hobbes gives his definition of 
philosophy, which resonates with the account that he gave in The Elements of Law of the 
beginning of new knowledge, but actually relies here even more upon Aristotle’s account of 
wonder. Hobbes defines philosophy here as 
the Knowledge acquired by Reasoning, from the Manner of the Generation of any 
thing, to the Properties; or from the Properties, to some possible Way of Generation 
of the same; to the end to bee able to produce, as far as matter, and humane force 
permit, such Effects, as human life requireth.179 
This definition is quite similar to that given in The Elements of Law, but with the notable 
exception of the addition of the knowledge of the “Manner of Generation” of a thing, and the 
properties that lead to that “Way of Generation.” Although Hobbes doesn’t immediately say after 
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giving this definition of philosophy that admiration is the passion which leads to search for the 
causes, like he does in The Elements of Law, he doesn’t really need to do so here; admiration is 
already incorporated into this definition of philosophy.180 The only difference is that curiosity 
gains an expanded role. Crucially, he also adds an ‘end’ of knowledge, which is aimed towards 
fabrication for use. Here we are well on the way to wonder being incorporated into a modern 
edifice. 
Hobbes begins his account of admiration and curiosity far earlier in the book, in chapter 
6. Curiosity and admiration are not themselves primary passions in this text, but types of other 
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Hobbes adopts the ancient definition of philosophy, he rejects most of the rest of it. Not all of this rejection is by 
annulment; some is by reconfiguration. 
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simple passions. Admiration is a manifestation of the passion called joy, delineated by the fact 
that it arises “from the apprehension of novelty.”181 The description that Hobbes gives of 
admiration in chapter 6 is sparse, to say the least. Although he does not identify it here as the 
beginning of philosophy, he identifies it with that which “excites the appetite of knowing the 
cause,” curiosity.182 Thus the two remain coupled in this text. Curiosity is the appetite, or “desire, 
to know why, and how.”183 Hobbes here puts into curiosity some of the qualities which before 
belonged to the passion of admiration. It is this passion, now along with reason, that 
distinguishes human beings from animals. Despite not calling it the beginning of philosophy, 
admiration must still play the same role that it did in The Elements of Law, since the definition of 
philosophy in Leviathan is concerned with the knowledge of the generation of a thing, and the 
properties that lead to that generation. Yet here in Leviathan both admiration and curiosity are 
defined as passions; one as a form of desire, the other as a form of joy. 
A possible explanation for the scant description of admiration in chapter 6 of Leviathan is 
that, in this text, admiration has a much more theological role than before. Thus it is described in 
much fuller detail in the overtly religious half of Leviathan, in chapter 37, ‘Of Miracles, and their 
Use.’ Here wonder makes its appearance in Hobbes’s mature system. Hobbes says that there are 
two things which may make human beings wonder at an event and call it admirable: The first is 
that it may be “strange,” by which Hobbes means that either the event has never happened before 
or it only happens very rarely. The second is that “we cannot imagine it to have been done by 
natural means, but onely by the immediate hand of God.”184 In this chapter Hobbes is not very 
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interested in the first quality, or at least not in things which only have the first quality and not the 
second, for at the moment when an event can be imagined to have a natural cause, “we no more 
wonder, nor esteem it a miracle.”185 The first quality of wonder is slightly familiar, as it runs 
from Aristotle’s example of spontaneous natural wonder, like events connected to the sun, up 
through Hobbes’s account of admiration in The Elements of Law. It is in the second quality of 
wonder that everything changes. Admiration and wonder are no longer directed toward any event 
that is new or strange, but only toward those events which cannot be imagined to be natural – 
toward miracles. Hobbes thus defined miracles as “a work of God (besides his operation by the 
way of Nature, ordained in the creation,) done, for the making manifest to his elect, the mission 
of an extraordinary Minister for their salvation.”186  
Wonder in this case is an extraordinary mode of receptivity between an authority and a 
subject. The strangeness of those extraordinary events which break up the ordinary from the 
inside no longer have an adequate basis for admiration or wonder. Now wonder and admiration 
belong only to those things which do not belong to the ordinary world, yet give to that world a 
mission or plan for ordering it. Hobbes uses the phrase “admirable order” when the “visible 
things of this world” are apprehended as caused by a supernatural force: God.187 It is only from 
the perspective which sees the world as a totality caused by God, even if there is no 
understanding of God and the word is no more than an empty signifier, that the world may be 
perceived in admiration, or wonder. Here we can see the importance of Hobbes’s historical 
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context, particularly the first consequence of his historical condition. Wonders were taken to be 
supernatural signs of God and could be used as political propaganda by opposing forces, or as 
affirmation for a particular ruler or order. 
Here Hobbes moves to enshrine that silent, dizzying wonder that Theaetetus felt for 
perplexing statements as a feeling which one may permanently feel toward an extraordinary 
authority, an authority which is outside of the context of the social field. If Hobbes follows this 
move to its conclusion, then that authority will have the same role which, Paul Stern noted, 
belonged to Iris, the goddess who has no other duty but to swoop down and render silent all 
those who would disagree with what is and is not a miracle.188 Of course, Hobbes does follow 
this to its conclusion and holds that the “Sovraign power” is to be the judge of “whether the 
Miracle we hear, or read of, were a real work.”189 The important foil here for Hobbes is the 
Roman Catholic Church, whose supposedly ecumenical domain Hobbes likened to an ephemeral 
‘Kingdome of Fairies.’ Hobbes argued that the sovereign, and not the Holy Office of the 
Catholic Church should be the focus for this power, since the sovereign state would be able to 
wield both political and ecclesiastical power, both of which stemmed at least in part from its 
affective authority.190 Additionally, this would ward off the danger of independent ministers, 
specifically Presbyterian, from using wonder and awe to overwhelm citizens.191  
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The suggestion for an official body in Anglican England which would determine the 
veracity of wonders was not unusual for this time. For example, the Cambridge scholar of 
biblical antiquity, John Spencer (1630-93) suggested a “kind of Philosophy office; wherein all 
such unusual occurences [would be] registered.”192 Of course, Hobbes’s proposal is quite distinct 
due to its incorporation into the core of his theory of the state. The theological form of wonder is 
controlled by Hobbes and becomes a tool of the sovereign power. Although the sovereign power 
cannot perform miracles, since that power belongs only to the divine, it can define what may and 
may not be considered a miracle. The sovereign cannot create this type of wonder, but it can 
eliminate it. Yet this is not only a matter of “political theology” or the power of the sovereign 
over questions of religion,193 but a matter of using a conceptual framework from ancient 
philosophy to build a certain apparatus of the state, one which alters the emotional makeup of the 
citizenry. It is important to note that Hobbes grants that in private a person will always have the 
liberty to decide for his or herself whether or not a strange and unusual event is a miracle or a 
wonder. A person will believe what they believe in private, and Hobbes sees there to be nothing 
that the sovereign could or should do to change this. But as a public person, one must give over 
to the sovereign the right to judge whether an event was a wonder or a miracle and to experience 
that event accordingly. 
In addition to devising a structure of the state which redirects and reconfigures wonder 
toward supernatural miracles, Hobbes’s sovereign power redirects another, corrupted, form of 
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wonder; what Hobbes calls awe. It is the feeling that accompanies natural ignorance when fear 
disallows the search for the causes. Hobbes begins his description of awe with a powerful 
example of rudimentary philosophical inquiry, based in the ancient model, which does not have a 
sovereign power to decide on the supernatural causes. This inquiry follows Hobbes’s description 
of a person curiously looking for causes, but not stopping upon the command of a “Sovraign 
power”, and that Sovereign power’s theology of the one “God eternall”, but rather seeking out 
his or her own understanding of the causes. This occurs in chapter 11 of Leviathan, ‘Of the 
difference of Manners.’ By manners, Hobbes means the qualities of humans which “concern 
their living together in Peace, and Unity.”194 In the end of this chapter Hobbes describes a 
condition in which there is no natural peace and unity – a state without a common civil religion. 
This condition begins with “curiosity,” which Hobbes calls here a “love of knowledge of 
causes.”195 It wouldn’t be outrageous, especially after the above exposition, to take this as a 
reference to Aristotelian philosophy, or a passion for knowledge of the causes rooted in the 
essentially human “desire to know.”196 It is only natural for humans to be curious. Yet what is 
not natural is an innate idea of God. Thus when curiosity leads from effect to cause, and follows 
the causal chain all the way down to the first cause, a person will not know for certain what the 
first cause might have been. Hobbes notes that “even the Heathen Philosopher,” likely 
referencing Aristotle, “confessed” the logical necessity of a “First Mover.”197 Yet, since Aristotle 
was a “heathen,” his philosophy could not recognize this “First Mover” as the Christian God.  
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Here Hobbes states that those who do not make a scientific enquiry into the natural 
causes of things will be caught in the fear of the original ignorance.198 Rather than seeking to 
remove the original state of ignorance, as in Aristotelian philosophy, which is concomitant with 
admiration, those who do not seek out the natural causes will see their admiration decay into 
fear. Without accepting the conclusion of a God which is “the eternal cause of all things,” human 
beings will be inclined to create for themselves invisible powers in its place and by the “fear” of 
those invisible powers they will be hindered “from the search of the causes of other things.”199 
These fearful people who “make little, or no enquiry into the natural causes of things,” will 
experience awe toward their idols – which block off all other objects of wonder.200 In order to 
ward off the fear which proceeds from ignorance, those without a theologically grounded science 
of the causes will feign unto themselves invisible powers which they create by their own 
imaginations, before which they stand in awe. Wonder is forced by fear to shift into a single-
minded awe. These idols need not only be religious. They may also be what Hobbes called in 
The Elements of Law “little stories of themselves.”201 These stories, which may take the forms of 
“Histories, or Fictions of Gallant Persons”, hold their audience captive, and direct their actions 
toward the enlargement of their glory at the risk of all.202 This self-feigned glory is for Hobbes a 
principle cause of quarrel, and it can lead to conflict over nothing more than “trifles.”203 This 
account in Leviathan is different from that of The Elements of Law, since rather than 
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experiencing admiration or wonder toward these little stories like the vainglorious, as they did in 
The Elements of Law, those who are bewitched by their stories experience awe. 
Here we have a case in which proper thaumazein, which in the case of the world itself 
would lead to a wonder at the “admirable order” of the world as created by God, is blocked for 
some people by the fear which accompanies natural ignorance. Curiosity becomes frustrated by 
fear and changes into awe. It may also be the case that curiosity never took off, and a person 
immediately experienced awe. Hobbes illustrates how in this case, rather than experiencing 
thaumazein, these fearful people will create images and creatures to explain the cause of the 
world to themselves. They then stand in awe, or deinon, of these creatures of their fancy. In 
short, phobos replaces thaumazein with deinon. This, I believe, is the key transformation from 
ancient to Hobbesian wonder. 
Remarkably, Hobbes responds to what he takes to be an absence of proper wonder in a 
way which structurally resembles Aristotle’s account of tragic catharsis; humans vainly attempt 
to ‘clarify’ their initial fear through “little stories” that they tell themselves, and, before which, 
they experience awe. He finds this alternative to be an ordinary response that some people have 
to the original ignorance of what might have caused the order of the things of the world. Without 
a visible power to keep these people in awe they will fabricate an invisible one for themselves, 
and the catharsis that it provides will be completely inadequate for providing a harmonious 
social order. These stories do nothing to eliminate the original fear, but actually increase it to 
levels of excess that increase the likelihood of conflicts over false fears. At the end of chapter 11 
of Leviathan it is made clear that phobos, deinon, and thaumazein will all be incorporated into 
Hobbes’s political philosophy to address these dangerous excesses. A theoretical path is made 
for the redirection of both thaumazein, as we saw above in the case of wonders and miracles, and 
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deinon, which is treated here as a corrupted form of thaumazein, toward the fearsome Leviathan, 
leaving the citizen in a permanent state of phobos. Thus is order secured. 
From here, Hobbes resuscitates awe, and channels it into his political philosophy. Some 
people will not have the capacity or perhaps desire to respond with the right kind of wonder to 
the admirable order of God as interpreted by the sovereign power, and thus will be dominated by 
the emotional need for the catharsis of awe. Hobbes builds upon this need, and uses it as the 
basis for the political education of the multitude through the over-awing Leviathan. Subjects are 
“to be taught not to be led with admiration of the vertue of any of their fellow subjects, how high 
soever he stand, nor how conspicuously he shine in the Common-wealth.”204 The subjects of the 
state, “though they may shine some more, some less, when they are out of his sight; yet in his 
presence, they shine no more than the Starres in the presence of the sun.”205 Set at the center of 
the political cosmos, the Sovereign is vested with the power over on what may appear as 
wondrous. According to Hobbes, only the sovereign state is capable of both controlling the 
wonder of the scientifically capable, and the awe of the incapable.206 The laws of nature and the 
various religions of the world by themselves are not enough without a “visible power to keep 
them [all] in awe,” for indeed the laws of nature themselves are contrary to the rest of the 
passions without “the terrour of some Power.”207 This awe, and the quarrels that it may create, 
necessitates the construction of a state structure to ‘clarify’ it. Immediately preceding the famous 
description of life during war as “solitary, nasty, brutish, and short,” Hobbes defines the 
                                                          
204 (Hobbes, Leviathan 1996, 234). 
 
205 (Hobbes, Leviathan 1996, 128). 
 
206 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for Political Theory for helping me to clarify this point. 
207 Ibid, 117. 
 69 
condition of war as a point when “men live without a common Power to keep them all in 
awe.”208 
For the Leviathan to affect catharsis, following Aristotle’s formulation, it must be a 
mimesis – an imitation or representation. 209 The Greek term mimesis is the subject of vast body 
of scholarship, and has been interpreted in many different ways. The aspect that I find important 
here is the affective power of an imitation as it is described by Hobbes. Much like how the 
imitations of action, for Aristotle, achieved “by means of pity and terror (phobos) the catharsis 
of such emotions” in the audiences of ancient tragedy, Hobbes’s imitations achieve fear and 
terror in his subjects. 210 In fact, Hobbes, purposefully or not, follows Aristotle’s account of the 
affective power of mimesis from the very beginning of Leviathan. In his Introduction, Hobbes 
describes the art of man to be an imitation of nature, the art of God. Further, he describes the 
imitation of “that Rationall and most excellent worke of Nature, man” to result in the creation of 
the subject of the text, the great Leviathan.211 Although the method of personification and 
authorship which Hobbes devises in chapter 16 is largely indebted to Latin sources, such as 
Cicero’s De Officiis, the Leviathan itself functions as an Aristotelian mimesis.212 It affects 
catharsis in its spectators; in this case, in the people who generated it. As Hobbes puts it later in 
the text, the Leviathan “hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by 
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terror thereof, he is enabled to conforme the wills of them all.”213 By a kind of catharsis the 
modern political order of sovereign states is achieved and maintained. 
The catharsis that the Leviathan affects in its subjects is effective, unlike that of the little 
stories of the vainglorious. The excess of fear that some subjects of the state once had is clarified 
by the terror of the Leviathan, a proper object of awe. Rather than be consumed by a perspective 
of fear of each other, citizens are pacified by an enduring terror of the Leviathan. The subjects of 
the Leviathan will be “in admiration for a power not without testimony, but made evident by 
great argument, and which needeth not either a Homer to praise it or any other such whose 
poems may indeed bring delight, but the truth will afterwards confute the opinion conceived of 
the actions.”214 The state is able to facilitate this alteration of perspective for those who were 
previously blinded by their glory, for the Leviathan is designed to be the center of a unitary body 
in which “he is made so as not to be afraid,” for he is the “King of all the children of pride.”215 
For those incapable of what Hobbes takes to be the proper sense of wonder, there can be 
no escape from the awe owed to the terrible Leviathan, the bearer of sovereignty. Even for the 
capable, miracles may only be a source of wonder when the sovereign allows them to be. Thus 
the citizens of Hobbes’s commonwealth are bound together by reconfigurations of what once 
were the bases of ancient philosophy. The medieval faith in an admirable order of existence 
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confirmed by the divine is replaced with a reoccupation of wonder to assuage the need for 
order.216 The domination of wonder and awe are permanent, from which citizens may not escape 
as long as the sovereign power endures. If they were to escape, according to Hobbes, the awe 
which was once directed toward the Leviathan, and the wonder, no longer proper, would change 
into uncontrollable fear. This need for the clarification of awe, and the control of wonder, aid in 
the creation of the modern state and sustain it. They give the state strength and together reaffirm 
it as a terrible wonder.  
Altogether, the source of ancient philosophy is transformed and prolonged – the original 
isolation, and silent state of being lost in the world – as the permanent station of the over-awed 
modern citizen under the Leviathan. In the context of the English Civil War, as depicted in 
Behemoth, Hobbes argues for the redirection of all wonder and awe towards the sovereign state. 
There may be no admiration of fellow subjects at the risk that this might “deferre to them any 
obedience, or honor, appropriate to the Soveraign alone.”217 Perhaps, then, it might be said that 
under the Leviathan any attention to politics not condoned by the sovereign – what contemporary 
political theory call non-sovereign politics – is in a permanent state of deferral.  
The effects of wonder and awe are therefore not merely spatial, but temporal. Politics 
beyond the visage of the state might continue to exist, but a populace turned in wonder and awe 
only towards the sovereign simply cannot see it. Since the conditions of possibility for the 
perception of marvelous, wondrous events has been altered, there cannot be any except for those 
authorized by the state itself. In this sense, “the world had to be ‘disenchanted’” of the ‘magic’ 
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possessed by any institution but the state “in order to be dominated.”218 Deeds and events worthy 
of wonder might continue to appear, but subjects may take no notice. And it is imperative that 
subjects take no notice for, if they do, it threatens the mortal state to meet its end. By this fact, 
admiration bestows a kind of permanence on the state. 
 The modern state theorized by Hobbes needs this deferral of wonder. In fact, at the 
moment at which political philosophy and political observers turn their attention away from the 
actions of the sovereign entity, and lose their awe for it, the efficacy of the modern state 
diminishes. Techniques and practices which continually control wonder and reaffirm awe must 
be repeatedly employed. ‘States of exception’ are not merely the boundary-setting possibility of 
the sovereign, but an aspect of the affective apparatus of the modern sovereign state. In a sense, 
only the sovereign may be the font of admiration. This deferral is the supreme Hobbesian irony. 
What better tool could there be to overawe the proud than the Leviathan, itself a monster, and 
thus a wondrous marvel? What could be more absurd than to find this monster ordinary, and to 
accept it as necessary? Yet this is the fundamental function of wonder as it presents itself anew 
in modern thought – to direct our attention to the marvelous and the new, and to selectively 
include those phenomena into the fundamental order or the world to the exclusion of other 
potentially wondrous phenomena. Hobbes thus makes a grand foray into reordering the 
passionate life of politics, one which reached back to ancient Greek philosophy for tools to cope 
with and manage the new experiences of modernity. His innovative tiger’s leap into the past, as 
we will see, was far from the last. 
                                                          
218 (Federici 2014, 174). 
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Chapter Two 
Wonder Taken for a Sign: Kant and an Order of Freedom 
 
 
Reflect that nothing except the soul is worthy of wonder; for the 
soul, if it be great, naught else is great. 
 
- Seneca, Epistles, VIII, 5219 
 
Your magic binds again 
What the sword of custom divided; 
Beggars become brothers of princes 
Where your gentle wing abides. 
 
- Friedrich Schiller, “An die Freude/Ode to Joy”220 
 
1. A War of Spirits 
“Now is the time of the sword and of wrath, not of mercy.”221 Such was the less than conciliatory 
position that Martin Luther adopted in his May 1525 tract, “Against the Robbing and Murdering 
Hordes of Peasants.”222 The Reformation which Luther began on All Hallow’s Eve of 1517 had 
over the intervening years inspired much more radical reformers than Luther himself. Where 
Luther originally only intended to reform the abuses and corruption of the Holy See, and then 
later, once he gave up hope for reforming Rome, to break from the church, many of his 
immediate followers sought to overturn the ecclesiastical and political orders of the world in 
their entirety. Luther quickly realized that he could not endorse the reordering of the world that 
                                                          
219 The Latin text is “Cogitate nihil praeter animum esse mirabile, cui magno nihil magnum est” (Seneca, Epistles 
1917, 38-41). 
 
220 This is the first version of the poem. The German text is “Deine Zauber binden wieder/ Was der Mode Schwerd 
geteilt; / Bettler werden Fürstenbrüder / Wo dein sanfter Flügel weilt.” 
 
221 (Luther, Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants 2013, 121). 
 
222 Ibid, 116-122; See also the original German in (Luther, D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe 
1908, 357-63). 
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he identified with radical Reformers such as Thomas Müntzer, whom he principally blamed for 
the religious impetus behind the German Peasants’ War of 1524-1525.223 Nor could he follow his 
once protégé, Andreas Karlstadt, who also, according to Luther, sought too quickly to abandon 
traditional orders and “pounce[d] on outward things with such violence” as though he wished to 
overturn the foundation of Christendom.224 For Luther, all radical Reformers who posed a danger 
to the secular order deserved the same name: Schwärmer, or, translated loosely, fanatics.225 
Luther’s attack on Schwärmerei began as a sectarian struggle over forces which Luther 
unleashed but could no longer control, but it would reverberate throughout the Reformation, and 
ultimately through the many pitches of Enlightenment political thought.226 This reverberation in 
the Enlightenment would ultimately culminate in a stunning key change in the thought of 
Immanuel Kant, a modulation which is currently misunderstood in much of the writings on his 
place in the history of political thought227 and his current relevance for contemporary political 
theory. In this chapter I argue that Kant achieved that modulation by using as leverage the 
                                                          
223 (Luther 2013, 117). 
 
224 (Luther, Letter to the Christians at Strassburg in Opposition to the Fanatic Spirit 1955, 67). For Karlstadt, see 
(Karlstadt, Whether One Should Proceed Slowly 1991, 49-51). 
 
225 See the original German in (Luther, Ein Brief an die Christen zu Straspurg widder den Schwermer geist 1899). 
See also (Windhorst 1977). The word Schwärmerei, according to Peter Fenves, is derived from the movement and 
sound made by the swarming of bees, and invokes, in general, the low absurdities or pastoral life. However, it does 
not lend itself to a clean translation into English, and thus it is often problematically, as we will see below with 
Kant, translated varyingly into fanaticism, enthusiasm, zealotry, visionary rapture, or, as is the (eminently 
reasonable) case for Fenves, exaltation. See Fenves 1993, ix-xii. To avoid such confusion, the term will go 
untranslated for the rest of the essay. 
 
226 (Heyd 1995); and (La Vopa and Klein 1998). 
 
227 See Clewis’s note on the confusion between Enthusiasmus and Schwärmerei in secondary literature on Kant in 
(Clewis 2009, 5-6). 
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experience of wonder, at his historical moment destabilized from its ancient and medieval place 
as the passion by which one recognizes and experiences the order of the cosmos.228  
However, it will take us a bit more historical reconstruction before we can reach a point 
from which we can recognize Kant’s intellectual modulation, and therefore the significance of 
his use of wonder in his later thought and for us. For Luther, the term Schwarmerei was not 
simply a name of opprobrium, but, as Dominique Colas has noted, it was “a concept at the heart 
of his political theory” that he used for those who struggled “to abolish civil society in the name 
of the Holy City.”229 The wayward radical Reformers, according to Luther, failed to base their 
teaching on rigorous textual hermeneutics, and therefore wavered according to their passions, 
with a mind like a swarm of bees.230 Luther’s deployment of this term against radical reformers 
not only expressed a central concept in his political theory, but with it he also enunciated a 
heading that would be slanderously used against a wide variety of confessions that emerged out 
of the waves of Reformations.  
As a set of historical phenomena, the term Schwärmerei has a dizzyingly complicated 
history, and referring to it with both concision and specificity is perhaps impossible. In one 
                                                          
228 On the destabilization of wonder in early modern thought, see (Daston and Park 1998).  
 
229 (Colas 1997, 4). 
 
230 (Luther, The Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ - Against the Fanatics 1955). Sarah Kareem pointed out 
to me a fascinating difference here between the pejorative simile of bees used by Luther, and the image of bees in 
Swift’s Battel of the Books, wherein the collection of honey by bees is like the curious searching of ancient wisdom 
compared to the spider of modern wisdom. Here I would venture the following interpretation: To Luther, for whom 
the world was a field of deception, or moderns, for whom knowledge of nature can only come through a doubting of 
the senses, the immediacy with which the bee collects honey from nature is only possible because of its naiveté. This 
may be why moderns cannot help but find the advice of Matthew 6:28, to “consider the lilies of the field, how they 
grow: they neither toil nor spin” as naïve for all but those who live in the Land of Cockayne or Utopia, where human 
life is immediately reconciled to nature. 
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respect, its pre-history flows out of the millenarian, chiliastic movements of the middle ages.231 
Luther and later his humanist associate Philip Melanchton coined and used the term against their 
radical opponents, the Anabaptists. The German discourse flowed, in one of its channels, into 
England in the mid-seventeenth century and came to be defined under the heading of 
“enthusiasm.” A 1646 pamphlet by Friedrich Spanheim, Englands Warning by Germanies Woe: 
or An Historicall Narration, of the Originall, Progresse, Tenets, Names and several Sects of the 
Anabaptists, in Germany and the Low Countries, names “Anabaptists, Catabaptists, Enthusiasts, 
Fanaticks and Libertines…Enthusiasts, for the Enthusiasms, raptures and other such like things, 
which they give out for secret and divine inspirations.”232 This English term, enthusiasm, came 
to be the center of a lively discourse up through the various locales and waves of the European 
Enlightenment.233 As R.A. Knox wrote in his classic, though dated, book on the subject, “words 
are born and die; they live only so long as they have an important errand to fulfil, by expressing 
what needs expression.”234 And the word was very much needed in Britain during the 
tempestuous seventeenth century.235 Five years after Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan appeared, 
works such as the Cambridge Platonist Henry More’s Enthusiasmus Triumphatus (1656) and 
Meric Casaubon’s Treatise Concerning Enthusiasm (1656) attacked the enthusiasts.236 
                                                          
231 See, for example, (Cohn 1970); (Engels 1966, 24-27); (Knox 1950, 71-116); and (Toscano 2010, 43-97). For a 
comparison between Cohn’s approach to millenarianism and that of two others (Hobsbawn 1959); and (Worsley 
1957) who participated with Cohn at a 1956 seminar on the subject, see Toscano 2010, 45. 
 
232 Quoted in Toscano 2010, 113-114. 
 
233 See (Eron 2014); (Heyd 1995); the essays in (La Vopa and Klein 1998), especially (Pocock 1997); (Mee, 
Dangerous Enthusiasm: William Blake and the culture of radicalism in the 1790s 1992); and (Mee, Romnticism, 
enthusiasm, and regulation: poetics and the policing of culture in the Romantic period 2003). 
 
234 (Knox 1950, 6). 
 
235 For an overview of various radical religious and political ideas in England during the seventeenth century, see 
Hill 1972. For a fuller account of the intellectual context, see Hill 1997. 
 
236 (Pocock 1997, 9). 
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According to More, “Enthusiasme is nothing else but a misconceit of being inspired” by the 
spirit of God.237 Therefore the enthusiasts, according to those who gave their adversaries this 
epithet, were led by their passionate visions to blasphemy. However, as we’ll see below, this 
overdetermined cluster of phrases – enthusiasm and Schwarmerei – would discursively find its 
way through the German strand of the Enlightenment to the work of Immanuel Kant as a 
problem to be solved.238 He did so not by completely banishing emotions from political life, but 
by elevating wonder and redefining enthusiasm. 
Conversely, within contemporary political theory, it is the supposedly perverse influence 
of the work of Immanuel Kant which stands to many as problem to be overcome. According to 
some contemporary theorists of the sentiments, morality without motivation is practically 
useless, and a kind of Kantian inspired political philosophy is to blame for this problem.239 
Therefore, it is argued, we must open our eyes to the driving forces of passions and affects which 
we experience in everyday life, such as sympathy, to find an ethos which might undergird the 
norms that are necessary for liberal democracy.240 From the perspective of these theorists, the 
fault for this motivational deficit is an appropriation of Kant by some prominent political 
philosophers.241 According to this perspective, theorists like Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls 
                                                          
237 (More 1966, 2). For more, see the essays in (Klein and La Vopa 1998). 
 
238 (Vopa 1997). 
 
239 See for example (Krause, Civil Passions 2008, 9), (Frazer 2010), and (Marcus 2002). To be sure, Krause (2008, 
27-47) offers a more complicated picture of the sentiments in Rawls and Habermas, the common targets of attacks 
against neo-Kantian rationalism in political theory. Nevertheless, Krause ultimately accepts the claim that both 
Rawls and Habermas have real problems of motivation in their theories. 
 
240 (Markell 2000). 
 
241 See, for example, (Bennett 2001, 133-136). The account above owes much to Bennett’s weaving of a 
“subterranean theory of moral motivation,” (134) but I disagree with Bennett on two major points. First, Kant’s 
treatment of Bewunderung and Enthusiasmus is in no way subterranean, but is a consistent and non-trivial thread in 
his thought from at least the mid-1760s to the late-1790s. Second, Kant’s account of Bewunderung and 
Enthusiasmus are not merely moral and ethical, but political. They are experienced by subjects, but in such a way 
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offer visions of overly-proceduralized political life which do not provide the necessary incentives 
for politics.242  
Yet, on the other hand, the Kantians also have a powerful case. Relations of equal dignity 
would quite likely be frequently endangered if not hinged to something outside of the capricious 
whims of human passion, or if moral motivations could only arise from habits and national 
custom. As many Enlightenment figures recognized, the particular sentiments of patriotism may 
ultimately be no better than affectionate tribalism.243 According to Rawls, the reasonable “modus 
vivendi” of toleration, which emerged after the bloody Wars of Religion, rather than passionate 
adherence to an ideal of the good life, made possible the intermittent peaceful coexistence of 
Europeans with wildly contrasting views after those wars.244 Only under these increasingly 
secular and dispassionate conditions could norms of equal dignity and respect flourish and make 
possible a liberal democratic way of life. Or, at the very least, these conditions would quell one 
                                                          
that they are brought outside of themselves and into the world of others. For another work on enchantment and the 
Enlightenment, but in the field of literature, see (Kareem 2014). 
 
242 The responses to Kantian political theory are immense and have come in waves. For one of the earliest responses 
from our current wave, see (Sandel 1984). On Kant as one of the first modern “liberal democrats,” due to his support 
for what he called republican government, which included representative government, a broad set of rights, and 
popular sovereignty, see (Doyle 1983) and (Pagden 2013, 356-358). 
 
243 See (Kleingeld 2012, 1-39) and (Pagden 2013, 315-319). 
 
244 (Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 2001, 1 & 192-193). What Rawls calls moral motivation by 
conception-dependent desires is quite similar to what I reconstruct below of the type of motivation that I find in 
Kant’s writings, in the coupling of Enthusiamsus and Bewunderung. The significant difference is that the affective 
motivation that I find in Kant is tied to what Rawls calls a comprehensive moral view, and part of what he rejects in 
Kantian constructivism. Perhaps this is one of the reasons that Rawls claims the theory of justice might realize the 
ideals of equal human worth that Kant “finds to be beyond all price,” but cannot start from them, due to their 
substantive character, in (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition 1999, 513). Yet, this misses the fact that for 
Kant, Enthusiasmus restrains itself from attempting to immanentize the ideal in the manner of the Schwärmer. 
Rather, Kantian Enthusiasmus and Bewunderung, as we will see below, motivate one towards a moral order that is 
formal but not substantive. On moral motivation in Rawls, see (Rawls, Political Liberalism 2005, 81-85) and for 
Rawls’s rejection of the comprehensive moral view of Kantian constructivism, see (Rawls, Political Liberalism 
2005, 99). 
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source of the wrath outlined above by Luther, even if they did not support relations of mercy and 
mutual beneficence.  
Both of these positions capture something important about the widely accepted moral 
framework of respect for the equal dignity of all human beings in the modern world.245 An order 
which incorporates a moral framework of equal dignity and respect must be abstracted from our 
particular passions and affects to be made universal.  However, an order must inculcate the 
proper passions and affects to support that moral framework to be effective in any particular 
case. Therefore, I suggest a solution to these views which is rooted in Kant’s thought; an 
alternative that Kant developed in his encounter with enthusiasm; and, finally, an alternative 
which is, I would argue, already prevalent in modern political life.246 
It is the argument of this chapter that the Kantian respect for dignity and the moral law 
already provide affective motivating supplements.247 Two of the most important supplements are 
what Kant calls the Enthusiasmus for the idea of a republic and the wonder, or Bewunderung, for 
                                                          
245 On relations of equal dignity as a constitutive framework of the modern world see, for example, (Habermas 1996, 
80, 109, 251, & 314), and (Taylor 1989, 3-24; 151-2; and 363-384).  
 
246 Another view has recently been offered by Linda Zerilli, that it is to reflective judgment which we must turn to 
overcome this deadlock between public reason and affect or the passions. Given the pluralistic conditions of modern 
liberal democracies, we require the exercise of aesthetic and reflective judgments to reach across the chasms that 
separate our beliefs, which involves both our cognition and aesthetic sensibilities. The absence of an ethical 
wholeness of our worlds demands that we should judge anew, according to this view. (Zerilli 2016). In contrast to 
this view, I show how Kant already imputes into our cognitions an affective support for the world, or order, in which 
modern democratic, or rather republican, life is possible. 
 
247 For a very different take on the problem of motivation in Kant, see (Sargentis 2012). On the controversy in 
general in Kant scholarship, (McCarty 1993). 
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the moral law.248 The role of Enthusiasmus in Kant’s thought has been explored recently,249 but 
this chapter argues that Kant’s deployment of this term can only be understood with reference to 
the affect of wonder. The relative dearth of Kant scholarship focused on wonder is, in a word, 
astonishing.250 This is especially baffling, since, according to the Concordance to Kant’s 
published works, while there are only 23 appearances of words related to Enthusiastisch and 79 
to Schwärmer, there are 120 of words related to Bewundern.251 When one studies this prevalent 
term, one sees Kant uses wonder systematically as an affective supplement to politics. Further, 
we see that Kant intervened in the debates on the role of enthusiasm in political and 
philosophical life in the German Enlightenment and late eighteenth century philosophy more 
broadly by arguing that Schwärmerei is the reception and misinterpretation of wonder. A 
legitimate and proper experience of wonder, on the other hand, is occasioned by the 
contemplation of the inexplicable capacity to be moral and motivates one to make such a 
capability a foundation of order in the world. In a word, the fanatical visions of the Schwärmerer 
                                                          
248 Although Bewunderung can be translated as wonder or admiration it is often translated as admiration when Kant 
contrasts it against Verwunderung, usually translated as astonishment. See (Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment 
2000, 154) and (Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 2007, 363). For this chapter, I will 
translate Bewunderung as wonder and, when appropriate, Verwunderung as sudden wonder. Wunder in Kant’s 
works, and commonly in German, is usually best translated into English as miracle. See fn. 1 in (Frierson 2010, 
285). Enthusiasmus will generally remain untranslated to avoid, as best as possible, ambiguities with the English 
enthusiasm. 
 
249 (Clewis 2009); (Fenves, A Peculiar Fate: Metaphysics and World-History in Kant 1991, 170-285); (Fenves, Late 
Kant: Towards Another Law of the Earth 2003, 45, 125, 136) and (Lyotard 2009). 
 
250 For an exception, see (Frierson 2010). However, both history and politics are missing from this account. The 
ontological study of what Satkunanandan calls awe (Achtung), although most English translators call respect, in 
(Satkunanandan 2011) is interesting, but underestimates the negative character of Achtung in the Critique of 
Practical Reason. See (Saurette 2005). For a different account of Kantian Achtung see (White 2000, 148; and 2009, 
49). 
 
251 Obviously, some of these are not used in a technical sense, but often in phrases such as ‘one wonders if…’ It is 
worth noting, however, that 75 of the uses related to Bewundern are as Bewunderung, the noun form, which would 
generally only be used in a technical sense. (Roser, Mohrs and Borncke 1992, Vol II: 172-174; Vol VI: 424-425). 
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are displaced by a reinterpretation of wonder, making space for a moral and free republican 
order.  
As it is bounded by the limits of reason, Enthusiasmus for the idea of a republic is 
distinguished by Kant from the Schwärmerei of the fanatical visionaries.252 Wonder at the 
inscrutable source of morality is distinguished from passionate, irrational, forms of motivation. 
Together, they give affective supplements to the pursuit of a republican, moral way of life for not 
only oneself, but for the entire cosmos.253 Kant remains in some sense then on the side of the 
contemporary Kantians, since he rejects the formulation and immanentizing of substantive ideals 
of the good life like fanatics, but Kant does still maintain a non-cognitive motivation for duty to 
the law – alternatively in Enthusiasmus and Bewunderung. Motivation is built into the moral 
order. 
When we recognize this, we can see that, in a similar vein to Hobbes, Kant was deeply 
embroiled in a controversy over the political dangers of enthusiasm and fanaticism. Rather than 
attempt to banish emotions entirely, Kant, like Hobbes, attempted to transpose and ‘clarify’ those 
vivifying experiences to make possible a certain way of life.254 For Hobbes this way of life 
would be mere survival under a Leviathan, but for Kant it would be republican. Unlike in 
Hobbes’s account, for Kant, wonder is used not to dominate citizens through an affective and 
visible apparatus of sovereignty, but to undergird a republican way of life. An internal 
rearrangement of wonder within citizens becomes a resource for living a free and moral life 
                                                          
252 See (Clewis 2009, 169-214) and (Vopa 1997). 
 
253 On the need for liberal democratic affective supplements even in the sentimentalist account, see (Krause, Civil 
Passions 2008, 77, 88). 
 
254 (Barker 2015). 
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under laws made with fellow citizens. Like Hobbes, Kant also turns to ancient philosophy to 
make these discursive moves. Yet it was not Aristotle’s writing on wonder that was most 
consequential for Kant, but that of the ancient Stoics. 
The transformed notion of wonder which Kant uses to supplement his political theory is 
vastly different in its consequences from that of the 'enthusiasts' who preceded him. Where they 
sought to 'turn the world upside down' or radically overturn the predominant order of the world 
based on their passionate vision of the truth, Kantian wonder affects one to adjust the principle 
order of the world only slightly, even imperceptibly, but by doing so to make a moral life 
possible. And, finally, even though this wonder, like Rousseauian patriotism, would be writ “in 
the hearts of the Citizens,” it would not rely upon the “sublime reason” or “great soul” of a 
Lawgiver.255 It would not be achieved by a single individual for all others, nor towards a single 
state, but would be available to all rational beings in the world as the imperceptible reconciliation 
between the natural and moral orders achieved in the form of a moral feeling.  
As well as revising our sense of Kant’s relationship to wonder, this chapter also has a 
place in a much larger history, one which this dissertation attempts to track in outline: the history 
of wonder in a secularized world. Although it certainly was not the intent of Luther or most 
Reformers to spur on enthusiastic movements, decouple ecclesiastical and civil orders, and 
therefore participate in the process of secularization, intentions do not determine the ends of 
action. Kant is usually seen as writing at the end of the early modern fascination with curiosities 
and wonders.256 Yet, Kant himself famously situates Bewunderung as the anthropological origin 
                                                          
255 (Rousseau 1997, 81, 71). It is also fundamentally distinct from the wonderful, terrifying, and politically expedient 
aspects of the Roman religion which Machiavelli found to be useful in reordering a city (Machiavelli 1996, 39). 
 
256 (Daston and Park 1998, 360-363) and (Frierson 2010). 
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of moral and natural philosophy in the conclusion to the Critique of Practical Reason, which 
must not be taken as an inconsequential aside.257 Kant tells us that the “wonderful capacity in us” 
which goes beyond the ability to “calculate [a] human being’s conduct” (CPR 5:98-99) stands in 
stark contrast to the disenchanted world wherein “one can, in principle,” as Max Weber would 
say, “master all things by calculation.”258 Kant here makes a lasting claim on the role of wonder 
in a world whose order is not perceived to be ordained by the divine. Therefore, the struggle over 
wonder, and the meaning of enthusiasm, is a struggle over a very old question which had lost its 
answer, but for which new answers were being posed. Where Hobbesian wonder leads one to 
order the world under discreet and absolute sovereigns, Kantian wonder motivates one, morally 
and politically, to a cosmopolitan order of republican states.  
Ultimately, though, why should we care? The reason, I suggest, is that the moral order 
which Kant describes and supplements with a transformed sense of wonder tells us not only of a 
chapter of the history of wonder, but about the potential use of wonder in the world in which we 
live. In a general sense, wonder is a feeling that, like other feelings such as anger or fear, 
predisposes us into orderings of the world, or into movements to alter those orders. However, 
wonder is distinct from feelings like anger or fear, in that it is felt as an object comes into view 
and we are compelled to desire it to come into view.259 For Kant, a feeling of wonder towards the 
                                                          
257 For the uneasy acceptance in early modern thought that scientific knowledge relied upon a passion, wonder, see 
(James 1997, 183-207). 
 
258 The references to Kant’s works are designated to the English title abbreviation, as well as volume, and page in 
the German academy edition, and, for the most part, use the translation provided by the corresponding volume of the 
Cambridge Edition of Kant’s works, included in the bibliography. The Cambridge Edition includes the German page 
numbers in the margins. The key to the title abbreviations is at the end of the dissertation before the bibliography. 
The Critique of Pure Reason, published in two editions, will be abbreviated as A or B. (Weber 1946, 139). For more 
on Kant’s description of the capacity for morality, sometimes called dignity, to be beyond calculation or price see 
also GM 4:434-35 & 442.  
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capacity to be moral, and live under laws which one makes for oneself, brings into view a 
possible order of the world, desirable in itself. It helps reveal the republican and cosmopolitan 
destiny of historical progress and to motivate one towards it. To us, assuming that we live in 
republics, it might be a part of the glue that holds them together. In short, when we see the way 
that Kant uses wonder to intervene in debates on enthusiasm and fanaticism during the 
Enlightenment, we gain a greater understanding of the foundation of the moral order of the 
modern world.  
Metaphorically speaking, then, the history of enthusiasm is a ripple in the long story of the 
contested secularization of wonder. In the moment of Kant’s writing, the moment of republican 
revolutions, that ripple would turn itself into a wave. When we look to this context, we can see 
that Kant did not seek to fully banish the emotions from political life. In fact, wonder and 
Enthusiasmus were important supplements to the practical reason that grounded the life of a 
republic. Returning ourselves to the intellectual torsions of Kant’s moment will help us to 
understand the fact that the procedural republic of liberal democracy is based not on a purely 
rational formal structure but relies as well upon a necessary supplement of wonder. This wonder 
remains as an artifact of the so-called Age of Reason.  
2. Enthusiasm, From Then to Kant 
So how did that ripple of enthusiasm find its way to Immanuel Kant? What was the shape of that 
discourse when it reached him?260 Returning to the point in the British trajectory that was briefly 
outlined above and briefly sketching that ripple on its way to Kant will give us a sense of the 
                                                          
259 When the feeling of wonder towards an object is regularized it might be said, as Kant would say of the endlessly 
recurring Affekt of wonder towards the moral law, that the object never ceases coming into view, but is always 
dawning. 
 
260 For a short “Excursus” on enthusiasm in the thought of Spinoza, Locke, and Hume, written with a genealogical 
intent for Kant’s intellectual background, see Dicenso 2011, 39-43. 
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discursive context of Kant’s use of wonder, so we may recognize his innovative use of wonder in 
his later works. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the term enthusiasm moved through a 
dispersion of texts in which it was generally, but not entirely, associated with fanatical religious 
movements, often through a medical lens, and, following Henry More’s assessment, applied to 
those who were accused of falsely claiming to be inspired by the divine.261 For early eighteenth 
century Anglophone writers, enthusiasm was an obsession.262 But, as we’ll see shortly, this term 
and discourse was not limited to British philosophers; the French Lumières and German 
Aufklärer took part as well, and it climaxed with the work of Immanuel Kant. 
 In the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, published in 1787, seven years after 
the first edition, Kant accused John Locke of “opening the gates wide to enthusiasm 
(Schwärmerei)” (B:127-129). The reason for this, according to Kant, was that Locke, in 
assuming that it was possible to encounter the pure concepts of the understanding in experience, 
had elevated the authority of reason beyond its own capabilities, ultimately leading to the 
conclusion that it would be possible to cognize what is beyond experience. Although Locke had 
destroyed the premise of innate ideas, he also led reason to reach towards things which, 
according to Kant, it had no access. Without giving the account of the structure of apperception 
that Kant would argue made any experience possible, Locke, according to Kant, was led to 
believe that he could access in experience that which Kant took to be inscrutable. Thus, by not 
                                                          
261 (Heyd 1995). 
 
262 Enthusiasm was the focus of many mostly forgotten British works of the period, including but not limited to: 
Reflections upon a Letter concerning Enthusiasm by Edmund Fowler (1709); Nature and Consequences of 
Enthusiasm, by a Protestant Dissenter, Thomas Morgan (1719); A Discourse proving that the Apostles were no 
Enthusiasts by Archibald Campbell (1730); Enthusiasm explained: with rules to preserve the Mind from being 
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recognizing that there were certain a priori structural limitations on what is available to 
experience, Locke led himself into what Kant called Schwärmerei. The first thing to note is the 
inherent irony of Kant’s position. Of course, Locke is famous not only for breaking new ground 
in the empirical philosophy of the late seventeenth century, but also for his critical essay on 
enthusiasm.  
 Locke’s essay on enthusiasm, which appeared in 1700 in the fourth edition of An Essay 
Concerning Understanding, held that enthusiasm was a kind of assent, apart from reason and 
revelation, which subverted them both.263 To Locke, reason and revelation are consistent with 
one another, and complementary. Enthusiasm, however, “takes away both reason and revelation, 
and substitutes in the room of them the ungrounded fancies of a man’s own brain, and assumes 
them for a foundation both of opinion and conduct.”264 Fundamentally, enthusiasm is an 
epistemological problem in which one refuses to rationally assess the truth of one’s propositions. 
Enthusiasts are led by what they take to be illumination by God, but illumination that cannot 
stand up to scrutiny. Enthusiasm is but darkness that refuses, and ultimately cannot withstand, 
the natural light of reason.  
 Perhaps the most famous early eighteenth-century text on enthusiasm would be written 
by one whose education Locke would oversee, Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of 
Shaftesbury.265 His Letter Concerning Enthusiasm (1707) offered a slightly more ambivalent 
take upon enthusiasm than Locke. This might have, along with Hume’s remarks below, led the 
eighteenth century German discourse on Schwärmerei to have included Enthusiasmus as a 
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related, but potentially less dangerous experience.266 For, although Shaftesbury lambasts the 
enthusiasts throughout his essay, he ends it by saying that he has “justified enthusiasm and 
owned the word” and labels himself to the recipient of his letter their “enthusiastic friend.”267 
According to Lawrence Klein, Shaftesbury took enthusiasm to be “an essential component of the 
philosopher’s psychic equipment since it made available to him fundamental insights about the 
nature of the cosmos and its moral axes.”268 One cannot help but recognize in ancient and 
modern figures a degree of enthusiasm in noble “heroes, statesmen, poets, orators, musicians and 
even philosophers.”269 Disturbingly, this “wonderfully powerful and extensive” experience that 
poses as divine inspiration is nearly impossible to distinguish from it.270 Ultimately Shaftesbury 
concludes, similar to Locke, that it is up to reason to protect us from this false feeling of divine 
presence, and that it is socially salubrious to mock those impostors who feign its authority, even 
if it might be a potential resource to more sober minds.271  
 Following this discursive trend, David Hume, in his 1741 essay “Superstition and 
Enthusiasm” is surprisingly not merely ambivalent about enthusiasm, but even argues that it may 
have beneficial political effects. Again, Hume takes enthusiasm to be a species of false religion, 
akin to superstition, but suggests it is one which elevates the mind.272 Although it might at first 
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bring disorder, it ultimately, as Hume sees in the historical trajectories of the Independents and 
Deists in English history, becomes a friend to civil liberty in its eventual support for freedom of 
conscience and toleration.273 In contrast to superstition, which Hume associates with Roman 
Catholicism, enthusiasm culminates in a greater desire and support for freedom. Thus, while the 
British discourse on enthusiasm was originally formed and sustained as a violent reaction to 
radical Reformers and their role in the English Civil War, it now began to reflect the changing 
role of those dissenters in English political society. This transformation would be carried back 
into the German branch of the discourse, which had originally flowed into the British, new 
semantic valences of Schwärmerei, at first more or less encapsulated by enthusiasm. But now the 
equivalence between Enthusiasmus and Schwärmerei would not be so clear. 
 Subsequently, there would be in the German context an ambiguous relation between 
ambivalent Enthusiasmus and dangerous Schwärmerei in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, with many philosophers trying to sort them out, to varying degrees of success.274 In 
1775, while he was the editor of the literary review journal, Der teutsche Merkur, the German 
writer Christoph Wieland – “once,” according to Anthony Pagden, “described as the German 
Voltaire”275 – challenged his reading public to find fixed meanings for the two terms.  Although 
there was a clear recognition that Schwärmerer were more or less only ever a kind of religious 
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zealot, authors had up to that point insufficiently differentiated the term from Enthusiasmus, 
which was unfortunate, since it appeared to Wieland that Enthusiasmus was an affect [Affekt] 
that could be harmonious with reason, while Schwärmerei was a passion [Leidenschaft] that 
destroyed it.276 However, in his 1788 text, The Secret of the Cosmopolitan Order, Wieland would 
claim that the tyrannicidal sentiments experienced by republican enthusiasts [republicanische 
Enthusiasten] – from Brutus to Sidney and Milton – were inimical to the cosmopolitan, and 
therefore rational and moral, order. This is not to say that Wieland would take a position against 
patriotism – German, French, or otherwise. In fact, it was quite the opposite. The point is rather 
that he took Enthusiasmus to be a reliable, but potentially very dangerous source of sentimental 
attachment in political societies.277  
 Authors such as Johann Gottfried Herder, Gotthold Lessing, Christian Garve, and, finally, 
Immanuel Kant, would all answer Wieland’s call to find fixed meanings for the terms.278 Of 
course, none of them did so in the same manner. In 1776, Herder, one-time student of Kant’s and 
major figure of the Sturm und Drang [Storm and Urge] movement, found Enthusiasmus, 
Schwärmerei, and, scandalously, philosophy, to be all more or less synonymous terms.279 
Lessing, also writing in late 1776, found it the critical responsibility of philosophers to carefully 
watch this precarious line between the philosopher and the Schwärmer, since they could be 
tempted to appeal to the masses in the very same way. He noted also the reliance of philosophers 
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on the same sort of inspiration that Enthusiasmus provides artists, going so far as to point out the 
reliance of many philosophers on the “Enthusiasmus of speculation.”280  
 Garve, a popular philosopher who did much to disseminate the works of British 
empiricists like Locke and Hume to the German public, argued in the early 1790s that 
Schwärmerei was a kind of false knowledge and Enthusiasmus a kind of creative inspiration for 
great literature, art, and perhaps even philosophy.281 Altogether, these German authors would use 
the term Schwärmerei in a way still deeply indebted to the original invocation of it by Luther 
over two centuries prior. Yet, Enthusiasmus, which carried with it linguistic resources from the 
British debates on enthusiasm of the early eighteenth century, would be used in a more or less 
ambivalent manner. Although it might pose its own kinds of dangers, it might also somehow 
support reason and be channeled towards the defense of freedom. 
 Kant, as we’ll see below, was already concerned with the distinction between 
Enthusiasmus and Schwärmerei in the mid-1760s, well before Wieland’s 1775 call for clarity. In 
fact, he took up this distinction again during and after he was done with the ‘critical business’ in 
the late 1780s and 1790s, and, in doing so, reinterpreted them both through the experience of 
wonder. When he did so, he seized upon the ambivalence in the account of Enthusiasmus. It 
could be said that his later reflections appeared near the close of the European fascination with 
enthusiasm in general. There would still be works on enthusiasm and Schwärmerei after Kant’s 
final works, but they would no longer be part of the same lively discursive context, and would be 
like the reiterative 1823 book by Isaac Taylor, The Natural History of Enthusiasm, which was 
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singled out by R.A. Knox as “probably the most uniformly dull book ever written.”282 Although 
this is perhaps a bit harsh, it strongly suggests that later works on enthusiasm lacked the vim of 
Luther’s call for the sword. And in the German speaking context at the dawn of the nineteenth 
century, even if Schiller and Fichte’s arguments with one another relied, in some sense, on these 
terms in the background of their debate, they “stopped short of calling each other Schwärmer.”283 
Kant’s work stands near the end of this string of discourses, if not by argumentative force, at 
least by chronology. Kant’s work therefore bookends the revival of the German discourse on 
Schwärmerei. And, in a way that I’ll explore below, that climax is one that has been unfairly 
taken into political theory as cold, affectless, and ultimately debilitating. Yet even after Kant 
would bring the boundary defying movements of reason within their theoretical and practical 
limits, reason, and reason’s law, would remain objects of wonder and awe to him. So, then, how 
did Kant intervene in this body of discourses and how did he use the notion of wonder to do so?  
3. Nothing Great Was Ever Accomplished Without Enthusiasmus: Pre-Critical Kant  
The Kant of the 1750s and 1760s did not find an inscrutable discontinuity between the 
observable order of the natural world and what he would later call the supersensible, or 
noumenal, world. The fundamental task of reason was not to understand its own limitations and 
conditions of possibility through critique, but to rationally and directly cognize the immanent 
structure of the world. Correspondingly, there was no break between nature and human morality. 
Therefore, wonder was legitimately directed in the same manner toward both the natural world 
and distinctly human things. Additionally, Enthusiasmus and Schwärmerei were differentiated, 
following from the ambivalence of the British discourse on enthusiasm, but their difference was 
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not yet explained by a misinterpretation of wonder, nor through the lens of a critique of the limits 
of reason. Wonder, for Kant, would not yet have a transformative moral and political role. 
Kant discussed wonder briefly in one of his earliest published works on natural 
philosophy, the breathlessly and revealingly titled 1755 work, Universal natural history and 
theory of the heavens or essay on the constitution and the mechanical origin of the whole 
universe according to Newtonian principles. The book was written by a young, unestablished 
Kant in a popular rather than academic manner with hopes to elicit a wide, European readership. 
Unfortunately, this was not to be, as the publisher went bankrupt shortly after publication and 
most copies of Kant’s book were impounded.284 Nevertheless, the book gives us an early picture 
of wonder in Kant’s Pre-Critical works, and therefore gives us insight into the way that wonder 
was modified to allow Kant to intervene in the debate on enthusiasm. 
At the beginning of the first part of the work is a quotation from the first epistle of 
Alexander Pope’s Essay on Man which encapsulates the entwinement of wonder and 
cosmological order in Kant’s thought: “See that great chain of miracles (Wunderkette) that 
unifies and draws together all the parts of this world and preserves the great whole” (UNH 1: 
241).285 Wonder here is the proper response to the intricate system, or chain, of existence. It is 
indeed the intrinsic wondrousness of the ordered system that holds it together. The basic 
structure of the universe is comprehensible through observable laws that have governed it since 
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its origin. The contemplation of the comprehensive order of the natural world simultaneously 
occurs with wonder, both under the heading of reason:  
One cannot look at the universe without recognizing the most excellent order in its 
arrangements and the sure characteristics of the hand of God in the perfection of its 
relations. Reason, having considered and wondered at so much beauty, so much 
excellence, is righty incensed at the bold foolishness that has the audacity to 
attribute all this to coincidence and a fortuitous chance (UNH 1: 331).  
The admirable order of existence is admirable by the fact that it is clearly ordered, and the 
principles of the ordering are open to being understood through human reason. Most crucially for 
Kant at this stage of his thought, wonder arises from observation of the phenomena and their 
immanent relations to one another. These relations are universal, as “the whole extent of nature 
is connected by a graduated sequence by the eternal harmony that refers all links to each other” 
(UNH 1:365). Here Kant is clearly speaking an old language forged by early modern humanists 
out of the rationalist metaphysical framework of late medieval scholasticism, that of the Great 
Chain of Being.286 Using a notion of wonder and the place of human beings in the natural order 
strikingly similar to that of Pico della Mirandola in the Oration on the Dignity of Man (1486), 
wherein Pico described as “wondrous” “man as a creature of indeterminate nature” with a “place 
in the middle of the world”, Kant says that there is, so to speak, a Great Ladder of Being, on 
which human beings occupy the middle rung (UNH 1: 359), linking and ordering all beings in 
the cosmos.287 And it is through wonder that this order is revealed to us. Adam Smith in his 
History of Astronomy, written roughly at the same time as Kant’s book, also associated wonder 
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as that which prompted man to “lay open the concealed connections that unite the various 
appearances of nature.”288 
Reflecting Kant’s use of an old notion of wonder, and its relation to cosmological order, 
this work not only fails to give us an original but also a rigorous treatment of wonder in the 
fashion that one might expect from the author of the three Critiques. Kant’s view in this work 
relies heavily on the traditional view of the Great Chain of Being which one can find in writers 
from Pico to, in Kant’s own century, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.289 This lack of rigorous 
treatment is shown by the fact that Erstaunen, generally translated into English as marvel or 
amazement, is used by Kant in essentially the same manner as Bewunderung (UNH 1:306; 1: 
312). It would not be until 1763 that Kant would rigorously conceptualize wonder, more than 
simply rely upon the rationalistic and traditional background to give meaning to the term. 
The pre-Critical text of Kant’s which conceptualizes the brief remarks on wonder from 
Universal history, and which was even more filled with a traditional sense of wonder towards the 
order of the natural world, was undoubtedly The Only Possible Argument in Support of the 
Existence of God (1763). This text is one of Kant’s most important of the period, and it is where 
he argues against the traditional structure of the ontological argument, as well as that the 
“physico-theological proof” of God, offered by Christian Wolff, devotee of Leibniz, is 
insufficient. It is rather the case that, first, a priori, there must be some being whose non-
existence would cancel the possibility of existence, and second, a posteriori, that “matter 
contains the principles that give rise to an ordered universe” in its unity. These two conditions, 
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the a priori and a posteriori, give rise to the notion to a Supreme Being, or God.290 It is into the 
second part of the argument which wonder is incorporated. 
“Wonder is the daughter of ignorance” (OPA 2:94), and it is our ignorance for how the 
world could have been harmoniously made according to predictable laws which is most 
astonishing. Here Kant is again close to Smith, who wrote that wonder occurs when a “quite new 
or singular object is presented” and we are “uncertain or undetermined where to place it”.291 It 
might be said that this broadly falls in the Aristotelian understanding of wonder, which identifies 
it with ignorance which can be dispelled with knowledge. However, according to Kant, even if 
all the mechanical functions of the universe could be made comprehensible, the universe itself 
would remain wonderful.292 “Some wonder is left over, no matter how we may have adduced the 
above consideration to render the phenomena more comprehensible…I should still be in wonder 
– in wonder at how so many functions can be united in a single structure” (OPA 2:152). Further, 
the thought that this unity is made possible by the design of a creator does not even diminish the 
wonder of this great unity of structure and functions (OPA 2:153). Even if ignorance is 
completely removed, admiring wonder at the observable structure of the cosmos endures as not 
just the beginning of thought. Rather, it endures in the manner Plato would have Socrates say of 
wonder in the Theaetetus; as the arche of thought: both beginning and guiding principle (155d). 
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The unity and order of existence is itself wonderful, and remains so even if every 
component of it could be understood. To describe the feeling which arises out of the 
contemplation of the harmony of all existence, Kant uses the phrases wonderful unity 
[bewundernswürdige Einheit] and wonderful community [bewundernswürdige Gemeinschaft] 
(OPA 2:101.31; 2:103.16; and 2:131.28). These are important phrases which shall be important 
in understanding Kant’s transformative use of wonder in the post-Critical works in not only the 
field of nature, but also of morality and politics. 
There is a wonderful community [bewundernswürdige Gemeinschaft] to be found 
among the essences of all created things. This community is such that the natures 
of things are not alien to each other but are united in a complex harmony. They 
spontaneously agree with each other. Their essences contain within themselves an 
agreement which is extensive and necessary, and which aims at the perfection of 
the whole. (OPA 2:131) 
Though the remarks on wonder in these two texts are primarily directed towards the natural 
world, there is no break assumed between the natural and the moral worlds. Therefore, the 
wonderful unity, or community, that is observed in the natural world is also a description of the 
moral and human world.293 However, it would not be until his texts from 1764 that Kant would 
explicitly use wonder towards moral characteristics. It would also be in these works that he 
would first gesture towards the distinction between Enthusiasmus and Schwärmerei. 
Before his silent decade of the 1770s and then reemergence in the 1780s with his Critical 
works, Kant held views which were more or less common for a philosopher of the Enlightenment 
in that he sought not to eliminate the passions from moral and political life but rather to 
understand and instruct them. In 1764, Kant wrote one of the more remarkable sentimental texts 
of the Enlightenment. It must be said, however, that it was remarkable not only for its style and 
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perspicacity in describing moral life, but also for its unabashed and disgusting racism and 
sexism. Nevertheless, it still gives us a picture of Kant as a sentimental Aufklärer, glaring warts 
and all. As Anthony Pagden has noted, “‘sympathy’ or pitié” had been taken by “so many of the 
philosophes of the Enlightenment…as the sole enduring definition of the human species.”294 In 
this set of texts, Kant was not so different. 
Observations on the feelings of the beautiful and the sublime shows wonder used in moral 
terms associated with the sublime (OBS 2:209). The most significant aspect of wonder here is 
that it is used to describe the feeling (Gefühl), or sometimes sentiment (Empfidung), that is 
aroused upon observing aspects of sublimity in both nature and in human characteristics (OBS 
2:227). In this early work, Kant treats wonder in moral terms quite similar to the Stoic manner 
which Adam Smith treated it in The Theory of Moral Sentiments of 1759. There Smith wrote that 
“we wonder with surprise and astonishment at that strength of mind which is capable of so noble 
and generous an effort” as to display magnanimity and calm under conditions of great duress.295 
There are two crucial aspects to Kant’s redolence of Smith’s Stoical invocation of wonder in this 
context. The first is that wonder is legitimately directed towards human characteristics, such as 
virtue, and virtuous action. The second is that there is no distinction in this account of the 
sentiments made between what is moral and what is natural. One wonders at human morality in a 
way that is not fundamentally distinct from how one wonders at nature. Both these aspects will 
be set in stark relief once we come to Kant’s Critical works. 
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In this stage of Kant’s writings, both Schwärmerei and Enthusiasmus are best understood 
in their simultaneously moral and physical respects in the clinical argot of humorism, much in 
the manner of the British discourse on enthusiasm following Henry More, as being potential 
characteristics of the melancholic character (OBS 2:221; EM 2:266-267). Schwärmerei, 
according to Kant, is “a pious brazenness and is occasioned by a certain pride and an altogether 
too great confidence in oneself to come closer to the heavenly natures and to elevate itself by 
astonishing [erstaunlichen] flight above the usual and prescribed order” (OBS 2:251). The 
Schwärmer falsely presumes that he can ascend the chain of being to that of more divine beings.  
“The Schwärmer only talks of unmediated inspiration and of the contemplative life,” but this, 
Kant says, is merely talk (OBS 2:251). The presumptions of the Schwärmer to the domains of the 
philosopher or the theologian are no more than presumptions. The Schwärmer was historically a 
character in England and Germany, Kant tells us, surely referencing the past prevalence of 
radical Reformers in both countries. Interestingly, Kant says that in both countries that the 
schwärmerischen Geistes has cooled itself off in moderation. Here Kant follows part of the 
narrative of enthusiasm offered by David Hume. The similarity is made more likely to be less 
than coincidental in the fact that Kant also poses Schwärmerei against superstition in the same 
manner as Hume.296  
Kant insists like Hume that the political effects of Enthusiasmus are not altogether 
deleterious, while maintaining the usual Enlightenment view of Schwärmerei as a form of 
religious fanaticism. Kant clarifies in a footnote that,  
Fanaticism297 must always be distinguished from Enthusiasmus. The former always 
believes itself to feel an immediate and extraordinary communion with a higher 
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nature, the latter signifies the state of mind which is inflamed beyond the 
appropriate degree by some principle, whether it be by the maxim of patriotic 
virtue, or of friendship, or of religion, without involving the illusion of a 
supernatural community (OBS 2:251). 
In Essay on the Maladies of the Head of the same year, Kant goes even further to valorize 
Enthusiasmus. He makes the shocking claim regarding Enthusiasmus that “nothing great has 
ever been accomplished in the world without it” (EM 2:267). Kant identifies Aristides, whom 
Herodotus called the best and most just man ever produced by Athens;298 Epictetus, the freed 
Roman slave and stoic philosopher; and Jean-Jacques Rousseau as exemplary of Enthusiasmus in 
that they all were moved by a moral feeling to greatness and freedom (EM 2:267). Schwärmerei 
appears as an extreme form of piety, but Enthusiasmus as a zealotry for freedom (OBS 2:222). 
This is also reflected in Kant’s first published use of the word Enthusiasmus in The Question, 
Whether the Earth is Ageing, Considered from a Physical Point of View (1754), wherein Kant 
notes the “drive of the ancients towards great accomplishments, such as their Enthusiasmus for 
fame, virtue and love of liberty, which filled them with high ideals and raised them above 
themselves” (Q 1:212-213).299 It seems as if Kant focuses the deleterious effects of extreme 
passionate motivation in the experience of Schwärmerei, of which “human nature knows no 
more dangerous illusion” (EM 2:267). This is not only a problem for morality or rationality, but 
also a political problem since the Schwärmer is particularly successful in infecting crowds, and 
“even the state occasionally suffers raptures” (EM 2:267).  
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A general shift in Kant's thought begins to become apparent in 1766, when Kant wrote 
one of his most enigmatic books, Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by the Dreams of 
Metaphysics. Here, in the years just preceding the 'silent decade' when Kant would develop the 
groundwork for the Critical project, Kant developed his attack on those who imagine that they 
may break through the boundaries of perception and take it as divine experience. Kant does this 
through, first, a perplexingly friendly analysis and, then, devastating attack on the theological 
ravings of the lively ‘visionary’ and kook, Emanuel Swedenborg. This was a piece of Kant's 
larger project against those who, in Kant's view, would suppose that the passionate inspiration of 
poetic genius breaks through the boundaries of the understanding. At this point Kant shifts in a 
direction that would fully crystallize in the Critique of Pure Reason, wherein he puts strict 
limitations on what can be perceived and the transcendental structure of all apperception. In fact, 
one would not go too far to say that where Kant explores the delusions of the Schwärmer in 
Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, in the following years, he would critically define the boundary of reason 
which in turn gives definition to the overextension that is enacted by the Schwärmer. The Critical 
project is necessary to define what exactly Schwärmerei is, and subsequently, as we will see, to 
provide a satisfactory way to differentiate it from Enthusiasmus through the account of wonder. 
Additionally, there would be a transformation in the following decade regarding the role of 
wonder. Where before wonder was legitimately directed towards experientially available 
examples of virtue, or the observable order of nature, now Kant moves us on a path that will see 
wonder directed at something entirely different, outside of the natural order of the world and 
toward a transcendental structure which cannot be experienced or known, but is nevertheless 
universally accessible as a feeling. And as a moral feeling, wonder may give solace to those who 
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seek in humility a condition of equal dignity and respect which might be called a republican way 
of life, which, in the end, achieves a reconciliation of the natural and moral worlds. 
4. A Sign of the Times: Post-Critical Wonder  
According to the usual story, Kant’s project of the three Critiques turned fully against any 
substantive role of feeling in political life.300 And this view is not without substantial, or even 
overwhelming, textual support. After Kant’s search for the transcendental structure, limitations, 
and powers of reason, he delineated from reason those other inclinations, such as passion, which 
might determine the grounds for action. According to the post-Newtonian view of the world as 
composed of causal forces, human beings are caught in chains of causes, including feelings, 
which are out of their control. Hence the problem for Kant after the Critical works, was that 
feeling, broadly construed, would incline one to act in ways that are not grounded in a 
reasonable, and therefore free, way of life. To be free meant to be able to act in a way that is not 
determined by one’s natural impulses. The only possible route for freedom, according to this 
reading of Kant, is through reason unconditioned by nature. 
However, Kant will deploy wonder, a rational “astonishment [at ideas] that does not 
cease when the novelty is lost” (CPJ 5:272), as that which reconciles freedom with the sensible, 
natural world. In so doing, Kant not only shows an affective supplement for moral motivation, 
but also intervenes in the Enlightenment debate on enthusiasm. According to Kant’s 
redeployment of terms, Schwärmerei is an experience wherein wonder goes awry, and one thinks 
that it is possible to cognize and make immanent the supersensible. Enthusiasmus, conversely, is 
a feeling of wonder for the idea of a moral order, or republic, which remains within the limits of 
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reason. Here Kant draws upon the writings of the ancient Stoics to meet the philosophical and 
political challenges of his own day. Moreover, Kant not only intervenes in a contemporary 
debate, but found an affective attachment which remains viable, and perhaps necessary, for the 
perfectionist project of federated republics in a cosmopolitan order. 
The hub of Kant’s ethical and moral works during and after the Critical period is 
freedom. Freedom is only possible when the will is not determined by inclinations stemming 
from sensation (CPR 5:72-3). Inclinations hinder the capacity of one to be moral, to freely 
determine one’s own actions, since “the moral disposition must be free from any sensible 
condition” (CPR 5:75). However, from the perspective of a sensible world governed by the laws 
of nature, this would seem to be impossible. The world which is apparent to the senses must 
function according to necessary laws of nature, and these laws would leave no room for the 
possibility of human freedom. This is the essence of Kant’s third antinomy in the Critique of 
Pure Reason, which, like each of the antinomies, is a contradiction which arises out of the 
attempt by reason to access that which is beyond what can possibly be known through 
experience (A444-451/B472-479).  
The third antinomy, concerned in particular with freedom, is the dialectic, seemingly 
without resolution, between these following two assertions: the first is that “causality in 
accordance with laws of nature is not the only one from which all the appearances of the world 
can be derived. It is also necessary to assume another causality through freedom in order to 
explain them.” The second and opposing thesis is that “there is no freedom, but everything in the 
world happens solely in accordance with the laws of nature” (A444-447/B472-475). Between 
these two positions reason is stuck at an impasse. For freedom to be possible, it must be that 
there is some causality which is not in accord with natural laws. However, reason is incapable of 
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perceiving anything which is beyond the natural, sensible world, in which our sentiments and 
feelings are embroiled. 
If there were ever to be a resolution to this conflicting set of doctrines which would hold 
freedom to be possible, it would have to mean that there is some way to act that isn’t determined 
by necessity. This, as Kant works through in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and 
the Critique of Practical Reason, is possible to conceptualize through a deontological 
framework, which holds freedom to be possible through a procedure of giving universal laws for 
oneself to be followed as duty. Freedom is therefore not a natural, but a moral condition; “the 
domain of the concept of nature” is under one set of laws and “that of the concept of freedom 
under the other” (CPJ 5:195). Fundamentally this is because there must be a division, “crude,” as 
Kant admits, “between a world of sense and the world of understanding” (GM 4:451).301 
Freedom, in this sense, is “independence from determining causes of the world of sense” such as 
“impulses of sensibility” and inclinations (GM: 4:455, 454). To put it simply, to be free is to be 
able to act in a way which is determined by reason and not by feelings, which constitute a 
fundamental danger to freedom. 
For these reasons, contemporary theorists of the sentiments, often inspired by Hume, 
have taken Kantian inflected political theorists to task for blithely ignoring the feelings that 
legitimately motivate people in normal political life.302 Attacks on Kantian practical philosophy 
by Humean sentimentalists are not exactly new. One of the first to claim that Kantian practical 
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302 For example, (Frazer 2010); (Krause, Civil Passions 2008); (Panagia, The Poetics of Political Thinking 2006, 
75); and (Panagia, Impressions of Hume: Cinematic Thinking and the Politics of Discontinuity 2013). See also 
Zerilli’s Arendto-Kantian response to Humean aesthetics in (Zerilli 2016, 41-82). 
 104 
philosophy is motivationally deficient was Christian Garve in 1792.303 Garve, who we briefly 
encountered above in his view on Schwärmerei and whose ambition it was, according to 
historian Frederick C. Beiser, to be the German Hume,304 accused Kantian practical philosophy 
of  being too abstract and unconcerned with the end which all humans share: to be happy.305 In 
real examples of action, he argued, our motivational determination is inextricably linked to the 
purposes for our actions. Will is always aimed towards specific objects, towards which one has 
concrete feelings and desires. For Garve, to ignore the motivation of action is to fundamentally 
misunderstand the reason that people act freely, which, whether it is to achieve moral perfection 
or happiness, is always motivated.306  
In the first section of On the Common Saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of 
no use in practice (1793), Kant responds to Garve’s accusation to say that he does recognize a 
kind of moral motivation, but that it takes the form of moral feeling (OCS 8:278-289).307 Kant 
acknowledges that  
the will must have motives; but these are not certain objects proposed as ends 
related to natural feeling, but nothing other the unconditional law itself; and the 
will’s receptivity to finding itself subject to the law as unconditional necessitation 
is called moral feeling, which is therefore not the cause but the effect of the 
determination of the will, and we would not have the least perception of it within 
ourselves if that necessitation were not already present within us. (OCS 8:283-284) 
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Kant argues that the experience of following a nomos that one gives oneself out of the exercise 
of one’s own reason inspires a kind of feeling. But it is not a feeling of need for pleasure or 
avoidance of pain, which Kant thinks of as natural. Rather it is a feeling which is moral. This 
moral feeling takes the form of respect [Achtung], submission, and, if necessary, humbling 
before the moral law (CPR 5:75-80).308 This has a “negative effect”, in that the result of the 
moral feeling is the negation of any form of determination of the will by inclination (CPR 
5:78).309 This is the strictly negative and limiting case of feeling in Kant’s practical philosophy. 
It is only as an effect of the will being determined by the universal maxim that it has chosen for 
itself. It appears, then, that even in the case that Kant argued that he incorporated feelings into 
his philosophy, he only did so in a technical sense and in order to exclude all others. However, 
when we look to the way that Kant returned to the debate on Schwärmerei during and after 
writing the Critiques, we find that he did indeed suggest two affective supplements for 
motivation in moral and political life. 
 The problem of extreme feelings overwhelming the capacity for moral politics was not 
only for Kant an abstract formulation but was tied to some of the most consequential debates of 
the Enlightenment. The debate on Schwärmerei, in particular, would reappear for Kant in his 
mid-1780s encounter with the philosophy of his one-time student and now-tepid friend, Herder. 
This encounter would lead him to modify his position on Enthusiasmus and Schwärmerei and 
restructure it through an interpretation of the experience of Bewunderung within the structural 
limits of experience set by the Critical enterprise. It would no longer be a problem to be analyzed 
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309 This is against the reading of Achtung in (Satkunanandan 2011) as providing both an ontological and positive 
basis of morality. 
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with medical categories, but philosophical, through the lens that Kant developed in his Critical 
works.  
From the period of 1762 to 1764, the period in which Kant wrote many of the earlier 
works noted above, Herder was one of Kant’s finest and most loyal students.310 Later, Herder fell 
under the influence of Johann Georg Hamann, a verified Schwärmer and so-called ‘Magus of the 
North’ who was a leading figure in the Sturm und Drang movement, formed in large part as a 
response to the German Enlightenment. Obviously, Herder’s shift was a disappointment to Kant, 
but this disappointment did not immediately break into the open. As early as 1768, Kant 
privately warned Herder that his taste for the insight of genius led him to tend dangerously 
toward Schwärmerei.311 This rift would go public with Kant’s review of Herder’s Idea for a 
Philosophy of the History of Humanity in 1784, and the Kant scholar John Zammito has gone so 
far as to argue that Kant’s rivalry with Herder and the controversy over Schwärmerei lay at the 
origin of the Critique of the Power of Judgment.312 
 Kant’s conflict with the Sturm und Drang movement over Schwärmerei would break out 
most famously in What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking? (1786). The immediate cause 
of this essay, of course, was the Pantheism Controversy, in which Kant was forced to intervene 
to respond to the charge that Enlightenment necessarily led to atheism and ultimately nihilism.313 
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A key danger that Kant encounters in this essay is that of Schwärmerei overthrowing and 
replacing reason in the German intellectual moment, or, worse, reason warping into a kind of 
Schwärmerei by the desire to not only critique but also destroy all forms of order in the world.  
 What Kant offers instead is the orientation of thinking by reasonable principles rather 
than by the wild and lawless movements of supposed insight into supersensible things (OT 
8:143-146). It is difficult to not see here the reprisal of Kant’s accusation against Herder and 
Hamann – that the belief in inspiration and genius beyond the limits of clear reason by the Sturm 
and Drang movement would lead one to solipsistic raving and irrationalism.314 On questions of 
religion, if we are led to think that even reason may speak on what is beyond the senses, then, 
according to Kant, “a wide gate is left to all Schwärmerei” (OT 8:143). Reason that does not 
obey any sort of law is inexorably led to the same conclusion that Luther recognized in the 
radical Reformers: the complete overthrow of all existing forms of order. This is the political end 
of Schwärmerei. It acts under the belief that it is truly rational, but in its presumption that there 
are no limitations on reason, which it “calls Free Spiritedness [Freigeisterei],” it recognizes “no 
duty at all” (OT 8:146). Therefore, if it is not limited by civil authorities, the only outcome can 
be disorder. Yet, crucially, Kant does not describe Enthusiasmus in these terms. Indeed, far from 
it. 
 In the Critical and post-Critical works Kant would turn again to Enthusiasmus and 
Schwärmerei to rigorously reconceptualize them. When doing so, he would also use and 
transform the notion of wonder. To delineate between these two kinds of enthusiasm in this 
period of his thought, Kant used a conceptual distinction between different kinds of sensations in 
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their relation to moral action. The two specific ways that Kant thought about sensations which 
could overtake the rational basis of moral action in this period were what he called affect [Affekt] 
and passion [Leidenschaft]. In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant writes that “Affects 
are specifically different from passions. The former are related merely to feeling; the latter 
belong to the faculty of desire, and are inclinations that make all determinability of the faculty of 
choice by means of principles difficult or impossible” (CPJ 5:273). One way to think of this is 
that during the experience of Affekt one is caught off balance, but in the experience of 
Leidenschaft, rooted in the word leiden [suffer], one is enduringly aggrieved, whether one 
chooses to be or not.315 In other words, affects are only ever feelings, but passions also always 
hinder or destroy the ability to freely determine one’s own actions.316 
Further, affects are sudden and overwhelming feelings which momentarily overpower the 
ability of reason, whereas passions are slow and methodically overtake the desires which 
determine one’s choices (CPJ 5:273). Affects are quick to pass, whereas passions go to the root 
of things and corrupt them. In the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, based on the 
final form of the annual anthropology lectures which Kant offered from 1772-1796, Kant wrote 
that “affect works like water that breaks through a dam; passion, like a river that digs itself 
deeper and deeper” (AP 7:252). Kant is cautious of both affects and passions, saying that either is 
in some sense always “an illness of the mind,” but it is the “lasting inclination” of passion that 
removes the freedom of the mind, where affect might only occasionally hamper it (AP 7: 251; 
MM 6: 408; CPJ 5:272). 
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316 This distinction surely bears some trace of Stoical thinking on the passions, which distinguished between fleeting 
feelings and those feelings which ossified into an attachment that hindered one’s ability to act rationally. See 
especially Seneca’s De Ira as well as Wieland’s discussion noted above. 
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 Enthusiasmus, Kant writes in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, is “the idea of the 
good with affect” (CPJ 5:272). Schwärmerei, on the other hand, is a “deep rooted, oppressive 
passion.” “[Enthusiasmus] is a passing accident, which occasionally only affects the most 
healthy understanding; [Schwärmerei] is a disease that destroys it” (CPJ 5:275). Remarkably, 
when Kant defines the distinction between affect and passion in both the Critique of Judgment 
and the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, he does so in immediate proximity to and 
in service to the difference between Enthusiasmus and Schwärmerei.317 Enthusiasmus is the 
means by which one suddenly feels that which is morally good. It strikes one and stretches the 
mind to the limit. Nevertheless, this sensation does not seep down into one’s character, and 
weaken one’s ability to be rational, moral, or free. Schwärmerei, on the other hand, gives one 
“the incentive pathologically (in sympathy or self-love), not morally (in the law); but [it] 
produce[s] in this way a frivolous, high-flown, fantastic cast of mind, flattering themselves with 
a spontaneous goodness of heart” (CPR 5:85). The Schwärmer loses their rational self to their 
fancies. 
 Through his elucidation of the experience of Enthusiasmus Kant admits that affects can 
be useful supplements to moral action. It is an affect which may “handle the reins provisionally, 
until reason has achieved its necessary strength; that is to say, for the purpose of enlivening us, 
nature has added the incentive…as a temporary surrogate of reason” (AP 7:253). The example 
that Kant gives of Enthusiasmus here is in the affective response to reason representing to itself 
the morally good in a manner that enlivens the will. Enthusiasmus is here a special kind of 
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feeling. Kant says that an “Enthusiasm of a good intent” can be the result of reason “enlivening 
the soul” and is thus useful achieving moral ends (AP 7:254).318  
 Where Enthusiasmus is an affective incentive that nature provides reason to overcome 
seemingly impassible obstacles, Schwärmerei is “in the most general sense an overstepping of 
the bounds of human reason” (CPR 5:85). It is not, as Herder and other thinkers of the Sturm und 
Drang movement proclaim, the sister of philosophy, but rather its usurper.319 In practical affairs, 
Schwärmerei not only leads humans away from acting rationally, but also morally (CPR 5:86). In 
a fragment written sometime in the late 1790s, Kant even goes so far as to define his Critical 
project, and therefore the Enlightenment, against the danger of the Schwärmer: “The cause of 
Schwärmerei is a lack of a critique of reason itself” (17:438).320 The Schwärmer believes that the 
“appearances of the world present to the senses are merely a symbol of an intelligible world 
hidden in reserve” (AP 7:191).  They would presume that they can clearly and in isolation 
recognize the presence of the supersensible in experience (R 6:174). The Schwärmer is therefore 
prepared to read in these signs any number of things, almost ineluctably leading to a justification 
for the total overthrow of world order. And foreseeing the ruin of this world order, “the pious 
[fromm] Schwärmer by this time is already dreaming of the restoration of all things and a 
renovated world after the time that this one will have perished in flames” (CF 7:81). 
 Yet what is it that leads the Schwärmer to assume that they can gain access to that which 
reason denies them? Kant’s answer to this is simple: they are enthralled in wonder, but in the 
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wrong manner. Both Enthusiasmus and Schwärmerei, according to Kant, are responses to the 
“inscrutability of the idea of freedom,” of the fact that we can act in a way that is not determined 
by sheer natural forces (CPJ 5:275). However, it is the Schwärmer who misperceives their 
experience of this inscrutability as something positive and available to perception. This 
misperception takes the form of a “deep-rooted, oppressive passion” which not only misleads, 
but destroys the understanding (CPJ 5:275). They suppose that they may give positive reasons 
for what makes freedom possible, even if there is no rational way to uncover this mystery. They 
think that they may perceive what they simply cannot perceive. 
 In the cases of wonder for both the natural world and the possibility of freedom, Kant 
tells us that a misunderstanding of wonder can also give rise to Schwärmerei. Kant gives the 
example of the pre-Socratic Anaxagoras, who began with a great wonder for nature, but that 
“through misunderstanding this wonder gradually rose to Schwärmerei” (CPJ 5:364-6; see also 
CPR 5:137). In the same vein, one can see in the famous conclusion of the Critique of Practical 
Reason the warping of wonder at the moral law into Schwärmerei: “Morals began with the 
noblest property of human nature,” the ability to be free, “and it ended with Schwärmerei and 
superstition” (CPR 5:162-163; see also MM 6:387). In believing that one may sense and take as a 
clear guide the supersensible which is hinted to us in the boundary-experience of wonder, the 
Schwärmer loses their senses entirely.  
 There is something of a paradox in Kant’s treatment of wonder as an affect and not a 
passion.321 Wonder, Kant writes in this period, is an affect which is exceptional in the fact that it 
may endure; it strikes one in the experience of a “novelty that exceeds expectation,” but it is “an 
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astonishment [Verwunderung] which does not cease when the novelty is lost” (CPJ 5:272). 
However, this does not mean that it is only a kind of extended surprise. Although it is related to 
surprise in how it is experienced, wonder is an affect which is “stimulated [angeregt wird] only 
by reason and is a kind of sacred shudder [Schauer] at seeing the abyss of the supersensible 
opening before one’s feet” (AP 7:261; see also ONA 8:402-403).  In tying wonder to the “abyss 
of the supersensible” which dawns on a spectator, but which never comes into view, Kant here 
completely leaves behind contemporary theorists, such as Smith and Kames, to set out a new 
path in thinking about wonder. Children may be surprised at every novelty, which will occur 
frequently since they are themselves new to the world, but it takes reason to perceive the order of 
things. This is precisely the explanation for how it may endure; we may constantly return to it 
and, as Kant says, one “cannot be surprised enough” (AP 7:261). Although the forces which 
made that order possible may elude us, the existence of that order is itself enough to affect us. 
What then does Kant take to be the proper object of wonder? And how exactly does Kant in his 
later writing think that one is to respond to it? 
 The capacity of human beings to be moral is that which is most wonderful to Kant, and 
about which we must be careful to not presume that we may know its ‘inscrutable source.’ It is 
this that he means when he refers to the “abyss of the supersensible” above (AP 7:261), and that 
which sets apart his early writings on wonder from the later in this regard. In the Critique of the 
Power of Judgement, Kant wrote that “nothing more sublime” has ever been said or expressed 
than the inscription above the temple of Isis, the Egyptian goddess, taken in contemporary 
European historiography to be the mother goddess of nature322: “I am all that is, that was, and 
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that will be, and my veil no mortal has removed” (CPJ 5:316).323 For Kant this meant that 
although mortals might be tempted to look beyond what is apparent to the senses, one would 
have to do the impossible: go beyond one’s rational capacities. 
Elsewhere, Kant deployed the metaphor to say that “the veiled goddess before whom 
we…bend our knees is the moral law in us, in its inviolable majesty” (ONA 8:405). The source 
of a human being’s ability to deny their sensual nature is itself a mystery. However, Kant 
believes that we should not wonder at examples of those who are obedient to moral laws, since 
obedience to moral laws lies “objectively in the natural order of things as the object of pure 
reason” – but rather that all of us have the ability to be moral. This capability – the possibility of 
a moral predisposition – is the thing about which we cannot cease wondering. It is the “object of 
the greatest wonder” which only “increases the longer we contemplate” it (CF 7:58-59; see also 
CPR 5:161-162; R 6:49).  
 Kant also says that the feeling of wonder at the capability to be moral makes one more 
capable of acting morally and thus freely. This is similar to how Kant says that Enthusiasmus, a 
kind of wonder, may be used as an affective supplement which may momentarily incentivize one 
to act morally when one’s reason is not yet able to do so directly. With regard to the moral 
feeling, Kant tells us that one is to “cultivate it and to strengthen it through wonder at its 
inscrutable source” (MM 6:400). Wonder at the capability to be moral, and to be free, makes one 
more receptive to the possibility of being both. This leads one to “enhance the moral incentive 
(the thought of the law), both by contemplating the dignity of the pure rational law in us 
(contemplatione) and by practicing virtue (exercitio)” (MM 6:397). Wonder is a positive 
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supplement to the moral feeling, respect for the moral law, that makes it more robust and 
efficacious. In other words, wonder energizes one to live according to virtue. 
In stark contrast to how wonder was used by Kant in a moral setting in the pre-Critical 
works, wonder at exemplary moral characteristics or actions does not fulfill a didactic purpose 
in the post-Critical works. Wonder is not properly directed towards any observable traits or 
characteristics. Almost in direct opposition to the Stoical reading of wonder in a moral context 
by Adam Smith noted above, according to which “we wonder with surprise and astonishment at 
that strength of mind which is capable of so noble and generous an effort” as to display 
magnanimity and calm under conditions of great duress, Kant maintains that “even in wondrous 
[bewunderten] action, if the motive from which it was done was esteem for one’s duty, then it is 
just this respect for the law that straightaway has the greatest force on the mind of a spectator, 
and not, say, any pretension to inner magnanimity and a noble case of mind” (CPR 5:156-
157).324 No matter how wondrous that an apparent action or an observable moral characteristic 
might appear to be, Kant argues that they are not proper objects of wonder. It might seem that 
Kant departs from the modern Stoic position demonstrated by Smith. This is true in part, but 
only in part. Kant radicalizes the modern Stoic position. As Seneca wrote in the eighth of his 
Epistles, “one should reflect that nothing except the soul is worthy of wonder; for to the soul, if 
it be great, naught is great.”325 It is only the capability of free choice – granted by the divine 
spark of the soul for the ancient Stoics and as a postulate of reason for the modern Stoic, Kant – 
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which is worthy of wonder.326 All else is, as Epictetus would say, external to the “faculty of 
reason”, and thus not worthy in itself as an object of admiration.327 
It is the disposition to be moral, and to freely follow a law that one gives oneself, that is 
worthy of wonder. Kant argues that wonder for virtuous actions falls short for moral education, 
indeed it also falls short of proper wonder: “to teach only wonder for virtuous actions, however 
great a sacrifice these may have cost, falls short of the right spirit that ought to support the 
apprentice’s disposition in favor of the morally good” (R 6:48-49; see also MM 6:483). This is 
so, because to wonder at action is to wonder at that which appears. What makes the capability to 
be moral so incredible is that there is simply no way to explain it in natural, sensible terms. 
When one considers the virtuous action of an individual as a didactic example, one also opens to 
consideration the inclinations of that individual which may have determined their action. We 
may start to consider the things which caused them to do what they did, besides their own free 
choice. This leaves the morality of the actions vulnerable to annihilation through contemplation. 
Remember, it is the capacity for freedom which is wondrous for Kant, not its enactment. 
Consequently, wonder is universalized towards a capacity that all human beings intrinsically 
possess. 
 In this fact, Kant’s remarkable transformation of his own conception of wonder from that 
which appeared in his pre-Critical works, and of his striking importance in the political history 
of wonder, becomes clear. For Kant, wonder is not properly experienced when one’s attention is 
drawn towards the observable, in contrast to the general orientation of wonder in the pre-Critical 
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works. Instead, wonder is experienced when one’s attention goes beyond what is apparent and 
shudders at the absence of something invisible that could make sense of the inexplicable. Our 
desire to find the causes of things leads us to demand to know why people would ever act in 
ways not determined by nature. It is jarring to know that there is simultaneously no 
imperceptible, supernatural cause of moral action, and yet moral action is possible. The proper 
orientation of wonder between the visible and the invisible in the post-Critical works also shows 
one how Schwärmerei is so frequently translated into English as “visionary rapture” (CPJ 
5:275). The Schwärmer, seized by wonder at that which is inscrutable, imagines that they may 
see, and make immanent, that which they do not and could never see. 
 Finally, it is wonder which is the experiential point where the possible reconciliation 
between the moral and the natural worlds is revealed in time. In the way that Kant describes this 
reconciliation, Kant returns to terms which he used in Universal History (1755) and The Only 
Possible Argument (1763) to transform and reinscribe them into a new view of order that is 
focused around the principle of human freedom. Again, wonder is not directed towards the 
observable structure of the world, but instead, now, towards the purposiveness which one may 
reasonably judge to be structured into nature. This purposiveness, or “hidden plan of nature” is to 
bring about a political and moral order which makes manifest the human capability for freedom 
(IUH 8:27). The reconciliation between morality and nature is therefore one which is revealed as 
a project, and it is wonder which projects us into it, extending us into an unforeseeable but 
unmistakable moment in future time. Here again, Kant turns to a Stoic notion, this time the 
notion that the natural universe can be observed as purposive and guided by providence, and he 
radicalizes it. Where Epictetus could say that “God has brought the human race into the world to 
be a spectator of himself and of his works and not merely to observe them, but also to interpret 
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them” and that the rational contemplation of nature would end “with contemplation and 
understanding, and a way of life that is in harmony with nature”, Kant would also find the 
observed purposiveness of the course of history to point to a condition in which freedom is made 
manifest and morality reconciled to nature.328 
 Following Kant’s ‘Copernican Revolution’, the experience of wonder is an affective 
dimension of how consciousness prestructures the world through its cognition of it. Where Kant 
in the 1750s and 1760s described the “wonderful unity” [bewundernswürdige Einheit] or 
“wonderful community” [bewundernswürdige Gemeinschaft] of the world of nature, Kant now 
writes of “wonderful purposiveness” [bewundernswürdige Zweckmäβigkeit] or a wonder for the 
purposiveness of nature (OPA 2.101.; 2.103.; 2:131.; CPJ 5:423; CPJ 5:364). Human beings 
naturally wonder, in a manner akin to a religious feeling (CPJ 5: 482), at what they take to be the 
purpose, or final end, of nature.329 The phrase “wonderful purposiveness” [bewundernswürdige 
Zweckmäβigkeit] in the Critique of the Power of Judgment is primarily associated with 
biological phenomena, but it maps quite well onto the “plan of nature” which Kant takes as a 
presupposition of reason in Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim in 1784. Kant 
clearly held to this belief for the next five years through writing the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, wherein he said “that if reason is to provide a final end a priori at all, this can be 
nothing other than the human being (each rational being in the world) under moral laws” (CPJ 
5:488). From the perspective of human reason, the purpose or end of nature can only be a 
                                                          
328 (Epictetus 2014, 16), but see also (Seneca, On Providence 2007). There are many more resonances between 
Kant’s philosophy of history and that of ancient Stoicism but examining them all would simply take us too far afield 
here. See (Lloyd 2008, 90-128). 
 
329 It is also interesting to note a similar kind of wonder at the useful and beneficial character of nature in both Only 
Possible Argument (2:131) as well as in Perpetual Peace (8:363), where Kant remarks on the way that the earth 
provides for humans as they are driven by conflict to inhabit seemingly uninhabitable parts of the globe. 
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political end. It must also be a political end which is universal for all human beings. This end is 
no longer the hierarchical order of the Great Chain of Being, but an order of equals. 
 Once again, for Kant what is most wonderful is the capacity of human beings to be moral, 
to freely obey laws they give themselves in overcoming natural inclinations. That wonder which 
they feel towards their moral disposition implicitly reveals that there must be some natural 
purpose to that feeling. It is a hint given to us by nature of the future place of morality, a “world 
in accordance with moral laws” (CPJ 5:458): 
In all probability this moral interest would have first aroused attention to the beauty 
and ends in nature, which would then have served admirably [vortrefflich] to 
strengthen that idea, but could not have founded it, let alone made it dispensable, 
because it is only in relation to that final end that even the investigation of the ends 
of nature acquires the immediate interest that displays itself in such great measure 
in the wonder of them without regard to any advantage to be drawn from them. 
(CPJ 5: 458-459) 
In the experience of wonder for the capacity to be moral, nature interests us in fulfilling that 
capacity to be moral and free. The very fact that human beings wonder at their capacity to be 
moral and free reveals the purposive relation that their morality has to the order of the natural 
world. This evidence gives a hint and motivation to bring to fruition this final end. The final end 
for humans, according to Kant, is to live in a civil society and in a cosmopolitan order, since 
these are the only conditions in which morality, and therefore freedom, are possible (CPJ 5: 432-
433).  
 Wonder thus provides to Kant a political sign of an order destined to come. A civil 
constitution is the end of the historical unfolding of the moral disposition under the principle of 
freedom (AP 7:327). A cosmopolitan society, likewise, is “destined by nature” to develop (AP 
7:331). “We observe with wonder the preservation of a species of organized natural beings, 
constantly working towards its destruction and yet always being protected without assuming a 
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higher principle” (AP 7:328). The fact that human beings, naturally flawed and tending towards 
corruption, are somehow capable of preserving the civil orders in which they live is one which 
necessarily fills us with wonder. This wonder must then also, given what we’ve seen Kant say 
above, strengthen the human drive to realize their moral potential. It is wonder that leads one to 
anticipate this possibility; a possibility of constituted republics, the only states that Kant finds to 
allow humans to be simultaneously free and live under laws, and a cosmopolitan society, 
wherein this moral possibility is a universally shared condition, reflecting the universal capacity 
to be moral. 
 For previous forms of wonder – for example, that which Hobbes directs towards the 
sovereign and his effects330 – the signs which invoke wonder were purely visible; for Kant, the 
sign which provokes wonder is not the concretization of the visible state, but the invisible law 
within oneself and others. The sign which provokes Enthusiasmus is not the tyrannocidal 
violence of revolutionaries or the ravings of the Schwärmer, but the evidence of 1789, which 
shows that it might be possible for humans to live in republics; that is, under laws which they 
give themselves (CF 7:85). This wonder is not for how things are, as it was for the pre-Critical 
Kant, but for how they must be. In wondering at the capacity to be moral we are not oriented 
towards something which is present before our eyes, but only at something which is always an 
attribute of a possible future. It is therefore a wonder not for the intrinsic, but ultimately inert, 
natural and political harmony of the Great Chain of Being, but a wonder for the human capacity, 
as Hannah Arendt put it, “to forge a new chain.”331 It is a wonder for freedom, and a reconciled 
natural world ordered according to it. 
                                                          
330 (Barker 2015). 
 
331 (Arendt, The Promise of Politics 2005, 126). See also (Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy 1992, 3). 
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5. Enduring Wonder, From Kant to Now 
In the midst of the French Revolution, one of the most astonishing, and, as evidence of the 
fragility of human freedom, terrifying moments of human history, wherein all orders – political, 
moral, religious, and social – were overthrown, Kant wrote of a wonder which was orderly, non-
violent, and yet still political.332 Kantian wonder is revolutionary in the sense that it is 
reconciliatory. It binds one, in the subtlest of ways, to this new yet unapproachable cosmopolitan 
order, which, at some imperceptible and unforeseeable point in future time might bring together 
the moral and natural orders.333 Yet however distant it may appear, one can never lose the sense 
of it. While the Republic produced by the Revolution would be tragically fleeting, the affect 
which arose at the idea of a Republic, and the wonder towards a political order which could be 
moral, could never permanently perish. Enthusiasmus is a possibility for citizens of every state, 
as well as wonder for any human being in this world. 
 This chapter, like the one that precedes it, is written with an aim to understanding a 
modern use of wonder that is, as ever, fragile and contingent, if not in its possibility, then surely 
in its experience. The wonder that must be acknowledged in neo-Kantian accounts of politics is 
one that distributes a circuitry of moral feeling into everyday political life. This is itself a 
modulation of a certain kind of wonder. One can see this wonder developed from the earliest 
works of the 1750s to the works of the 1790s in Kant’s account of the reconciliation of the moral 
and natural orders. And it is through participating in this reconciliation that we, according to 
                                                          
332 For an exceptional study of the Jacobin argument that a sublime act of regicide would serve to unify the moral 
and natural orders of French society, see (Duong 2017). Even counter-revolutionaries like Joseph de Maistre 
described the Revolution as a great wonder in the providential history of Europe, but, unlike Kant, as an extreme, 
and terrifying, example of disorder (Maistre 1994). 
 
333 To capture the manner in which Kantian wonder suffuses the ordinary with the extraordinary, I have borrowed a 
phrase from (Cavell 2013). 
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Kant, feel the moral dignity of others, and thus, our freedom. Wonder was not dispelled over the 
course of the ‘Age of Reason’ but was transformed and redirected into other objects and 
locations in political life. With the rise of republican institutions of self-government, wonder was 
directed not only towards the edifice of the various institutions of the state, herein embodying the 
sovereignty of the institutionalized people, but also towards the citizens themselves; Each 
citizen, capable of rationally willing themselves into participation in a free commonwealth 
(Reich) of ends (GM 4:433). 
 A necessary component of that modern republican form of political life is that each 
citizen recognized each fellow citizen as capable of co-legislating with one another. To support 
that recognition, to see one another as capable citizens, Kant enlists wonder, Enthusiasmus, and 
the affective residue of the ancient and medieval firmament; a sense of a possible wondrous 
order of the world. The order here, however, is of fellow citizens. And a truly wonderful and 
supernatural order it is. When one takes it on faith – making space for both a ruthlessly 
dispassionate and often self-interested rationalism as well as a belief in one’s fellows to 
transcend that self-interest – then a different kind of order is possible; an order of a 
republicanism of the spirit.334  
 It might be the case that our “unsocial socialibility” is enough to naturally bend the arc of 
history towards a political condition of freedom, which our capacity for the teleological 
judgment of our place in nature tells us must be so, but, according to Kant, nature has offered us 
a supplement that fortifies our providential conjecture; and that supplement is wonder. Therein 
nature comes to its own aid in the construction of “such a sublime form of constitution.” The 
                                                          
334 Here I have in mind the nostalgic vision of republicanism in (Cicero 1991). For the eighteenth-century German 
reception of Ciceronian republicanism, see (Zande 1995). 
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human will, “revered but impotent in practice” (PP 8:366) is thus reconciled to and necessary for 
the realization of the natural order. This order, spurred on by and itself a wonder, of course does 
not stop for Kant at the borders of a republic, but rather must grow to reach that greatest sphere 
of the old order, where in Kant’s new order one is to finally become a citizen – a politēs – of the 
cosmos.335 
  
                                                          
335 On “cosmopolitan right” being the culmination of the Enlightenment project, see (Pagden 2013, 370). 
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Chapter Three 
The Whole Mystery of Commodities: Marx’s Critique of Wonder 
 
Besides, men see in heaven and here on earth 
things happen, that often fill their minds with fear, 
and they humble their hearts with terror of the gods. 
They’re crushed; they crawl on earth, because, perforce 
through ignorance of causes they confer 
on gods all power and kingdom over the world. 
If people have learned that gods live carefree lives, 
and still for all that, wonder by what means 
phenomena occur, especially those 
they see in heavenly zones above their heads, 
then they will slip back into their old beliefs 
and take on heartless masters, whom they deem 
almighty; poor fools, they don’t know what can be 
and what cannot; yes, and what law defines 
the power of things, what deep-set boundary stone; 
thus with reason blinded, they err and err. 
- Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, book VI, 50-67336 
Herein lay the spring of the mechanical art and mystery of 
educating the reason without stooping to the cultivating of the 
sentiments and affections. Never wonder. By means of addition, 
subtraction, multiplication, and division, settle everything 
somehow, and never wonder. 
- Charles Dickens, Hard Times for These Times 
 
1. Feeling Order after the Revolution(s) 
“They have only seen the Revolution; they must feel it.” 337 So wrote Joseph de Maistre in 1796, 
whose self-appointed mission, according to Isaiah Berlin, was “to destroy everything which the 
eighteenth century had built up”338 To Maistre, the French Revolution was an event “unique in 
history” by the merit that it was “radically bad” – it constituted a “schism of being.”339 However, 
                                                          
336 (Lucretius 2011, 148). 
 
337 (Maistre 1994, 18). 
 
338 (Berlin, Introduction 1994, xiii). 
 
339 (Maistre 1994, 38). 
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at the same time that Maistre finds the Revolution – a cataclysm of regicide and hatred for 
tradition – to present itself as a profound negation, he also finds it to be a moment in which order 
was made perceptible and Providence palpable.340 Maistre opened the text in which this attack on 
the Revolution appeared, Considérations sur la France, by turning Rousseau’s famous “Man is 
born free, but everywhere he is in chains” on its head: “We are all attached to the throne of the 
Supreme Being by a supple chain that restrains us without enslaving us. Nothing is more 
admirable in the universal order of things than the action of free beings under the divine 
hand.”341 By this regal chain, the course of Providence has pulled the people of France forward 
into a moment of terror. However, those who find in the events of the 1790s only disordered and 
meaningless violence have failed to respond to it with the proper wonder that the event deserves. 
As “one of the most astonishing spectacles that humanity has ever seen” the Revolution reveals 
“wondrous relationships”; but “instead of being astonished, we look the other way or talk 
nonsense.”342 Crucially, the unfolding of the Revolution was not just to be known, but to be felt. 
 Maistre was addressing a question with which other Francophone theorists who wrote in 
the long wake of the French Revolution were struggling.343 That is, what would be the 
sentimental effects of the disruption of social order caused by the Revolution “When Reason 
                                                          
340 (Maistre 1994, 5). 
 
341 (Maistre 1994, 3). See also (Armenteros, The French Idea of History: Joseph de Maistre and his Heirs, 1794-1854 
2011, 315).  
 
342 (Maistre 1994, 22 & 4). 
 
343 On the sentiment of reaction in de Maistre’s work and that of other conservatives, see (Robin 2017). For the 
extremely complicated reception of de Maistre’s thought from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, see the essays 
collected in (Armenteros and LeBrun, Joseph de Maistre and his European Readers: From Friedrich von Gentz to 
Isaiah Berlin 2011). On the profound influence of Maistre’s philosophy of history on nineteenth century socialists, 
including Saint-Simon, the Saint-Simonians, and Proudhon, see (Armenteros, The French Idea of History: Joseph de 
Maistre and his Heirs, 1794-1854 2011, 283-314). For the influence of Catholic thought on Proudhon, but also 
French socialism more broadly, see (Vincent 1984, 13-78). 
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seemed the most to assert her rights, / When most intent on making of herself / A prime 
Enchantress.”344 According to political economists of the nineteenth century, a key domain in 
which that rationalization would develop over the nineteenth century would be in the burgeoning 
sphere of production.345 As the political revolution of the eighteenth century abolished feudalism 
and opened the doors for the development of an economy organized around the productive power 
of private property – capitalism – it created the conditions for the social revolution of the 
nineteenth century, where its effects would be felt most acutely. 
 The present chapter is a study of Marx’s reworking of wonder, which is a crucial emotion 
through which order was experienced in the nineteenth century by social theorists and 
revolutionaries; that is, as a wonder for the social order formed by capitalist production and 
distribution. I argue that Marx gives us an understanding of how capitalism conditions the way 
the ordering of the world is felt and the conversion of that feeling into an ideological 
representation of the world. This conversion creates a support for the capitalistic system of 
private property in not just disconnected consciousness, but through conditioning an affective 
disposition towards the perceived economic order in our senses and passionate attachments. The 
historical thrust of this argument will be that we can only understand Marx’s critique of political 
economy if we see it as emerging out of the context of sentimental concerns of the early- and 
mid-nineteenth century. One implication is that Marx’s later writings should be reconsidered as 
having an affective, and not merely cognitive content.  
 In the political history of wonder, Marx appears at first as one who wrote both too soon 
and too late. He wrote significantly after the early modern philosophical fascination with marvels 
                                                          
344 (Wordsworth 1815, 70). 
 
345 (Sewell, Jr. 1980). 
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and wonders which, scholars maintain, came to a close roughly at the time of Kant’s writings in 
the mid- to late- eighteenth century.346 And he also wrote far too early for the resurgence of 
interest in wonder in the 20th century, inaugurated by Martin Heidegger and followed by his 
students, Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, and, a bit later, Jacques Derrida.347 Marx stands at the end 
of a certain tradition of political thinking, which bears upon the thinking of wonder as well. As 
the industrial revolution and transformations of property rights changed the material conditions 
of possibility for political thinking, theorists such as Charles Fourier, Henri de Saint-Simon, 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and Karl Marx studied how those transformations fundamentally altered 
the way that human beings as passionate animals might become attached to one another and the 
world itself. 
 Thinking about Marx helps us to understand this moment, and about how wonder figures 
into it. While forms of economic production created a condition in which ‘all that is solid melts 
into air’, including one’s sentimental attachments to the world and others with whom one shared 
it, wonder supplied a paradoxically stable form of attachment. Wonder could be directed towards 
experiences at the edges of the capacity for cognition – such as the perception of the mysterious 
and omnipresent commodity form – and could thereby be constitutively ordered to be reliably 
incited by the socially imbued artifacts of this new, liquid form of social existence. As this 
condition of social existence radically transformed the grounds for any possible political 
thinking, Marx is a lynchpin between, as Arendt would say, past and future thinking of the 
political passions. He shows how our affective disposition towards the world, crystalized in a 
                                                          
346 (Bynum 1997) and (Daston and Park 1998). See also (Kareem 2014). However, for the connection in 
supernatural content between Marx’s metaphor of capital as vampiric and the rise of the nineteenth century Gothic 
novel, see (Neocleous 2003). 
 
347 Note the selected authors in (Rubenstein 2008) and the leap from the Romantic interest in the category of the 
sublime to Martin Heidegger and those who followed in (Lloyd 2018). 
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‘bourgeois’ form of consciousness, betrays an inability to feel the world as it moves towards a 
radically transformed order. Therefore, I consider and assess a key paradox in Marx’s writings: 
How is it that capitalism feels to us as though it is constantly destroying itself and also, at the 
same time, as if it will persist forever? I argue below that the answer Marx offers is that these 
contradictory feelings about the capitalist form of production emerge from the wonderous 
qualities that are built into its structure. 
 By connecting Marx’s early and late works through this concern with wonder and 
sensuousness, I present a reading of Marx against that which has become predominant through 
the tradition of Western Marxism from György Lukács’s reading of Marx through the sociology 
of Max Weber to the critical theory of Jürgen Habermas. Rather than seeing Marx’s critique of 
commodity fetishism and ideology as a purely cognitive ‘ideology critique’, I show how Marx 
argued that both commodity fetishism and ideology had a real affective basis in a social order 
organized around commodity production, i.e. capitalism.348 To treat Marx’s critique of political 
economy otherwise is in danger of falling into the same position which Marx attributed to the 
Young Hegelians in the preface to the so-called The German Ideology, that they “demand to 
change consciousness,” but “they are in no way combating the real existing world.”349 To Weber, 
                                                          
348 This means, pace Habermas, that the kind of enchantment which Marx described cannot be eliminated by the 
“linguistification of the sacred” since it has a real and not merely cognitive basis under capitalism but only, as Marx 
repeatedly says, through a “negation of the negation” – revolution (Habermas, The Theory of Communicative 
Action: Volume Two - Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason 1987, 77-111). The works in this 
intellectual tradition are, obviously, extensive, but the bare bones are (Lukács 1971), (Horkheimer and Adorno 
2002); (Marcuse 1964); to (Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Volume One - Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society 1984) and (Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Volume Two - Lifeworld 
and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason 1987). For a recent monograph which takes a similar tack on critical 
theory, see (Chari 2015). However, as is clear below, I depart from Chari in finding much of the material for 
thinking about the sentiments in Marxism in Marx’s (and Engels’) own work. Moreover, against Adorno, I am 
extremely skeptical about the emancipatory potential of aesthetic experiences instigated by any work of art. 
 
349 (Marx and Engels, The German Ideology 1975, 30). The set of Marx and Engels manuscripts of 1845 to 1846 
that were gathered by others, at various times and for various purposes, under the title The German Ideology has an 
editorial and publication history inextricable from political history. Even referring to this collection as one unified 
collection is a fraught claim. However, for the sake of legibility, I will retain the title of The German Ideology for 
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whose writings were crucial to the formation of Western Marxism,350 the fact that we now 
understand the world to be conditioned by forces which can, in principle, be perceived and 
mastered by calculation rather than unknowable primal forces means that the world has become 
disenchanted.351 But, to Marx, how these forces appear to function can only be understood 
through analogy to the affective function of theological processes. The Frankfurt School has 
followed a path of interpreting this set of problems through the frame of consciousness, but this 
misunderstands something crucial of Marx’s description of the ‘fetishism’ of commodities in 
capitalism. However, even though I am skeptical of this path that has predominated in Western 
Marxism, I am equally hesitant to fully adopt the approach of generally classified as affect 
theorists, who can be too prone to downplay the capacity of reason in everyday political life. 352  
 According to Marx, it is not that political economists misperceive the world through their 
categories, but that they are following where their senses would ordinarily lead anyone under the 
conditions of capitalism.353 If one wonders in what might seem an ordinary way at the most 
conspicuous external objects of a world structured by capitalism – in fact, the most wondrous 
part of that world, its appearance as an “immense collection of commodities” –  then one creates 
                                                          
this collection of manuscripts below not as a unified book, which it is not, but as a common name for a collection of 
texts. See (Carver and Blank 2014). 
 
350 See (Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Volume One - Reason and the Rationalization of Society 
1984, 143-272). 
 
351 (Weber 1946, 139). See also (Bennett 2001, 58-65). 
 
352 Specific works which center the role of affect in political economy which I have in mind here include (Bennett 
2001); (Berlant 2011); (Connolly 2013); (Hardt and Negri 2009); and (Massumi 2015). 
 
353 For example, see (Cohen 1978, 326-344) and (Wood 2004, 112-162). Surprisingly, it is John Rawls who has one 
of most succinct formulations of this thesis: “They are real in that with fully normal powers of perception and 
inference we are taken in by the surface appearance of things. Similarly, we are taken in by the surface appearance 
of institutions and fail to see what is really happening beneath the surface (Rawls 2007, 342). However, all of these 
accounts play down the affective register. 
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and sustains an affective attachment to that world and its predominant forms of evaluation.354 
When one’s analysis of capitalism begins with a wonder of commodities, and remains there, one 
reifies in thought a social system in which the social passions are misdirected towards objects 
rather than ones fellows and therefore sustains a form of production in which the power to 
dominate and the structural need to exploit is in the hands of the few who own productive 
capital. To do so is to succumb to capitalism’s enchantment, which is, according to Marx, the 
predominant feeling of industrial capitalism arising in the wake of the French Revolution. 
 In the next section of what follows, I reconstruct the literary view of how the rise of 
industrial capitalism, compounded with the development of the science of political economy, 
created a felt condition of enchantment in early-nineteenth century Britain. Further, the political 
consequences of this enchantment were then incorporated into views of early socialists through 
their appropriation of political economy. I explore this through a brief consideration of Marx’s 
points of engagement with Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. In the third section, I reconstruct three key 
intellectual appropriations in Marx’s work, which together shaped his framework for 
understanding the affective conditioning of industrial capitalism: an antipathy to wonder from 
Epicurus, a view of human excellence from Aristotle, and a strong sense of historicity from 
Hegel. The fourth section builds upon this framework to reconstruct Marx’s depiction and 
critique of the affective conditioning of capitalism through the wondrous experience of a system 
of commodity production. 
 
 
                                                          
354 (Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy 1976, 125). 
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2. Enchantment, Political Economy, and Socialism 
Before briefly exploring the difference between Marx’s and Proudhon’s engagements with 
political economy with regards to the passions, let us see how a few prominent literary critics 
analyzed the ambivalent emotional life of industrial capitalism in early-nineteenth century 
Britain, which was, according to Marx, the locus classicus of “the capitalist mode of production, 
and the relations of production and forms of intercourse that correspond to it”, as well as the 
birthplace of the science of political economy.355 This will give us a sense of the stakes in the 
difference between the positions of Proudhon and Marx, and therefore, most importantly, of how 
Marx conceives of the social function of wonder in capitalism. We begin with Charles Dickens’ 
Hard Times of 1854. In this novel, Mr. Gradgrind, an avatar of political economy, orders his 
students to “Never wonder” in order to inculcate into his students the worldview of ‘the dismal 
science’356  
 For Dickens’ characters, this meant that all questions were to be solved by simple and 
unsentimental calculations of self-interest and the deciphering of bare facts. The proper course to 
national prosperity could be found only through dispassionately reasoning about these bare facts, 
whereas the impassioned flights of imagination, such as those by the wayward children in his 
classroom, would only distract one from the unsentimental reality revealed by political economy. 
Although by the end of Dickens’ didactic novel Gradgrind had found remorse for the 
dehumanizing effects of his cold and calculating philosophy, his exemplary student, Bitzer, tells 
Gradgrind that his catechism of the whole social system, which Bitzer had adopted from the 
teachings of Gradgrind, would proclaim that, “what you must always appeal to, is a person’s 
                                                          
355 (Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy 1976, 90). 
 
356 (Dickens, Hard Times 2001, 41). 
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self-interest. It’s your only hold.”357 Any other sentimental attachment is irrelevant. Bitzer’s 
social system is that of political economy, wherein, according to Adam Smith’s famous 
statement in The Wealth of Nations, “it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or 
the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their self-interest. We address 
ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love.”358 By this relation, “On mutual Wants 
build mutual happiness: / So from the first, eternal ORDER ran, / and creature linked to creature, 
man to man.”359 The order this sustains is one without true fellow-feeling, according to Dickens: 
“political economy is a mere skeleton unless it has a little human covering and filling out, a little 
human bloom upon it, and a little warmth in it” – a humanity that Dickens locates in the child’s 
affinity to wonder.360 And it is this feeling that is absent in the conceptual apparatus of political 
economy, or so the readers are led to believe. 
 Dickens’ assessment of the callous character of political economy is partly adapted from 
the diagnosis which Thomas Carlyle, who coined the phrase ‘dismal science,’361 started to 
develop in 1829 in “The Sign of the Times”, the title of which inspired the title of  Dickens’ 
book.362 In this essay, Carlyle describes a world dominated by a mechanical philosophy, where 
“wonder, is, on all hands, dying out; it is the sign of the uncultivated to wonder” and for the 
cultivated to “figure Society as a ‘Machine.’”363 However, at the same time, according to both 
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359 Alexander Pope’s Essay on Man quoted in (Taylor 2007, 181). 
 
360 (Dickens, On Strike 1854). 
 
361 (Carlyle, Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question 1849). It just so happens that this disgustingly racist text 
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these literary depictions, the world of nineteenth century England as revealed by political 
economy was also one of enchantment.364 It is described as one without sentiment, but its 
appearance reveals itself as otherwise  
 Dickens describes the industrial setting of Hard Times in the following terms: “The Fairy 
palaces burst into illumination, before pale morning showed the monstrous serpents of smoke 
trailing themselves over Coketown. A clattering of clogs upon the pavement; a rapid ringing of 
bells; and all the melancholy-mad elephants, polished and oiled up for the day’s monotony, were 
at their heavy exercise again.”365 Only mystical and sentimental terminology can capture the 
landscape in which workers toil, even if the principles by which that world is organized are 
ostensibly purely calculable. The buildings and factory equipment appear as objects out of myth. 
Carlyle produces a similar portrait, but highlights the way that the aspirations of workers and 
owners are enmeshed into the affectively charged landscape through how it determines the ideas 
which they express and their aspirations: “The Master Worker is enchanted, for the present, like 
his Workhouse Workman; clamours, in vain hitherto, for a simple sort of ‘Liberty’: the liberty 
‘to buy where he finds it cheapest, to sell where he finds it dearest.’”366 As Friedrich Engels 
would agree by way of affirmative citation, “the abolition of feudal servitude has made ‘cash-
payment the sole relation of human beings.’”367 Most curiously, it is through this enchantment, 
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supported by the science of political economy, that this ghastly new form of life upheld itself. 
Though its appearance as enchanted, this “nexus”368 of relations between human beings appeared 
as unalterable: “some baleful fiat as of Enchantment has gone forth saying, ‘Touch it not, ye 
workers, ye master-workers, ye master-idlers; none of you can touch it, no man of you shall be 
better for it this is enchanted fruit!’”369 The senses of both workers and owners were bewitched 
into seeing things as unchangeable and eternal. They had taken “transitory semblance for eternal 
fact.”370 
 This ambivalence of these nineteenth century conservative critics of the new industrial 
world of England, captures something essential about the relation between political economy and 
the affective conditioning of industrial capitalism: while the new philosophy presents itself as 
offering a new, fully rational worldview, it is essentially connected to a world which could be 
described as enchanted or enthralled by wonder. Even as political economy disavows wonder, it 
carries an ambivalent attachment to it. Social critics up to Marx and Engels would be beguiled by 
this representative ambivalence, which Marx would seize in his critique of political economy. 
For other social theorists of the mid-nineteenth century, political economy would be adopted as a 
language that might help answer the widely acknowledged question of the nineteenth century: 
whether a social revolution was to follow the political revolutions of the eighteenth century.371 
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Political economy would provide the concepts for what shape the revolution of the nineteenth 
century might take. To Marx and Engels, this ignored the ambivalent problem of enchantment. 
 William Clare Roberts has recently argued in Marx’s Inferno that the depiction of 
capitalism as a kind of “social hell” became a predominant trope, or a “flexible myth”, among 
socialists and radicals in the nineteenth century.372 In this reading of Marx, the structure of 
Capital is as a katabasis, or down-going, of the modern worker through the hell of the capitalist 
production process.373 However, I believe that the trope of the capitalist order as enchanted was 
just as important for the intellectual background of Marx’s work. And it is a trope which 
highlights the too-often sublimated aspect of sentimentalism in Marx’s materialism.374 One can 
see through reading both the works of French socialists and Marx’s criticisms of them how Marx 
argues that the enchanted view of political economy both determines and constrains the activities 
of other competing sects of socialists and radicals. In essence, their sense of the world is 
enchanted by the eternalizing structure of the ‘science’ of political economy. 
 A central problem for French socialists in the early nineteenth century, following 
Rousseau and his Enlightenment interlocutors, was that of the relation between the passions and 
                                                          
Corresponding Secretary for Germany of the International Working Man’s Association, following the Civil War that 
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commodities under capitalism – the form of attachment – is a function of domination. I will say more on this below. 
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the social order. Historian Pamela Pilbeam has gone so far as to say that the main motive behind 
the “total schemes” of early Utopian socialists such as Charles Fourier, the Saint-Simonians, 
Etienne Cabet, and Victor Considérant, “seems to have been the pursuit of ‘order’” and often 
how a passionate creature such as human beings could be incorporated into that order.375 In the 
same vein, it is also important to note, as Gareth Stedman Jones and Ian Patterson have, “that 
‘socialism’ began as an attempt to find a successor, not to capitalism, but the Christian Church” 
in how it presented a vision of how the human passions could be understood and used to arrange 
human things into a stable order.376 The rest of this section will focus on Marx’s engagement 
with Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, whose work was animated by an “obsessive desire for order in 
society” which arose from ‘anarchic’ economic interactions free from the interference of the 
state and who was one of the most influential socialist writers of the nineteenth century.377 
 Where Marx’s readership during most of the nineteenth century was relatively 
constrained, Proudhon’s was wide. In retrospect we political theorists, who generally only 
encounter Proudhon today in the third section of the Communist Manifesto, tend to think of him, 
if at all, as one of the many forgotten rivals of Marx’s. However, the centrality of Proudhon’s 
works for the European left was profound. Where Marx’s Communist League had little to no 
discernible effect upon the revolutions of 1848, nor in the Paris Commune of 1871, Proudhon 
was an active participant of 1848 with many followers in France – along with other socialists like 
the Saint-Simonians, Fourierists, the Icarian followers of Étienne Cabet and Louis Blanc – and 
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Proudhon also had a sizeable representation of adherents among the Paris Communards.378 And 
like many of those socialists and radicals of the mid-nineteenth century, Proudhon viewed social 
transformation in Europe through the lens of the French Revolution at the end of the eighteenth. 
His assessment of the Revolution was, as it was for most early socialists, complicated, and he 
defined it as driven by a “spirit of contradiction”.379 The meaning of the Revolution was an 
ambivalent mix of political freedom and the unfolding power of political economy: “The French 
Revolution was effected for industrial liberty as well as for political liberty.”380  
 The revolution of 1830, which established the liberal July Monarchy of Louis-Phillippe 
reenacted, or, as Marx would say of 1848, “conjured”, the liberal phase of the first French 
Revolution.381 This regime would be the object of Proudhon’s 1840 work, What is Property? In 
the conjuring of 1789, 1830 retained some elements of inequalities of the franchise and legalized 
a new order of private property.382 These, as the socialists and radicals argued, both revealed 
themselves as contradictory to the ideals of liberty and equality. On this point, Proudhon would 
say that “political economy, like a heavy fog, has weighed upon France, hindering the efforts of 
the mind and repressing liberty.”383 
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 Yet, as Roberts has shown, Proudhon’s thought on political economy is not as critical as 
it first appears. As Roberts notes, “economics is […] much like the natural sciences for 
Proudhon. It delineates the mechanics of the social world, telling us nothing about what we 
should do, but only providing parameters for what we should expect from our actions.”384 To 
understand how that order of human things might come to be, and its relation to the natural order 
of things, many early socialists, including Proudhon turned to the science of political economy. 
As Proudhon put it in Confessions of a Revolutionary, “all men are equal and free: society, by 
nature and design, is thus autonomous and, in other words, ungovernable. The sphere of activity 
of each citizen being determined by the natural division of labour and by the choice that he 
makes as to the work he will do, the said functions combine in such a way as to produce a 
harmonious effect, order resulting from the free actions of everyone: there is no need for 
government.”385 The problem was to align the order which prevails with the natural order of 
things, which could be neutrally disclosed by political economy. 
 Although Proudhon distinguished himself in his time in believing so firmly in a 
spontaneous order which would rise from mutually beneficial economic relations unrestrained by 
the state, he was similar to many other social observers in how he turned to political economy to 
explain the changing world that he saw around him. He even goes so far in the General Idea of 
the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century of 1851 to say that “political economy is in fact the 
queen and ruler of this age […] It is political economy which directs everything, without 
appearing to do so.”386 And in saying this, he ascribed to the features of this world a natural 
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character. Historian Joyce Appleby put this process succinctly: “With the increase in free 
exchanges, observers began to construe the voluntary but uniform acts of market participants as 
elements in a natural system. The new economic relations were undirected but patterned, 
uncoerced but orderly, free but predictable. They began to resemble – in men’s minds at least – 
the operations of systems in the physical universe.”387 According to Marx, Proudhon thus falls 
into the thinking of the political economists, who hold that “there are only two kinds of 
institutions…artificial and natural.” And the laws which are held to be natural, those which 
appear to prevail under current conditions, are “eternal laws which must always govern 
society.”388 The natural laws of economic movement are just as eternal as the movements of the 
celestial bodies of the cosmos. 
 It would be quite natural to think that Marx was here being tendentious towards the 
position of his rival. However, if we look to how Proudhon explained his thoughts on the 
generation of order in more detail, it is clear that Marx was not far from the mark. Proudhon’s 
thoughts on order are best captured in a work which appeared in 1843, On the Creation of Order 
in Humanity (De la Création de l'ordre dans l'humanité). Although Proudhon would later see the 
work as something of a failure in its attempt to combine Fourier’s “serial method” and Auguste 
Comte’s philosophy of history, we can see in the attempt a number of themes which remained 
important for Proudhon and are pertinent for the present study.389 A long quotation from the text 
elaborates this position. 
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[T]here exists a natural system of social economy, glimpsed or sensed by the 
legislators, who must strive to adapt their laws to it: a system that humanity fulfills 
each day and that I propose to recognize. Order is produced, in unorganized beings 
or those deprived of reason, by virtue of unconscious, blind, unerring forces, and 
according to laws unknown to them; — in reasoning beings, by virtue of forces that 
are felt and that are, for that reason, prone to deviate, and according to laws that 
these beings are called upon to know. In other words, the brute beings obey their 
laws without any understanding of them: Humanity is only organized by rational 
knowledge, and, if I can put it this way, by the elaboration that it makes of its own 
laws.390 
Political economy provides a useful conceptual framework for understanding the natural 
cooperative relations of exchange which might arise with the aid of reason.391 Therefore, it is the 
duty of philosophy and science to discover those natural principles to show how they may be 
unleashed. Although Proudhon in this work argues that science and philosophy depart from 
religion in that they are not based upon sentiments, but on reason, he makes a few interesting 
remarks in his System of Economic Contradictions on marvels in social and economic life.392 
 In the introduction of System of Economic Contradictions, Proudhon writes that “I 
certainly have less inclination to the marvelous than many atheists, but I cannot help thinking 
that the stories of miracles, prophecies, charms, etc., are but distorted accounts of the 
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extraordinary effects produced by certain latent forces, or, as was formerly said, by occult 
powers.”393 What Proudhon subsequently analyzes in the text are marvels which appear from the 
development of economic and social forces. Throughout the text, these marvels are evoked at 
least 24 times. Note in the following passage the play between passion, marvels, and reason:  
And you, reader, — for without a reader there is no writer, — you are half of my 
work. Without you, I am only sounding brass; with the aid of your attention, I will 
speak marvels. Do you see this passing whirlwind called SOCIETY, from which 
burst forth, with startling brilliancy, lightnings, thunders, and voices? I wish to 
cause you to place your finger on the hidden springs which move it; but to that end 
you must reduce yourself at my command to a state of pure intelligence. The eyes 
of love and pleasure are powerless to recognize beauty in a skeleton, harmony in 
naked viscera, life in dark and coagulated blood: consequently the secrets of the 
social organism are a sealed letter to the man whose brain is beclouded by passion 
and prejudice. Such sublimities are unattainable except by cold and silent 
contemplation.394 
For our purposes, what is most interesting about this passage is that even though Proudhon 
suggests in a strikingly bombastic fashion the replacement of “passion and prejudice” with 
“contemplation”, he acknowledges that the society and the phenomena that it produces are 
nothing short of marvels, phenomena which are named after the emotional experience which 
they provoke.   
 This evocation of marvels in System of Economic Contradictions points to a central 
aspect of Proudhon’s treatment of political economy, and central to that of other early socialists: 
the emotional register of capitalism.395 This is a central aspect of the socialist analyses of the 
nineteenth century. It is the central theme of Charles Fourier’s The Theory of the Four 
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Movements of 1808, in which he argues that he presents a science to harmoniously order human 
society according to natural passionate attractions.396 The Saint-Simonians attempted to do 
something similar in their desire to channel the social feelings of religion to the “religion of 
metaphysics. A metaphysics of feeling” provided by the doctrine of Saint-Simonianism.397 By 
missing this sentimental aspect of Proudhon’s – and other early socialists – treatment of political 
economy, we miss Marx’s response to Proudhon on these terms. It was the science of political 
economy which was used as the dominant paradigm to examine the passionate attachments of 
human beings to one another in market relations. However, even as early socialists argued that 
the current arrangement of the market in capitalism misordered the passions, their use of political 
economy obscured the wonder towards capitalism as it currently exists that is at the core of 
political economy.398 In this manner does the sensation of enchantment towards the system of 
commodity production enter into the social theories of the early socialists and perpetuate the 
dominance of workers expropriated from their labor. 
 This is a point which Marx would make against the ‘metaphysics of political economy’ in 
his first “Marxist” work, The Poverty of Philosophy (Misère de la philosophie) of 1847, which 
was written principally as a response to Proudhon’s System of Economic Contradictions of 1846. 
According to Marx, Proudhon adopts the categories of bourgeois thought from the metaphysics 
                                                          
396 The point is already clear from the 1808 introduction (Fourier 1996). 
 
397 (Bazard, Enfantin and Barrault 1972, 275, but see also 20 on social affectations). 
 
398 In this respect there is a surprising and great degree of continuity between the early socialists, such as Proudhon 
and Fourier, and neoliberals such as Friedrich Hayek in the 20th century who experience nothing short of marvel, or 
wonder, for what they take to be the so-called spontaneous order of the market. Friedrich Hayek himself says so 
much in The Fatal Conceit, when he calls the spontaneous order of the market “transcendent”, beyond the “reach of 
our understanding”, and “wonderful” (Hayek 1988, 72 & 84). My thanks to Kirstie McClure for suggesting this 
resonance of thought. And not only neoliberals maintain the enchantment of political economy, but so too do 
prominent theorists of affect in political theory, and, I suspect, not in the way that is intended. To Jane Bennett, 
“there is no vision of capitalist or noncapitalist economy today that does not include some role for the commodity 
form.” (Bennett 2001, 113). 
 142 
of political economy. These include “the division of labor, credit, money”, which are themselves 
expressed in political economy as “fixed, immutable, eternal categories.”399 Earlier in a section 
on Proudhon in The Holy Family of 1845, Marx made a similar point. There he wrote of 
Proudhon’s What is Property? that it is the “criticism of political economy from the standpoint 
of political economy” which would be “superseded by a criticism of political economy” in its 
fundamental conceptual categories.400 By basing his analysis of society on the categories of 
political economy, Proudhon eternalizes those categories. When French Socialists turned to the 
British ‘science’ of political economy to understand the world which emerged in the wake of the 
French Revolution, they adopted for themselves a worldview which was in itself, according to 
British literary figures, enchanted. They had taken, as Carlyle put it, “transitory semblance for 
eternal fact.”401  
3. Nil Admirari:  Marx’s Early Work  
Marx does not systematically treat wonder as such in his works. That much is clear. It was not 
one of his foci of analysis. However, there are a few striking examples of the emotion in his texts 
which deserve mentioning and draw us in to see the underlying significance of the experience of 
wonder in his work. These examples give us a glimpse of how Marx finds capitalism to be 
structured to produce both the feeling that it is destroying itself, while also seeming to be 
destined to last forever. The first example is in the Communist Manifesto. It occurs in the first 
section of the text, where Marx and Engels are listing the ways that the bourgeoisie, the class of 
private owners of productive property, has, “for exploitation, veiled by religious and political 
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illusions, […] substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.” In the place of human 
relations shrouded in sentiment it has reduced all relations to “a mere money relation”, making, 
as we saw Engels cite Carlyle before, “cash-payment the sole relation of human beings.”402 After 
listing the ways that enchanted relations between human beings have been dissolved by 
capitalism, Marx and Engels note that the bourgeoisie “has accomplished wonders far surpassing 
Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals.” In the following paragraph, Marx 
and Engels conclude with the following famous sentence: “All that is solid melts into air, all that 
is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of 
life, and his relations with his kind.”403 It is a remarkable sentence, demonstrating both the 
triumph of the bourgeoisie and Marx and Engels’ belief that this triumph amounts to an 
opportunity for social science to understand how power actually functions in the processes of 
production. However, it is quite odd that Marx and Engels choose to describe the monuments of 
capitalism as “wonders [Wunderwerke]”, achievements which appear as miraculous or 
supernatural, in that they far exceed the natural range of human capacities through the use of 
human cooperation, within a section of the text devoted to showing how the bourgeoisie have 
eliminated the role of the supernatural in social and economic life. 
 This oddity in the Communist Manifesto might easily be written off as a rhetorical 
flourish, though it seems to cut at the heart of the argument, if it didn’t recur in such a similar 
fashion in Capital. There Marx again evokes the wonder of the monuments of the Egyptian 
pyramids, Etruscans, and ancient Asian civilizations in order to demonstrate that the cooperative 
power of workers that was necessary to build those wonders “has in modern society been 
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transferred to the capitalist.”404 This alone does not shed much light on the significance of 
wonder in Marx’s thought. Yet there is another appearance of wonder in the text of Capital 
which might help our analysis.  
A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and easily understood. Its 
analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical 
subtleties and theological niceties. So far as it is a value in use, there is nothing 
mysterious about it, whether we consider it from the point of view that by its 
properties it is capable of satisfying human wants, or from the point that those 
properties are the product of human labour. It is as clear as noon-day, that man, by 
his industry, changes the forms of the materials furnished by Nature, in such a way 
as to make them useful to him. The form of wood, for instance, is altered, by making 
a table out of it. Yet, for all that, the table continues to be that common, every-day 
thing, wood. But, so soon as it steps forth as a commodity, it is changed into 
something transcendent. It not only stands with its feet on the ground, but, in 
relation to all other commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden 
brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful [wunderlicher] than "table-turning" ever 
was.405 
Here, in the different ways that a commodity appears, we have a kernel for our analysis tying 
wonder to the form of the commodity in Marx’s analysis: its fetish-character.  
Through its appearance as a second, non-sensuous value a commodity is a wondrous and 
wonder-working thing. Marx no longer reserves the term “wonder” for only the greatest 
monuments of production, on the scale of the Pyramids of Giza, Roman Aqueducts, or the 
Kölner Dom, but claims that all commodities are wonderous in their fundamental relation to all 
other commodities. This category, exchange value, fundamental to the science of political 
economy going back to Aristotle, is one which, in modern capitalism, is predicated on a 
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wonderous relation amongst commodities produced for the sole purpose of increasing surplus 
value for the owners of the means of production. What could this wondrousness mean?406 
 I propose to start at the beginning of Marx’s scholarship. To better understand how 
Marx’s deployment of the language of wonder fits into his theory of capitalism and his mature 
engagement with Proudhon, it is necessary to develop three elements of Marx’s early thought 
which he never fully abandoned: first, his skepticism towards wonder; second, his assessment of 
human capabilities relating to sight and cognition; and, third, his rejection of sense certainty for a 
dialectical, historical method of analysis. To quickly develop these three elements, I will 
respectively touch upon Marx’s writings on three important figures for his development: 
Epicurus, Aristotle, and Hegel. Then we will be able to return, in the following section, to 
Marx’s later work on political economy with more tools for grasping his meaning. 
a. Epicurean Enlightenment 
In his doctoral dissertation, Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of 
Nature of 1841, Marx gave a high estimation of the ancient systems of Epicureanism, Stoicism, 
and Skepticism, calling them the “key to the true history of Greek philosophy.”407 What Marx 
finds in these systems, and particularly in Epicureanism, is similar to what Nietzsche found in his 
Daybreak of 1881 to be the sentiment through which the “philosopher of antiquity” approached 
the work of philosophy: Nil Admirari – wonder at nothing.408 For these schools of thought, to 
                                                          
406 Both Joshua Dienstag and Sean Monahan have suggested to me an alternative meaning of this to that which I 
explore below. This is that Marx’s work makes the everyday aporia of capitalism appear as wondrous in his analysis 
of it, and thus proceeds from this wondering to an inquiry into the causes of this mysteriousness. Wondering, then, is 
a result of Marx’s demonstration. While this reading is interesting in how it brings Marx’s notion of wonder 
curiously close to that of Aristotle’s, it overlooks the degree to which the ‘mysteriousness’ of economic life was 
already an evident problem for social critics of the nineteenth century before Marx’s work, as Marx well knew. See 
(Roberts 2017, 56-103). 
 
407 (Marx, Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature 1975, 29-30). 
 
408 (Nietzsche 1997, 129). 
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endure wonder and strive passionately after phenomena that occur outside of oneself is to 
surrender oneself to forces that are beyond one’s control, and therefore to endanger one’s chance 
at living a good life. Nietzsche might have overplayed his point in this summation, but he is not 
far from the mark about the three major Hellenistic schools of thought, which all, in one way or 
another, found the passionate experience of wondering (thaumazein in Greek or admiratio in 
Latin) to be a threat to ataraxia, stillness of the soul, which was either a product of or contributed 
to a happy life, (eudaimonia or felicitas).409 The affective basis of knowledge is something which 
gave them great trepidation, as it did early modern thinkers such as Descartes, Spinoza, and 
Hobbes, themselves deep readers of the Hellenistic schools.410 Marx, in this regard, followed this 
early modern reading of the Hellenistic philosophy, and identified Epicurus as the “greatest 
representative of Greek Enlightenment” for the fact that in his thought, according to Marx, 
“nothing is eternal which destroys the ataraxy of individual self-consciousness.”411 To be sure, 
the support which Epicurean philosophy gives to modern atheism was also quite attractive to 
Marx. 412However, there was more to it than that. Epicurus’s philosophy of nature is constructed 
such that the elements of the cosmos which disturb the soul, such as the unpredictable 
movements of meteors, are not eternal parts of the cosmos. In this attitude towards wondering 
and the semblance of the world provided to the senses, we can see a foreshadowing of Marx’s 
                                                          
409 To prove this point with certainty would take me far too afield at this point. However, one can find in the writings 
of Cicero, Seneca, Lucretius, Horace, and Epicurus much evidence to support this broad conclusion. 
 
410 On the trepidation with the affective basis of knowledge and science by the early moderns, see (James 1997). 
 
411 (Marx, Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature 1975, 72). 
 
412 For a reading of Marx’s dissertation which sees it arising out of contemporary concerns of Kantian and Hegelian 
philosophy, see (Fenves 1986). 
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attitude towards the objective illusion and the affective disposition of political economists, as 
well as other agents living under the conditions of capitalism, in commodity fetishism.  
 Marx finds in Epicurus a model of affective Enlightenment, in that he discovers a relation 
between the self and the world in which knowledge of the world can be achieved without 
sacrificing the flourishing and freedom of the self. Marx makes this point a bit more clearly in 
his Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy: “Epicurus denounces the senseless mere wondering 
contemplation of the celestial bodies as stultifying and fear-inspiring; he asserts the absolute 
freedom of mind.”413 Marx continues on this point a few pages later:  
For Epicurus the sound of his own voice drowns the thunder and blots out the 
lightning of the heavens of his conception. We can gather from the monotonous 
repetition how important Epicurus considers his new method of explanation, how 
intent he is to eliminate the miraculous, how he always insists on applying not one, 
but several explanations, giving us very frivolous examples of this in respect of 
everything, how he says almost outright that while he leaves nature free, he is 
concerned only with freedom of consciousness.414  
Hans Blumenberg broadly concurs with Marx’s interpretation of Epicurus and puts this point 
into more analytic language: “For Epicurus the appetite for knowledge is an important source of 
the affects of fear and hope that rule human life and cheat it of its potential happiness.” However, 
Epicurus does not suggest that one should refrain from the judgments of things which cause 
destabilizing emotions, but demonstrate the “affective neutrality of all possible theories about the 
                                                          
413 (Marx, Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy 1975, 418). The textual support for Marx’s reading is primarily in 
the Letter to Herodotus, where Epicurus writes that “Those who have observed such phenomena [revolutions of 
celestial bodies, eclipses, etc.] but are ignorant of their nature and ultimate causes, stand in awe of them as much as 
if they had no knowledge of them; and their fear may well be greater if the wonderment occasioned by the 
observation of such phenomena fails to find an explanation in a system of ultimate causes. Hence, even if we find 
more than one cause for these revolutions, risings, settings, eclipses, and the like, as we did in our little treatise, we 
must not suppose that we have not acquired the scientific knowledge needed to contribute to our serenity and 
happiness. Hence we should investigate the causes of all celestial and nonperceptible phenomena by making a 
comparison of these with the various ways in which an analogous phenomenon takes place in our own experience” 
(Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus 2012, 110). See also (Epicurus, Leading Doctrines 2012, 174-176). 
 
414 (Marx, Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy 1975, 420). 
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natural phenomena that surround man and fill him with uncertainty.”415 This attitude of the self 
will be crucial as we later attempt to parse Marx’s writings on political economy. 
 One can see Marx test out this attitude to argue against other contemporary German 
Romantic philosophers, such as Friedrich Schelling, through an interpretation of Plato. In the 
following passage, Marx interprets Plato’s metaphysics in the Timaeus through the language of 
Hegelian dialectics. However, it presents motifs which would persist in Marx’s thought.  
In expounding definite questions of morality, religion, or even natural philosophy, 
as in Timaeus, Plato sees that his negative interpretation of the Absolute is not 
sufficient; here it is not enough to sink everything in the one dark night in which, 
according to Hegel, all cows are black; at this point Plato has recourse to the 
positive interpretation of the Absolute, and its essential form, which has its basis in 
itself, is myth and allegory. Where the Absolute stands on one side, and limited 
positive reality on the other, and the positive must all the same be preserved, there 
this positive becomes the medium through which absolute light shines, the absolute 
light breaks up into a fabulous play of colours, and the finite, the positive, points to 
something other than itself, has in it a soul, to which this husk is an object of 
wonder; the whole world has become a world of myths. Every shape is a riddle. 
This has recurred in recent times, due to the operation of a similar law.416 
Here Marx finds in the transcendental philosophy of Plato an antagonism towards the finite, 
phenomena world, which is not only opposed by the Ideas, but is evacuated of any meaning by 
the ideal. All that remains of the phenomena are the empty shells that are objects of wonder in 
how they only have value by the stamp of the ideal. 417 Below we will see Marx treating 
commodities in a similar manner, as social hieroglyphs which carry value by the fact that they 
have been stamped by the form of capitalist production, and thus trigger wonder in that curious 
connection. However, here as below Marx adopts an Epicurean attitude to wonder, which 
                                                          
415 (Blumenberg 1983, 262). 
 
416 The italics are mine, (Marx, Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy 1975, 497).  
 
417 See also (Breckman 1999, 269). 
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recognizes the potential to be pulled into external phenomena by wonder towards them but 
strives to resist that pull. This is not to say that Marx pursues scientific inquiry in an Epicurean 
manner. In fact, there is much more of Aristotle and Hegel in Marx’s formulation of scientific 
inquiry. However, it is the Epicurean attitude that prevails towards the phenomena of capitalism 
as they immediately appear to the senses.418 
b. The Humanism of a German Aristotle 
We now come to a more familiar dimension of the early Marx, although not less controversial: 
his humanism. Here we will look at a few of the capabilities which Marx attributed to human 
beings with special reference to Aristotle. As I mentioned in the introduction, to make my 
argument I obviously depart from readings of Marx by such writers as Louis Althusser who 
claim that there is a clear ‘epistemological break’ between the Humanism of the early Marx and 
the ‘Scientism’ of the later Marx.419 The connection between the early works and the late works 
is a difficult question, and not one which I claim to answer or adequately address here. However, 
I think that any reasonable reading of Marx’s work will see that there are clear points where his 
concerns about the dehumanizing effects of capitalism in The Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844 are carried through to the immanent ideal of freely and fully developing 
one’s capacities in Capital. Here I want to focus this question of Marx’s humanism on the place 
of Aristotle in Marx’s works, which I will address briefly to establish a few fundamental human 
capacities which Marx holds human beings to have. This will be important as we proceed to the 
works on political economy, in that it will show how some capacities are either warped or misled 
                                                          
418 My thanks to William Clare Roberts for pushing me to clarify this point. 
 
419 For a detailed response to the Althusserian position, see (Geras 2016). 
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under the conditions of capitalism. A key part of this story will be the function of the emotions 
for human flourishing, which will be my focus in what follows. 
 Aristotle is a regular reference in Marx’s work, in particular Aristotle’s definition of man 
in the Politics. In 1843, Marx wrote that “A German Aristotle who wanted to derive his politics 
from our conditions would write at the top of it: ‘Man is a social animal that is however 
completely unpolitical’”.420 In the so-called Grundrisse manuscripts of 1857-1858, Marx writes 
that “man is a ζῷον πολῑτῐκόν [zoon politikon] in the most literal sense: he is not only a social 
animal, but an animal that can isolate itself only within society.”421 Finally, in Capital, volume 1, 
of 1867 Marx writes that “man is, if not as Aristotle contends, a political, at all events a social 
animal,” which he clarifies in a footnote to say that “strictly, Aristotle's definition is that man is 
by nature a town-citizen.”422 It is clear then, that Marx takes something central about the 
definition of the human being, from the early stages of his writing to the late, from Aristotle. 
However, he also seems to believe that there is something that is missing for human beings in 
contemporary society which existed for human beings in the world in which Aristotle lived; 
something, given the centrality of the active political life for Aristotle’s eudaimonia, 
fundamental for human flourishing. 
 According to David Leopold’s account of the young Marx’s writings, “in order to 
flourish, the essential capacities of the individual must have developed in a healthy and vigorous 
manner. This is only possible in a society which satisfied not only basic physical needs…but also 
                                                          
420 (Marx, Letters from the Deutsch-Französiche Jahrbücher 1975, 137). 
 
421 (Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1858 1975, 18). 
 
422 (Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1 1975, 331). 
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less basic social needs.”423 However, I would argue that Marx has a more perfectionist, and 
therefore more Aristotelian, view of developing human capacities than Leopold is willing to 
grant. The young Marx was deeply concerned with the historical and economic conditions which 
would make possible the development of human virtues, even if he might have expressed this 
through some of the language of Feuerbach: “The real, active orientation of man to himself as a 
species-being, or his manifestation as a real species-being (i.e., as a human being), is only 
possible if he really brings out all his species-powers—something which in turn is only possible 
through the co-operative action of all of mankind, only as the result of history.”424  Human 
beings are fundamentally beings who can only fully develop their capacities in active communal 
life, which was the polis for Aristotle. In the modern world, which is not organized around 
equitably providing the economic or social goods necessary for human beings to fully develop 
their capacities, human beings are still individuated by the order of society, but not to the full 
level of development which is possible for a member of the human species.425 
 To Aristotle, of course, the best form of life includes the time and opportunities necessary 
for pursuits of contemplation and theorizing.426 As Aristotle says at the beginning of the 
                                                          
423 The basic physical needs which Leopold lists are “for sustenance, warmth and shelter, certain climatic conditions, 
physical exercise, basic hygiene, procreation and sexual activity” and the social needs are “for recreation, culture, 
intellectual stimulation, artistic expression, emotional satisfaction, and aesthetic pleasure”. Leopold is also careful to 
note that this list is in no way exhaustive (Leopold 2007, 241). On Marx and human nature, see also (Geras 2016) 
and (Ollman 1971). 
 
424 This also bears a strong resemblance to the philosophies of history of Kant and Hegel, but the notion of ‘species-
being’ draws a direct line to Feuerbach. (Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 1975, 333). 
 
425 Obviously this account of Marx means that I believe that another aspect of republicanism is apparent in his 
writings: not only the aspect of freedom as non-domination which Roberts (2017) reads into Capital from the work 
of (Pettit 1997), but also the aspect of republicanism that views the vita activa as necessary for achieving the full 
scope of a human life. For this latter aspect, see (Pocock 2016, 49-80). However, I fully acknowledge that to 
substantiate this point would require a reading of both Marx’s On The Jewish Question and The Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, which I simply cannot perform here. 
 
426 See Politics , Book VII. 
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Metaphysics, all human beings by nature desire to know. This desire to know is felt as wonder.427 
Wondering and learning about things is a pleasurable experience, since it brings the human soul 
“into one’s natural condition” – a state of knowledge of things.428 Nussbaum calls this the 
“original joy in sorting out the world.”429 Aristotle here means ‘normal’ not in the sense that any 
human being will allow themselves to follow the passion of wonder to knowledge, but that the 
average healthy human being will proceed from wonder through inquiry towards knowledge. 
According to Aristotle, “it is owing to wonder that men both now begin and at first began to 
philosophize”, wondering first “at the obvious difficulties”, those everyday aporia which appear 
to our senses, but, when we notice them, we cannot immediately understand.430 The natural 
course of wonder then is to proceed from those obvious difficulties towards the grander 
questions, such as those about the ordering of the cosmos and the genesis of the universe. When 
science and philosophy provide answers to the difficulties which originally cause wonder, 
Aristotle holds that, in those circumstances, the passion of wonder simply ceases.  
 In contrast to Epicureanism and the other dominant Hellenistic schools that would arise 
after him, then, Aristotle found it untroubling that wonder, a passion arising from our senses, 
would play a large role in not only philosophy but the good life, insofar as it leads to a salubrious 
conclusion: knowledge. Where the Epicurean attempted to avoid wondering altogether, Aristotle 
found it normal and fundamentally human to be moved by this passion, as long as it ended in the 
                                                          
427 Quotations from the Metaphysics are taken from the translation by W.D. Ross in (Aristotle, Metaphysica 2001), 
and the translation of the Rhetoric in the same volume, (Aristotle, Rhetorica 2001). (Rhetoric 1371a25-30). 
 
428 (Rhetoric 1369b30-35). 
 
429 (Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought 2003, 189). 
 
430 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 982b10-15). 
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“contrary” and “better state” in which “men learn the cause”.431 Surely we can see in The 
German Ideology, for example, Marx’s own delight with theory when he describes criticism as 
one of the many pleasurable activities which he would freely choose to do, but would not 
determine his social existence in a communist society.432 Here Marx is close to Aristotle’s belief, 
as Marx describes it, of “theoria as the best thing,” the most pleasant and the best, “or when he 
admires rational pursuits as a core part of human nature.”433 Moreover, Marx believes that if 
suitable conditions exist for the fulfillment of human flourishing, “sense-perception…must be 
the basis of all science.”434 
 However, due to the alienation humans experience under capitalism, Marx argues we 
cannot naively rely upon what appears to our sense-perception as the basis of science. “Criticism 
appears no longer as an end in itself, but only as a means. Its essential sentiment is indignation, 
its essential activity is denunciation.”435 Under capitalism, we simply cannot trust our senses. 
Even though a healthy society might allow the normal functioning of eyes, the sense of 
perception has become estranged under capitalism. The attachments that one can forms to the 
world and others are fundamentally conditioned by the objective relations which predominate in 
society. “Each of [man’s] human relations to the world – seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, 
feeling, thinking, observing, experiencing, wanting, acting, loving – in short, all the organs of his 
individual being” only manifest themselves in relation to the world, and are therefore determined 
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432 (Marx and Engels, The German Ideology 1975, 47). 
 
433 (Marx, Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy 1975, 496). 
 
434 (Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 1975, 303). 
 
435 (Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introduction 1975, 177). 
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socially by the objective conditions of capitalism.436 To put this in moralistic terms, “all passions 
and all activity must therefore be submerged in avarice.”437 What is required, in order to bring 
about a condition in which the senses can function normally is to transform the world itself.  
The abolition of private property is therefore the complete emancipation of all 
human senses and qualities, but it is this emancipation precisely because these 
senses and attributes have become, subjectively and objectively, human. The eye 
has become a human eye, just as its object has become a social, human object—an 
object made by man for man. The senses have therefore become directly in their 
practice theoreticians.438 
By eliminating the private ownership of property, and therefore the alienating form of 
commodity production in which laborers have no ownership over their own products, one 
eliminates both the perception of things as owned solely by oneself as an owner and owned by 
another as a producer. Cartesian skepticism in social matters is brought to a historical conclusion. 
One perceives objects as possessed by all humans socially, and thus the world as fully human. 
However, in contemporary society, according to the early Marx, the senses are problematic for 
theory. One sees objects through the lens of ‘avarice’ – as possessed by oneself or another – and 
therefore permeated by relations of exploitation and domination. How then should human beings 
make sense of a world in which the senses are themselves untrustworthy? How can one know the 
ordering of the world and thus gain the capacity to act in it? 
c. Hegel and History 
The dialectic of knowing begins famously in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit with the 
philosophical weakness of our bare sensory knowledge of the world. According to Hegel, the 
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437 (Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 1975, 309). 
 
438 (Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 1975, 300). On Marx’s extraordinary belief that social 
science will no longer be necessary in communist society, see the appended concluding essay in (Cohen 1978). 
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certainty which occurs to us through our unmediated senses is upon reflection the “most 
abstract” and “poorest truth”.439 This is due to the fact that what immediately appears to our 
senses does not alert us to the historicity of the processes behind those phenomena. For instance, 
at the moment that I am writing this passage, if I were to ask myself a simple question, “What is 
now?” I might answer, “Now is afternoon. Yet now, as I look back upon this sentence while 
editing this passage, the ‘now’ is now night.440 The knowing that I find in the sensuous, 
according to Hegel, is overburdened by the self which I carry into it in that moment, which is 
itself expressed in an ephemeral moment of intuition. And that intuition is no more than an 
artifact of a moment of the world, which contains its own tendency towards negation: this 
moment I know is not the moment which I had previously marked as ‘now’. True knowing must 
engage itself in a dialectical process which is fundamentally historical and aimed towards 
capturing movement in its historicity.441 Where for Hegel, this is a process, as Marx puts it, “of 
the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking,” Marx takes this as the way which theory must 
view the processes which take place in the material world.442 Theory must distrust the immediate 
observations of the senses as potentially misleading one from the historical tendencies taking 
place in the world.443 
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440 (Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit 1977, 62-63). 
 
441 “It is clear that the dialectic of sense-certainty is nothing else but the simple history of its movement or its 
experience, and sense-certainty itself it nothing else but just this history” (Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit 1977, 
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442 (Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1 1975, 19). 
 
443 See also the appearance of Hegel in the method of political economy given in the so-called Grundrisse, (Marx, 
Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1858 1975, 38); as well as Marx’s critique of Feuerbach’s eternalizing model of 
“sensuous certainty” in The German Ideology, (Marx and Engels, The German Ideology 1975, 39-41). 
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 Hegel’s approach to the theoretical treatment of the senses, a historically grounded 
dialectical approach, is carried over in his treatment, tacit and overt, of wonder. This approach is 
also, as I will attempt to show in the following section, shared by Marx. Let us look to how 
Hegel carries over his critique of sense-certainty to Aristotle’s notion of wonder towards what 
appears to our senses leading towards philosophical thinking: 
[W]e must abandon mere intuition and the necessity for that lies in the fact that 
intelligence is, but its concept, cognition, whereas intuition is not yet cognitive 
knowledge, since intuition as such does not attain to the immanent development 
of the substance of the object but confines itself rather to apprehending the not 
yet unfolded substance still wrapped up in the inessentials of the external and 
contingent. Intuition is, therefore, only the beginning of cognition. It is to this 
position of intuition that Aristotle’s saying refers, that all knowledge starts from 
wonder. For since subjective reason, as intuition, has the certainty, though only 
the indeterminate certainty, of finding its own self again in the object initially 
burdened with the form of unreason, the subject-matter instils into it wonder and 
awe. But philosophical thinking must rise above the standpoint of wonder. It is 
quite erroneous to suppose that one already genuinely knows the subject-matter 
when one has an immediate intuition of it. Complete cognition belongs only to 
the pure conceptual reason.444 
Let us cut through some of the Hegelese of this passage. Mere intuition, in which we attempt to 
make sense of the world as it immediately appears to us through our senses, is blind to the 
historicity of the world. We simply do not perceive through the senses what is essential about 
things or the tendencies by which they develop.445 Hegel accuses Aristotle of only working on 
the level of intuition in his conceptualization of wonder. Therefore, wonder burdens the subject 
who experiences it as an individualizing and de-historicizing passion. Although Aristotle writes 
that science brings wonder to its opposite, knowledge, he does not reject wonder as a response to 
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with the Zusatze 2007, 183). 
 
445 I am suspicious here that Hegel is downplaying Aristotle’s connection between discovering the causes, but that is 
beside the point. 
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appearances as a starting point for philosophical thinking. Hegel, on the other hand, argues that 
philosophical thinking must rise above the standpoint from which wonder occurs, the senses. “A 
talented historian,” Hegel notes, “has before him in vivid intuition the whole of the conditions 
and events he is to describe.”446 
 In his reading of Hegel, Marx finds a method of analyzing economic phenomena. The 
first of the Theses on Feuerbach gives us a clue as to what Marx would develop in the first 
volume of The German Ideology. The thesis begins by noting that “the chief defect of all 
previous materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that things [Gegenstand], reality, 
sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as 
sensuous human activity, not subjectively.”447 Further, in the fifth thesis, Marx notes that 
“Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking, wants [sensuous] contemplation; but he does not 
conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activity.”448 Reading these two theses 
together, it is clear that Marx is attacking a mode of thought which views the world apparent to 
the senses as inert, as an object which does not move. If one takes Hegel’s dialectics seriously, 
this trace of sense-certainty leads one astray from actually understanding the tendencies by 
which the appearances of the world function. Although Marx does not use the term here, and 
Feuerbach does not much use it in his own writings, Marx is clearly attacking a kind of wonder 
towards human affairs which is immune to the historical conditioning of dynamic human 
activity.  
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 In The German Ideology, Marx continues this attack against the position he identifies 
with Feuerbach:  
In the first case, the contemplation of the sensuous world, he necessarily lights on 
things which contradict his consciousness and feeling, which disturb the harmony 
he presupposes, the harmony of all parts of the sensuous world and especially of 
man and nature… He does not see that the sensuous world around him is not a thing 
given direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry 
and of the state of society; and, indeed [a product] in the sense that it is an historical 
product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each 
standing on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing its industry and its 
intercourse, and modifying its social system according to the changed needs. Even 
the objects of the simplest "sensuous certainty" are only given him through social 
development, industry and commercial intercourse.449 
The wonder of the philosopher, even if it presupposes that it begins with what is apparent to the 
senses, is led away from actual processes of the human world due to an eternalizing attitude. The 
eternalizing feeling of the philosopher, the wonder by which Aristotle philosophizes over the 
eternal movements over the heavens, renders her incapable of knowing the great dialectical 
process of history which formed the social system at its present moment of development. Under 
the conditions of capitalism, this leads to the false assumption that the present order of the 
production will always be. Marx historicizes the conditions under which aporia appear to us as 
objects of wonder. The Aristotelian picture of a healthy passion of wonder in response to those 
everyday difficulties is at best severely misguided under social conditions in which flourishing is 
not cultivated. 
 These three elements of Marx’s early thought will be crucial for how we analyze wonder 
in Marx’s work on political economy and will allow us to develop strands of it which would not 
be immediately apparent otherwise. It is important to note that this section has not argued that 
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Marx abandoned Aristotle for Epicurus, or that there is some necessary connection between the 
Epicurean attitude in Marx and the historicity he takes from Hegel. What I have been tracking in 
this section are elements of Marx’s thought that bear on his analysis of wondering in capitalist 
society. Surely it would be wrong to say that Marx put aside Aristotle for Epicurus, since it 
seems rather the case that after finishing his Dissertation, Marx moved towards the materialism 
of Aristotle as he began to better appreciate the place of external goods in the happy life. 
However, it seems clear to me that Marx maintains an Epicurean attitude towards wonder at the 
appearances and the supposed laws of motion under conditions of capitalism, which, as a student 
of Hegel, he views to historically condition not only the kinds of life that are possible, but the 
forms of thought which might emerge. 
 We have from Marx’s readings of Epicurus and Aristotle two opposed attitudes towards 
wonder which will help us to understand the curious way that Marx treats the passion in his 
critique of political economy and therefore also in his assessment of life under the conditions of 
capitalism. From Aristotle we have a model of how wonder can lead us to knowledge of the 
world when its apparent objects are pursued though careful inquiry. On the other hand, Epicurus 
provides Marx with a hesitant attitude towards the passionate dynamic of wonder which holds it 
to be a danger to happiness and enlightenment. In Aristotle’s description of wonder we have a 
picture of how we might be drawn to knowledge by passion in a world which is ordered in a way 
that is conducive to human flourishing. And in Epicurus, an attitude for a world which is 
inherently troubling to our possibility of happiness. When we consider the lessons of Hegel on 
how our senses can mislead us when we do not give attention to the historically conditioned 
character of the world, we are led to lean towards the Epicurean position, even if we might be 
convinced by Aristotle’s model of flourishing under fitting conditions. When we learn of the 
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conditions of capitalism which, according to Marx, orders the world with little regard for human 
flourishing, Marx would tell us to not lean but to leap to the Epicurean position, which he does. 
There might be comfort – and even a mild pleasure – in trusting the sensory basis of 
philosophical wonder in analyzing the world of capital. However, that wonder is a trap, which 
leads us to perceive the ordering of that world as eternal. Inquiry must proceed in a historical, 
dialectical manner to avoid being enchanted by the appearances of the world. Only in a truly 
human world could one’s senses be trusted. For Marx, that world is one wherein the reproduction 
of the world is controlled by all and not the few. And that world cannot be achieved by theory 
emerging from wonder alone. 
4. Marx’s Dialectical Critique of Philosophical Wonder  
 
Marx began his Inaugural Address of the Working Men’s International Association of October 
1864 by drawing attention to the contradiction of the so-called progress of capitalism: “It is a 
great fact that the misery of the working masses has not diminished from 1848 to 1864, and yet 
this period is unrivalled for the development of industry and the growth of its commerce.”450 The 
increased productive capacity which attended the growth of capitalism in the middle of the 
nineteenth century was accompanied by a corresponding increase in poverty. Marx drew the 
attention of his audience to the extremely different characterization of the moment by the British 
Liberal Party member and Chancellor of the Exchequer, William Ewart Gladstone. Gladstone 
puts aside the troubling data regarding public health in the “Sixth Report on Public Health” and 
the “Report of the Children’s Employment Commission” in light of the massive expansion of 
productive capabilities in Britain, stating that “the average condition of the British labourer has 
improved in a degree we know to be extraordinary and unexampled in the history of any country 
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or any age.”451 However, Gladstone was truly overtaken, according to Marx, by emotion by 
another curious feature of the economic life of Britain: 
[d]azzled by the ‘Progress of the Nation’ dancing before his eyes, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer [of Britain] exclaims in wild ecstasy: “From 1842 to 1852 the 
taxable income of the country increased by 6 per cent; in the eight years from 1853 
to 1861, it has increased from the basis taken in 1853 20 per cent! The fact is so 
astonishing as to be almost incredible! … This intoxicating augmentation of wealth 
and power,” adds Mr. Gladstone, “is entirely confined to the classes of property!452 
Even as the misery of the great majority of the people increased, the power and wealth of the few 
expanded. Gladstone, like a caricature by Carlyle or a character by Dickens, was enchanted by 
the productivity of the British national economy. The facts of this expansion are treated as “so 
astonishing to be almost incredible!”453 Any thought of the chance for the working class to 
flourish is put aside by this dazzling vision of growth. 
 What follows below is an analysis of why Marx thinks that the power of political 
economy to dazzle and astonish is tied up in the wonder of capitalism. This is the critical part to 
Marx’s work, which worked in conjunction, as the quotations above show, with his work as a 
political organizer. For Marx, the world of capitalism revealed by political economy is one of 
enchantment: “It is an enchanted [verzauberte], perverted, topsy-turvy world.”454 How is that 
“enchanted, perverted, topsy-turvy world” suffused with wonder, and what is the attitude which 
Marx offers in turn? Now that we have reconstructed the preceding three elements of Marx’s 
early ‘humanist’ thought, we can better understand his mature work on political economy which 
put him at odds with other socialist thinkers, on the relation between the passions and political 
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economy and the role of wonder therein. Here we have an image of workers desperately seeking 
a full, flourishing life, knowing that the world as it appears cannot be fully trusted, and therefore 
should restrain themselves from searching for a form of economic and political organization 
based on the shapes that they find in that world. According to Marx, to begin an inquiry of the 
proper functioning of the world from how the present world appears is to be bewitched by that 
appearance and to be doomed to reify its liquid contours. 
 We now have a place to begin to understand Marx’s dialectical approach to political 
economy in Capital, which he first began to develop in his attack on Proudhon in The Poverty of 
Philosophy, and we can analyze the feeling of living under capitalism as Marx portrays it. That 
feeling, as I noted in the introduction, is something of a paradox. The feeling produced by 
capitalism is, on the one hand, that of wonder for the novel products made possible by 
“constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of 
production, and therefore the whole of society.”455 This process is one which ostensibly destroys 
all sentimental attachments which preceded the productive relations of capitalism and, in 
Capital, results in the displacement of workers into a ‘reserve army’ of disposable workers that 
are shed in each revolutionization of production by technological ‘progress.’456 And yet, on the 
other hand, the commodity form itself, when stamped on a good as mainly valuable in exchange, 
bestows a quality of wondrousness, according to Marx, establishing a supersensible order of 
things. So, while capitalism appears to continually disorder itself, there is an ever-present 
continuation of order, and in both these processes a pull of wonder.  
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 A few words on Martha Nussbaum’s analysis of wonder might help show how I 
understand wonder to function in Marx’s writings on political economy. Nussbaum has 
developed over the course of several books a rigorous theory of emotion as a judgment of 
value.457 In it, she holds wonder to be an emotion which brings objects into view as significant – 
as objects with value for us – through which we attach ourselves.458 In the sense of emotion 
developed by Nussbaum, one could, without too much violence to the text, think of the value 
theory of labor which Marx develops in Capital as how affective attachments to the commodity 
form create a self-perpetuating system which empowers the holders of capital while dominating 
and exploiting the rest who must work to survive by constantly bringing economic value into 
view as a significant attachment – the most significant, in fact, if one wishes to be able to feed 
oneself.459 And in this reading of Capital, it is the wondrous way that commodities are valued 
which contributes to the attachment to them and to the perception of the commodity form as 
eternal. In the rest of the chapter I will substantiate this claim about wonder and value, helping to 
explain the apparent contradiction between two appearances of wonder in Marx’s writings on 
political economy through evidence gathered from an all too brief reading of Capital, primarily 
the first volume, but also from the notebooks that were collected after Marx’s death as volume 3. 
This will hopefully show how the mysteriousness of commodities actually feels.  
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Marx explores, but to which scholars have paid insufficient attention. 
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 The story which Marx tells in Capital is of appearances, seeming, and objective illusion. 
This monumental work, which has the “ultimate aim” to “reveal the economic law of motion of 
modern society” begins with the appearances. “The wealth of societies in which the capitalist 
mode of production prevails appears as an ‘immense collection of commodities’; the individual 
commodity appears as its elementary form.”460 This appearance, however, presents obvious 
difficulties. As Roberts has shown, Proudhon and his followers, as well as radicals in England 
who followed the teachings of Robert Owen, focus on these mysteries. The reasonable response 
of a social observer is to wonder at these apparent difficulties between the prevailing conditions 
and the possibility of human flourishing or freedom. This is precisely what these writers 
document. They find the order generated by capitalistic production to be filled with mysteries – 
the money mystery, the gold mystery, the paper money mystery, and others – “by means of 
which artful and impudent knaves have contrived to rob the laboring part of mankind.”461 They 
look to the relations of production and consumption and are themselves perplexed.462 So, they 
look to the causes. However, as Marx shows in the first part of Capital, this is a trick that is 
played on workers, and more generally producers, who live under conditions of capitalistic 
production. To become fixated on the mysteries of production and distribution that appear 
“visible and dazzling to our eyes”463 as problems to be solved through rational analysis, is to 
miss the fact that it is the economic system as a whole – a system which produces commodities 
for the accumulation of surplus value – that is the origin of the feeling of mystery. This system as 
a whole can only come into ‘view’ from an historical analysis of its movements. To view its 
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movements as eternal is to terrify oneself in the same way that Epicurus sought to avoid being 
terrified by the movements of the cosmos. 
 What then is the sensuous basis of the domination of capital through the ideology of 
political economy? Further, how does ideology affect the body? It does so through wonder, and 
not through some purely cognitive structure of commodity fetishism. Commodities and products 
of the enchanted, dominated structure of the social world do not go untouched by this 
enchantment.  The way that we feel commodities under capitalism – the social form of 
attachment – is a function of domination. Commodities are the physical embodiment of the 
ordering of the social world into those who labor to create commodities, and those who own the 
surplus value from selling those commodities. More than that, they are the primary physical 
objects which one encounters in the world fabricated by capitalist production. Commodities are 
what one perceives when one looks upon a world given form by capitalism. However, the form 
of the commodity mysteriously evokes numerous other phenomena: 
A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social 
character of men's labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon 
the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of 
their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between 
themselves, but between the products of their labour. This is the reason why the 
products of labour become commodities, social things whose qualities are at the 
same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses. In the same way the light 
from an object is perceived by us not as the subjective excitation of our optic nerve, 
but as the objective form of something outside the eye itself. 464  
Marx pays close attention in this passage to the physiological phenomenon of sight. And for 
good reason. What he is analyzing here is the point at which the social world touches the mind 
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through the senses, and how those senses and the social passions maintain the structure of that 
world. 
But, in the act of seeing, there is at all events, an actual passage of light from one 
thing to another, from the external object to the eye. There is a physical relation 
between physical things. But it is different with commodities. There, the existence 
of the things qua commodities, and the value relation between the products of 
labour which stamps them as commodities, have absolutely no connection with 
their physical properties and with the material relations arising therefrom. There it 
is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic 
form of a relation between things.465 
Crucially here, Marx shows commodities and the imagined relations between them take the place 
of the social relations between active, productive human beings. For one such as Marx who was 
a reader of the sentimentalist texts of the early socialists, and the Enlightenment philosophers 
who preceded them, the claim that social relations assume relations between objects is not 
something to suggest lightly. It is a strong suggestion that the social passions, which were intense 
objects of study just as much for Adam Smith as for Charles Fourier, are redirected towards 
inert, inactive objects – entities without energeia of their own. The ‘calm passions’ of doux 
commerce not only displace non-economic social passions, but redirect passions towards 
‘socialized’ things.466 And this is accomplished in the normal functioning of the eyes following 
that which pulls them to wonder, and thereby leading them to feel things to be as they aren’t. 
 Marx has harsh words for the economists who view things in this manner. However, he 
does not say that they are wrong to view appearances in this manner. In fact, this is the normal 
way that one would view appearances. However, this normal viewing of things elicits an 
affective response which is geared towards social, human things, rather than towards inert, 
                                                          
465 Ibid. 
 
466 (Hirschman 1977). 
 167 
merely physical objects. What is needed is a different approach which treats the appearances 
differently – historically and dialectically: 
There it will be seen what the philistine’s and vulgar economist’s way of looking at 
things stems from, namely, from the fact that it is only the direct form of 
manifestation of relations that is reflected in their brains and not their inner 
connection. Incidentally, if the latter were the case what need would there be of 
science.467 
The inner connection of things, according to Marx, can only be found when one historically 
studies the manner in which things have appeared and developed, often out of seemingly 
opposite things. To Marx, political economists, particularly of the mid-nineteenth century, have 
made the fatal error of basing their science on what their senses uncritically tell them. Marx’s 
harshest assessment is perhaps aimed at Edmund Burke who perfectly encapsulated the 
eternalizing passion of political economy in writing that “the laws of commerce are the laws of 
Nature, and therefore the laws of God.”468  
 Of course, Marx acknowledges the massive advancements which figures of classical 
political economy such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo offered in understanding the shape of 
capitalism: 
It is the great merit of classical economy to have destroyed this false appearance 
and illusion, this mutual independence and ossification of the various social 
elements of wealth, this personification of things and conversion of production 
relations into entities, this religion of everyday life.469 
However, despite the scientific advancements of some of the greatest luminaries of classical 
political economy, the objective sensory order of capitalism – felt by any agent who moves 
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within it – reproduces the feeling of enchantment of that order. It is a “sanctification of ordinary 
life.”470 Ultimately, this causes, by a regular functioning of the senses, the spokesman of political 
economy to be a mouthpiece for those who dominate through the ownership of productive 
property. To Marx, the normal functioning of wonder in a world structured by capitalism will 
lead one to become a functionary.  
Nevertheless even the best spokesmen of classical economy remain more or less in 
the grip of the world of illusion which their criticism had dissolved, as cannot be 
otherwise from a bourgeois standpoint, and thus they all fall more or less into 
inconsistencies, half-truths and unsolved contradictions. On the other hand, it is just 
as natural for the actual agents of production to feel completely at home in these 
estranged and irrational forms of capital — interest, land — rent, labour — wages, 
since these are precisely the forms of illusion in which they move about and find 
their daily occupation. It is therefore just as natural that vulgar political economy, 
which is no more than a didactic, more or less dogmatic, translation of everyday 
conceptions of the actual agents of production, and which arranges them in a certain 
rational order, should see precisely in this trinity, which is devoid of all inner 
connection, the natural and indubitable lofty basis for its shallow pompousness. 
This formula simultaneously corresponds to the interests of the ruling classes by 
proclaiming the physical necessity and eternal justification of their sources of 
revenue and elevating them to a dogma.471 
And with the aid of these justifications, the historical movement which determines the structure 
of domination in society persists through the wonder by which agents enmeshed in capitalist 
society hold to the illusory world that capitalism conjures. Political economy takes this wondrous 
viewpoint as common sense, and uses this common sense as a starting point, thereby aiding in 
the persistence of the capitalist form. More than just persist, “under the capitalist mode of 
production and in the case of capital, which forms its dominant category, its determining 
production relation, this enchanted and perverted world develops still more.”472 The feeling of 
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enchantment and domination feed upon one another in capitalism, sustaining one another as built 
into the sensorial order of the world.  
 Even as the world produced by capitalism appears as a nightmare – a social hell, as social 
critics of the nineteenth century put it473 – the passionate way that it was perceived due to the 
objective reality of commodity production made it feel enchanted and eternal. Marxian dialectics 
approaches matters in a different matter: historically. To Marxist dialectics, to use a phrase by 
Lukács, “the inherent meaning of reality shines forth with an ever more resplendent light, the 
meaning of the process is embedded ever more deeply in day to day events, and totality 
permeates the spatio-temporal character of phenomena.”474 This metaphorical light is that of the 
historical processes behind economic phenomena which give rise to the epiphenomenal 
categories of political economy.  
 Before moving to the conclusion, it might do well to briefly dwell on what it means when 
Marx calls the enchantment of the world by capitalist categories and ways of thought a “religion 
of everyday life.”475 Religion is a substantial theme in Marx’s thought, and not one we can fully 
explore here. However, if we look to the way that natural religion functions in The German 
Ideology, we find an analogue to the sensory order of capitalism. There Marx, the student of 
Epicurus who denied the involvement of the gods in the world, describes natural religion as 
arising from “consciousness of nature, which first confronts men as a completely alien, all-
powerful and unassailable force, with which men’s relations are purely animal and by which they 
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are overawed like beasts.”476 This is a response that Marx finds to be a quite ordinary sensory 
response to an ordering of the world over which humans have no control. Awe towards an alien 
world is a natural response of human beings. It is a response which will only end, according to 
Marx, through “an association of free men, working with the means of production held in 
common,” who have the capacity to control and master the powers which have “till now 
overawed and ruled men as powers completely alien to them.”477 Only communism, political 
action responding to and encouraging the movement of history, can end it. By adopting an 
Epicurean attitude towards the alien powers of the world which might give rise to wonder, the 
eyes of the dialectician are drawn away from the field of vision and towards historical study. The 
enchanted world of capitalism as it is, “stultifying and fear-inspiring”, is not hospitable for “mere 
wondering contemplation” if one hopes to ever escape it.478 
5. The Whole Mystery of Commodities 
“The whole mystery of commodities, all the magic and necromancy, that surrounds the products 
of labor on the basis of commodity production, vanishes therefore as soon as we come to other 
forms of production.”479 
Early socialists such as Proudhon, according to Marx, fail to envision a future in which human 
sociality may fully come into existence. By expressing their visions of social organization 
through the categories of political economy, however critically, their social philosophy remains 
enchanted in the terms of the present and is therefore anti-social. It is only through a dialectical 
analysis of the categories of political economy that one can anticipate a future realization of a 
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socialized humanity, and thus of a humanity which can, so to speak, see things clearly; of a 
humanity which judges value in a human way, or, to use Martha Nussbaum’s definition of 
emotion, is no longer dominated by alien forms of emotion, but free to experience emotions 
which will guide them towards flourishing. When we wonder at the appearances around us, we 
tend to reify, in thought and practice, the categories which are presented to us to make sense of 
those appearances. The mode in which the objects of the world have been produced conditions 
our affective reception of those objects, and our sense of the proper ordering of the world. Those 
who experience admiring wonder at the productive order of the world will strive, albeit in 
profoundly varying ways, to reify that order of the world. The feeling of mysteriousness towards 
commodities remains a form of domination. The world of capital is indeed wonderous, but to 
wonder at it is to fall into a trap. 
 We moderns are creatures who dwell in a material world of our own making, stamped by 
the commodity form of capitalist production. Therefore, our senses, and our passions incited by 
them, are conditioned by those forms, since our reason has no other source for perceiving the 
world but our senses. In a similar manner, modern workers’ sensory experience of things 
produced under conditions of domination may sustain a mode of evaluation which attaches them 
to their own domination. Even as capitalism necessarily constantly transforms itself and expends 
laborers as disposable, agents living under capitalism eternalize it by their emotional attachment 
to its form.  
 However, Marx’s theorization cannot take the place of political action which responds to 
historical conditions. Relying in part on the old philosophical distinction of appearance and 
reality, Marx’s critical theory is in part a technique of debunking. However, only seeing in Marx 
a cognitive approach to political economy is to accuse him of one of the main errors that he 
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attributes to the German ideologists: that life is an affair of the brain but not the body. For Marx 
as for Aristotle, life consists in action. Even though Marx holds to an Aristotelian view of 
flourishing, the emotional attitude that he suggests towards the appearances of the world is 
Epicurean. Our senses and the passions which rise from them, including wonder, might aid us to 
pleasurably find our way in a trustworthy cosmos. However, in a world produced through 
domination, our senses and emotions are not to be trusted. To admire is to be subjected to an 
alien power, for both Epicurus and for Marx. Theory must go beneath the appearances to find the 
tendencies which order the world towards domination.  
 Marx, like more literary social critics such as Carlyle or Dickens, finds a nineteenth 
century world which is both enchanted and resistant to wonder. However, the resistance to 
wonder in Marx’s view belongs to Marx himself. To wonder in this enchanted world is to repeat 
the enchantment with little difference. Theory will not transform the order of the world. Marx 
admitted that his work could neither “leap over the natural phases of [economic] development 
nor remove them by decree.”480 Instead, he viewed theory as at best a kind of Socratic midwifery 
which could, in addition to aborting the corrupt doxai of political economy, “shorten and lessen 
the birth-pangs” of a new world.481 Power ultimately belongs to action. 
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Chapter Four 
Thinking Out of Order: Arendt and Political Wonder 
 
“The name of the philosopher, then, will be reserved for those 
whose affections are set, in every case, on the reality.” – Plato, The 
Republic V, 480482 
“When you were blind / You touch things for their shape / Have 
faith in wordless knowledge” – Bill Callahan 
 
1. Seeing the World as it Isn’t in the Twentieth Century 
The narrator of Samuel Beckett’s modernist classic of 1953, The Unnammable, tells us little 
concrete about who he is, what he is, or, to tell truth, what sort of story, if any, he is narrating; 
but he does tell us something about his condition as an observer: “I, of whom I know nothing, I 
know that my eyes are open, because of the tears that pour from them ceaselessly.”483 To the 
political theorist, or really any observer of the twentieth century, which was, as George Kateb 
rightly put it, “the morally worst century so far”, one cannot help but adopt a similar attitude to 
that of Beckett’s narrator if one allows oneself to endure the reality of the twentieth century and 
its horrors.484 According to Hannah Arendt’s biographer, Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, this is similar 
to how Arendt endured the subject of her first major book, The Origins of Totalitarianism: “The 
emotional power of the book Hannah Arendt started to write in 1945 and 1946…came from her 
ability to sustain – through four years of intense effort and over five hundred dense, difficult 
pages – a deep, agonized “Ach!” before the deeds of infamy she analyzed.”485 And it was this 
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sort of willingness to suffer shock that Arendt also appreciated in her friends, saying that what 
set Mary McCarthy apart from other satirical writers was that she wrote “from the viewpoint and 
with the amazement of a child who [has] discovered that the Emperor [had] no clothes” and that 
Randall Jarrell wrote as one who finds “to his everlasting surprise [the world] was as it was.”486 
And, most significantly for this chapter, Arendt finds the central concern of the writings of her 
friend Walter Benjamin contained in the statement: “What seems paradoxical about everything 
that is justly called beautiful is the fact that it appears”; that is, a concern with “the wonder of 
appearance.”487 
 To exhibit θαυμάζειν, or wonder – a shocked, but affirmative admiration488 – towards the 
events of the twentieth century is itself something of a paradox. It is quite natural to be shocked 
at the world events of the twentieth century. But to affirmatively admire those events would 
seem to require nothing short of a theodicy. Indeed, in her 1954 lecture entitled “Concern with 
Politics in Recent European Thought,” Arendt argued that contemporary Catholic philosophers, 
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French existentialists, and German philosophers not only share as a background experience “the 
sheer horror of contemporary political events,” but also a “refusal to own up to” it.489 According 
to Arendt, this refusal to own up to and philosophically analyze the background experience of 
sheer horror is quite similar to the original sin of philosophy: “the traditional refusal to grant the 
realm of human affairs that thaumazein, that wonder at what is as it is, which, according to Plato 
and Aristotle, is at the beginning of philosophy.”490 However, without “an original experience of 
thaumazein” towards the realm of human affairs, no “authentic political philosophy” could 
arise.491 
 The problem which this chapter analyzes is the seeming contradiction between 
philosophy and politics: that philosophy recoils from wondering at the deeds and events of 
human activity, and yet that no “authentic political philosophy” could exist without the wonder 
of those sights and the contemplation of them. To Arendt, the traditional mode of Theōria, or 
contemplation, culminated in a state of absolute speechlessness and quiet, which recoiled from 
the noisiness of human activities, and a beholding of absolute truth set in a ‘reality’ apart from 
the realm of appearances of those disturbingly rambunctious activities. However, the beginning 
point which Arendt takes for political theory is that “appearance – something that is seen and 
heard by others as well as by ourselves – constitutes reality.”492 The background of Greek 
experience belies this fact in that Theoria was for the ancient Greeks a set cultural practices – 
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including the pilgrimage to religious sanctuaries, the visitation of foreign city-states, or viewing 
of religious festivals – before it was a quiet philosophical activity.493 As Arendt knew, “Greek 
‘theory’ is the prolongation, and Greek philosophy the conceptualization, of this initial wonder” 
at that which appears to us.494 In a decisive way, “Theōria, in fact, is only another word for 
thaumazein”.495 Therefore, analyzing Arendt’s writings on wonder – wherein she dismantles the 
traditional model – will help us to understand the surprisingly intimate relation between the life 
of the mind and the life of action in her writings and in general. 
 This chapter is an analysis of wonder in the political thought of Hannah Arendt as written 
in an historical moment, as was the case in the other chapters, in which it was no longer clear 
how a feeling of wonder should be politically meaningful. I argue that Arendt both offers a 
model for the experience of wonder by political theorists towards the field of political 
contestation, as contrasted to the wonder experienced by traditional philosophy, as well as 
describes a way that wonder can be institutionalized in human affairs to give the critical attention 
necessary to sustain the spaces of political freedom. To Arendt, wonder and the thinking 
stemming from it are coeval with political life, as they are both impassioned experiences of the 
new. However, Arendt breaks from the traditional attitude of philosophers, including the authors 
in the preceding chapters, who subsume the wonder towards political phenomena under the 
search for knowledge or truth, and which seeks meaning through some object external to the 
                                                          
493 On Greek theoria, see (Euben 1990, 50-51) and (Nightingale 2004, 40-71). The inversion which Plato performs 
in the Republic, from the opening trip to the Piraeus for the religious festival of the Thracians to the formulation of 
philosophical theory, is paradigmatic. 
 
494 The quotation is from (Arendt, What is Authority? 2006, 115). To Arendt that the “passion for seeing” was “the 
basic Greek attitude to the world seem[ed to her] too obvious to require documentation” (Arendt, Thinking 1978, 
130). 
 
495 (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 302). 
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world apparent to the senses, whether it be a supersensible ‘ideal’ or some transcendent narrative 
of history. Rather, political theory as an activity of wondering must be, in the formulation of 
Wendy Brown, a meaning making enterprise which struggles to make sense of the wondrous 
events and deeds of political life.496 
 This argument is framed historically through Arendt’s break from German philosophy 
and her critique of the major political ideologies of the mid-twentieth century. In both cases, 
Arendt finds a refusal to see and endure, in the sense of pathos, the activities of human affairs. 
Against this background of a refusal to endure wonder, Arendt dismantles the different kinds of 
responses to wonder by examining thaumazein in ancient Greek thought, particularly that of 
Aristotle, Plato, the ancient historians and poets, and, finally, Socrates.497 From all these 
responses, Arendt excavates a way to respond to wonder in search of understanding, as opposed 
to philosophical truth or absolute knowledge. Once we clearly grasp the full import of Arendt’s 
writing on wonder, we will not only better understand the fraught relation between political 
philosophy and politics, but also add to our understanding of how secularization has affected the 
role of emotions in how we experience and evaluate political life. This historically grounded 
analysis of wonder in Arendt’s political thought will also provide a way to explore Arendt’s 
often overlooked perspective on the involvement of emotions in politics, allowing us to see 
Arendt’s place in the history of the emotions in political thought. It does so through untangling 
the activities of vision and contemplation in their relation to passion. 
                                                          
496 According to Brown, “insofar as theory imbues contingent or unconscious events, phenomena, or formations with 
meaning and with location in a world of theoretical meaning, theory is a sense-making enterprise of that which often 
makes no sense, of that which may be inchoate, unsystematized, inarticulate,” (Brown 2002, 574). 
 
497 On wonder in ancient Greek thought in general, see (Hunzinger, Wonder 2015). 
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 What then is the meaning of ‘vision’ for political theorists today, particularly for those 
theorists who take inspiration from Arendt’s works? Do they share the same problem that Arendt 
identified in traditional philosophy, that it turns away from wondering at the world in favor of 
speechless contemplation? According to Sheldon Wolin’s classic formulation, “political 
philosophy constitutes a form of ‘seeing’ political phenomena” as a vision.498 To Wolin, a 
‘vision’ means both a descriptive report and also a semi-poetic vision which relies upon the 
imagination to both fill in the details and also suggest an order which is not fully present, but is 
“a projection of the political order into a time that is yet to be.”499 If this is so, then ‘vision’ for 
political theorists is both concerned with the world as we find it, and the world as we imagine it 
to be. It would seem that political theory is caught in the same paradox of wondering about the 
world, but of ultimately turning to fabricated ideas to make sense of it. 
 Recently, Tracey B. Strong has argued in his 2012 book, Politics Without Vision: 
Thinking without a Bannister in the Twentieth Century that the major political thinkers of the 
twentieth century wrote without any reliance on a comprehensive vision provided by the poetic 
imagination. His book is therefore focused on “precisely those figures who reject the need for, 
and the possibility of, a ‘vision.’”500 If there is a ‘hero’ of the book, it is certainly Hannah 
Arendt, who is the focus of the penultimate chapter and supplies the German phrase “Denken 
ohne Geländer” – translated into English – for the second half of the title.501 However, it is quite 
                                                          
498 (Wolin, Politics and Vision 2004, 17). 
 
499 (Wolin, Politics and Vision 2004, 20). See also (Wolin, Political Theory as a Vocation 1969). 
 
500 (Strong 2012, 7). 
 
501 The metaphor was one which Arendt, ironically, “never published but kept for [herself]” and only came to public 
knowledge through her mentioning it during a conference in 1972 on “The Work of Hannah Arendt” subsequently 
published in a few anthologies, most recently as (Arendt, Hannah Arendt on Hannah Arendt 2018, 473).  
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odd to find Strong’s discussion of thaumazein – for Arendt the pathos by which we experience 
the world in thought – to beso short and dismissive. According to Strong’s reading, Arendt finds 
philosophical wonder to be a problem, one most paradigmatically embodied in the example of 
Heidegger’s excessive wondering leading him to blunder his way into supporting Nazism. In this 
truncated reading of wonder in Arendt’s thought, Strong is in the company of many others who 
principally think of Arendt’s writings on wonder as more or less an argument with Heidegger 
over the appreciation of the public life over the philosophic.502 Even though Arendt’s arguments 
with Heidegger, principally in “Martin Heidegger at 80” and less overtly in “Philosophy and 
Politics”, were important occasions for Arendt’s reflections on the wonder of political life, they 
in no way are the sum of those reflections. While certainly not wrong to focus on these texts, 
focusing on them exclusively leads to misleading conclusions, such as that wondering always 
concludes in speechlessness as it does for Plato and Heidegger. Socrates, to take the most 
obvious example, had a lot to say after his bouts of thaumazein. Therefore, if we take Arendt’s 
texts on Heidegger as the sum of Arendt’s thought on wonder, we are left with a profoundly 
misleading portrait of the relation between the life of the mind and the active life, and therefore 
of political theory. In those texts Arendt is critical of one kind of response to wonder, which is a 
fundamental capacity of the human condition and not subsumable to any one kind of response or 
interpretation. It overlooks the central role of passionate thinking in Arendt’s writings on 
politics. 
                                                          
502 See especially (Dolan 2000, 268-270); (Lloyd 2018, 120-139); (Rubenstein 2008, 20-24); (Strong 2012, 329-
331); and (Taminiaux 1997, 168-198). Kateb’s reflections on Arendt and wonder are very interesting in not only 
looking beyond the Arendt/Heidegger relation, but also in how he insists on a unitary view of wonder by seeing it, in 
composite with gratitude, as the “substratum of Arendt’s thought on the human and individual”, in (Kateb, Hannah 
Arendt 1983, 165-166). In fact, Arendt’s turning from the gratitude of the “Concluding Remarks” in the first edition 
of The Origins of Totalitarianism to a systematic analysis and ‘dismantling’ of wonder after the first edition of The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, as we’ll explore below, makes this idea of a ‘composite feeling’ a little awkward. 
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 As such, this chapter takes seriously the many ways in which wonder, the pathos of 
thought, appears in Arendt’s texts. Accordingly, the reading of Arendt that this chapter offers 
brings her writings surprisingly close to the texts of affect theory, with its emphasis on the 
“visceral register” of theory, than readers of Arendt are accustomed to acknowledge.503 
However, it still takes seriously the fact that, as Linda M.G. Zerilli has noted, “affect and 
cognition are not two different systems, but radically entangled.”504 In Arendt’s account of 
wonder, we can see the political valence of that entanglement of affect and cognition.505 Put 
another way, we can see an account of affect which is not debilitating to thinking, but binds it to 
political life. 
 Arendt’s place is in this dissertation is rightly at the end; a conclusion to a history of 
treating wonder in politics in terms of knowledge rather than meaning. Like the theorists in 
previous chapters of this dissertation, Arendt takes up the problem of making sense of the new 
phenomena of the modern world, and also, like those previous theorists, turns back to the thought 
of antiquity for aid in that endeavor. In the second section of this chapter, I track the dismantling 
of ancient Greek thought which Arendt conducted to sort through the modern paradoxes of 
contemplation and ‘History,’ which she found to plague the modern thinkers of her own moment, 
                                                          
503 For an assessment of the predominant reading of Arendt as opposed to the passions, as well as a sustained 
rejoinder to that reading with a focus on anger and courage, see (Degerman 2019). On the “visceral register” of 
political thinking in theorists of affect, see especially (Connolly, Why I am not a secularist 1999, 11, 24, 27, 32, & 
35); and (Connolly, Neuropolitics 2002, 106-107, 128-129, 136, & 142). 
 
504 (Zerilli, A Democratic Theory of Judgment 2016, 261). The chapter of Zerilli’s A Democratic Theory of 
Judgment on affect theory was originally published as (Zerilli, The Turn to Affect and the Problem of Judgment 
2015). 
 
505 I will also note here that the second section of this chapter will make clear why Arendtians such as Zerilli are 
often perplexed to find that Arendt rejected any productive role for the imagination, (Zerilli, "We Feel Our 
Freedom": Imagination and Judgment in the Thought of Hannah Arendt 2005, 163-164). I will show that, for 
Arendt, the productive use of the imagination, which here Zerilli shares with affect theorists such as Brian Massumi, 
imperils theory into falling into ideology. See (Massumi 2002, 12-13). At the risk of being impertinent, to argue for 
a productive role of the imagination, rather than a “kind of imagination, which actually is understanding,” (Arendt, 
Understanding and Politics 1994, 323), is to offer a quasi-Arendtian substitution of making for acting.  
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especially Martin Heidegger. I show how Arendt found in the writings of ancient historians an 
approach to wonder which dissolved some of these paradoxes of modern philosophy which led it 
to turn to grand narratives of History to bestow meaning upon politics. In the third section, I 
explore the function of wonder in Arendt’s political theory, particularly as it is developed in The 
Human Condition, as guiding it as a ‘meaning-making enterprise.’ Here I show how Arendt took 
up the task of approaching political phenomena with a passion of wonder. In the fourth section, I 
show how Arendt’s writings on wonder explore the intimate relation of the life of the mind and 
the active life in the contemporary world. Action and thinking may not be the same kinds of 
activity, but they need one another; and the passion of wonder is the medium tethering them 
together. Here we can also see how Arendt addresses the temporal dimension of wonder, which 
bestows upon a perceived object a permanence in time that may serve as the basis for a stable 
ordering of the world. To Arendt, the fact that wonder is a pathos means not only that it is a 
feeling which crosses the boundaries between, metaphorically speaking, the mind and the heart, 
but it is something which is endured in time. I then conclude by reflecting on the contemporary 
urgency of Arendt’s mode of wondering. 
2. Goodbye to All That: Arendt and German Philosophy  
During a conversation with Gunther Gaus in 1964, Arendt noted with finality that “I have said 
good-bye to philosophy once and for all”506 This was a long journey from philosophy to political 
theory, but it began in earnest when Arendt was forced to emigrate from Germany in 1933, at 
which point political “indifference was no longer possible.” From then on, she started to think 
                                                          
506 (Arendt, "What Remains? The Language Remains": A Conversation with Günter Gaus 1994, 2). This statement 
might appear to become untenable with Arendt’s work on The Life of the Mind in the later part of her authorship. 
However, if one hears her remark as ‘being done’ with a certain tradition of philosophy, which views ‘Man’ in the 
singular, and views thinking as fundamentally opposed to politics, then her remark would hold true to the end of her 
life.  
 182 
about politics systematically.507 She would not have left it ‘once and for all’ until after she 
reexamined the tradition of political thought during her research following the initial publication 
of The Origins of Totalitarianism. As was clear to any reader of the first edition of Origins, the 
analysis of Stalinism in the Soviet Union was slim at best. This was not lost on Arendt, and in 
1952 she successfully proposed a book project for a Guggenheim Fellowship on the “Totalitarian 
Elements in Marxism” which was subsequently retitled as “Karl Marx and the Tradition of 
Western Political Thought.” However, as Arendt recognized, to connect totalitarianism in some 
fashion to Marx was to condemn the tradition of political thought itself. As Margaret Canovan 
wrote, “Arendt’s question for the sources of Marxist totalitarianism led her right back to the 
beginnings of Western political thought” and thus she needed to work her way through the entire 
canon from Plato to Hegel.”508 Through this study, Arendt came to the conclusion that “as an 
ideology, Marxism is doubtless the only link that binds the totalitarian form of government 
directly to that tradition.”509 The key link, which this section will explore, is the turning to 
history to bestow meaning upon the field of human activities. It was not just philosophy, but 
German philosophy in particular to which Arendt said goodbye and the one strand of German 
philosophy which Arendt left most vocally was that of the historicism which ran from Hegel to 
                                                          
507 (Arendt, "What Remains? The Language Remains": A Conversation with Günter Gaus 1994, 4); but see also 
(Arendt, The Eichmann Controversy: A Letter to Gershom Scholem 2007, 466). 
 
508 (Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought 1992, 64 & 66-67). On the Marx project, 
see (Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought 1992, 63-98); (Kohn 2005); and 
(Weisman 2014). Although much of the work from the Marx project was printed as “Ideology and Terror” in a 
subsequent edition of Origins of Totalitarianism, essays in Between Past and Future, and On Revolution crucial 
excerpts from, and lectures related to, the project have recently been published as (Arendt, Understanding and 
Politics 1994); (Arendt, The Promise of Politics 2005); (Arendt, Karl Marx and the Tradition of Western Political 
Thought 2018); and (Arendt, The Great Tradition 2018). It is now available in one volume as (Arendt, The Modern 
Challenge to Tradition: Fragmente eines Buchs 2018). 
 
509 (Arendt, Karl Marx and the Tradition of Western Political Thought 2018, 7). 
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Heidegger.510 Like many of her generation brought up in German philosophy, including Leo 
Strauss and Karl Löwith, Arendt found the historicism of German philosophy to cloud important 
philosophical questions in obscurity, which was a continuation of the old philosophical practice, 
going back to Plato and Aristotle, to find the meaning of politics in a location other than in 
politics itself. 511 Although Heidegger attempted to return philosophy to question the meaning of 
human existence, even he ultimately determined the answer to that question through a grand 
historical narrative. The effect of this, as Arendt would later argue, would be to lead philosophy 
away from any genuine wonder towards human activities. 
a. From German Historicism… 
 Arendt came to this grand evaluation of philosophy and wonder while revising her 
understanding of ideology after her initial assessment of it in the first edition of The Origins of 
Totalitarianism.512 In modern ideologies, Arendt would find the culmination of the traditional 
refusal of political philosophy to attend with wonder human actions and events. As Arendt would 
decide while undertaking this research, the problem of ideology, particularly in its Marxist 
formulation, was one rooted in the fundamental problems of the Western tradition of philosophy. 
It was also one which was rooted in a modulated form of wonder experienced by a figure she 
would come to call homo faber in works such as The Human Condition. In the first edition of 
Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt ends the text with the subsequently replaced “Concluding 
Remarks” in which she opposes the dominance in totalitarian states by ideologies, which are 
                                                          
510 Arendt: “If I can be said to ‘have come from anywhere,’ it is from the tradition of German philosophy,” (Arendt, 
The Eichmann Controversy: A Letter to Gershom Scholem 2007, 466). 
 
511 On historicism: for Strauss, see especially (Strauss, Natural Right and History 1953); and (Strauss, Political 
Philosophy and History 1959). For Löwith, see (Löwith 1949). 
 
512 On the deep changes between different editions of Origins of Totalitarianism, see (Tsao, The Three Phases of 
Arendt's Theory of Totalitarianism 2002). 
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built on a distrust and resentment of all things given, against a “fundamental gratitude for the few 
elementary things that are invariably given us, such as life itself, the existence of man and the 
world.” In politics, “gratitude emphasizes that we are not alone in the world.”513  
 In contrast to gratitude, ideology is depicted as a technique of totalitarian regimes to 
replace common sense with a kind of supersense. “Over and above the senselessness of 
totalitarian society is enthroned the ridiculous supersense of its ideological superstition.”514 Even 
though the world as it presents itself to the senses regularly disproves the ridiculous ‘logicality’ 
of ideology, ideologists claim to have the “key to history,” or the “solution to the riddles of the 
universe.”515 No matter how much one questions those who are seized by an ideology, one could 
never disabuse them of their attachment to their supposed keys and solutions. This supersense 
then is made to take the place of the senses, in the fact that totalitarianism aims to entirely 
remake the world according to its logical system. The passionate attitude towards the world is 
then a “contempt for factuality” – for all things that are given in the world by nature rather than 
made by man.516 This will likely strike readers of The Human Condition as very familiar, in that 
it resonates with arguments that Arendt makes in the chapter on the “Traditional Substitution of 
Making for Acting” in that text.517 However, before making those arguments Arendt would 
                                                          
513 (Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 1951, 438). On gratitude in Arendt’s thought generally, see (Kateb, 
Hannah Arendt 1983, 165-169). On gratitude in the first edition of Origins and its subsequent absence, see (Tsao, 
Arendt's Augustine 2010, 45-50). 
 
514 (Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 1951, 431). 
 
515 (Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 1951, 431). 
 
516 (Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 1951, 432). 
 
517 (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 220-230). 
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undergo a significant shift in her thinking by tying ideology to modern problems of historical 
thinking endemic to the tradition of philosophy, particularly in the German strand.518 
 This shift would start most notably in “Ideology and Terror,” given first as a lecture in 
the summer of 1952 in Heidelberg, then published in a Festschrift for Karl Jaspers in February 
1953, subsequently revised and expanded for publication in The Review of Politics in 1953, and 
finally replacing the “Concluding Remarks’ in later editions of The Origins of Totalitarianism, 
starting with the 1955 German edition.519 In “Ideology and Terror,” Arendt defines ideology as 
“quite literally what its name indicates: it is the logic of an idea.” She then follows this definition 
with a near restatement of a sentiment from the “Concluding Remarks,” that “ideologies pretend 
to know the mysteries of the whole historical process – the secrets of the past, the intricacies of 
the present, the uncertainties of the future – because of the logic inherent in their respective 
ideas.” This more or less rephrases a few passages from the previous conclusion to Origins. Yet 
after this near restatement, Arendt makes two rather strange claims, which introduce new 
dimensions to ideology. The first is that “ideologies are never interested in the miracle of 
being.”520 The second is that “the ‘idea’ of ideology is neither the eternal essence grasped by the 
eyes of the mind nor the regulator of reason – as it was from Plato to Kant – but has become an 
instrument of explanation.”521 This coupling of claims appears as something of a non sequitur in 
                                                          
518 (Arendt, The Eichmann Controversy: A Letter to Gershom Scholem 2007, 466). 
 
519 See (Tsao, The Three Phases of Arendt's Theory of Totalitarianism 2002, 604); as well as (Arendt, Ideologie und 
Terror 1953); (Arendt, Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government 1953); and (Arendt, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism 1968). 
 
520 (Arendt, Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government 1953, 316).  
 
521 (Arendt, Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government 1953, 316). These two sentences do not appear in 
the version of the text in the Jaspers Festschrift, (Arendt, Ideologie und Terror 1953). It is possible, but by no means 
certain, that they were added in response to some of Jaspers’ critique of the original essay in his letter to Arendt of 
April 3, 1953. See (Arendt and Jaspers, Hannah Arendt Karl Jaspers Correspondence 1926-1969 1992, 208). 
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the text. Of course, it makes sense that Arendt would describe the historicality of the logic of 
ideology, given what she had written in Origins about the emphasis in totalitarian ideologies on 
movement. But from what is Arendt distinguishing ideology? What would it mean to be 
“interested in the miracle of being” or to grasp an eternal essence by the eyes of the mind? 
 These phrases really only make sense when considered alongside Arendt’s reflections in 
the last chapter of The Human Condition, “The Vita Activa and the Modern Age,” on 
contemplation, “the beholding of something.”522 Here Arendt notes that there are two kinds of 
contemplation, both of which are rooted in the thought of Plato and Aristotle. The first was the 
“speechless state of contemplation” which both Plato and Aristotle took to be the end of 
philosophy.523 This begins in thaumazein, which Arendt calls here the “shocked wonder at the 
miracle of being,” and ‘rises’ up to the contemplation of truth.524 The second kind of 
contemplation is the use of “the inner eye” to behold “the shape of the model according to which 
[one] fabricates his object.”525 Reading “Ideology and Terror” in light of this, it appears that 
Arendt believed that ideology functioned in a way similar enough to philosophical contemplation 
that it required some subtle distinctions. It was important to Arendt to note that, first, ideology 
did not begin in wonder of the miracle of being and, second, the ‘idea’ which the ideologist 
beholds was not that of Plato or Kant, but the logic of historical movement, a process. However, 
ideology did rely on the experience of wondrously beholding some kind of absolute standard set 
apart from the world of the senses which could then be used as a rule to regulate one’s actions. In 
                                                          
522 (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 301). 
 
523 (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 302). 
 
524 Wonder is described as a response to the “miracle of being” on (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 303). 
 
525 (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 302). 
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this reliance, modern ideologies, particularly Marxism, share a trace of the tradition of Western 
philosophy. 
 Arendt argues that through this trace from the tradition of Western philosophy, “modern 
ideologies” are “fitted to immunize man’s soul against the shocking impact of reality.”526 Since 
the spectacle of the triumph and tragedy of the French Revolution, the modern tradition of 
political philosophy, most famously embodied in the writings of Hegel, has been filled with a 
“feeling of awe and wonder at the power of history itself” which is exerted through “the force of 
history and historical necessity.”527 In contrast to the view of the first edition of Origins of 
Totalitarianism, Arendt now views ideology as cutting off human beings from their sense of the 
world as it is given, let alone any extreme experience of the world as shocking or admirable.  
 It is not gratitude that Arendt now opposes to ideology but wonder of the world. To show 
gratitude requires no thinking, whereas shock and interest spur one to think. And in gratitude, we 
need not ponder the meaning of the things we appreciate, we need merely appreciate them. What 
is important here is not that the ideologists, namely the totalitarian rulers Hitler and Stalin, had 
any new ‘ideas’, but that they made the ‘stringent logicality” of ideological reasoning permeate 
the entire regime.528 While the content of the ideology of Nazism in racism bore no resemblance 
to the main strands of the Western tradition of political thought, the content of Stalinist ideology 
was related, in however corrupt a form, to central strands of the tradition of philosophy with its 
centering of History. And these strands were resistant to wondering about the meaning of things 
apparent to the senses. 
                                                          
526 (Arendt, What is Authority? 2006, 135). 
 
527 (Arendt, On Revolution 1963, 43). 
 
528 (Tsao, The Three Phases of Arendt's Theory of Totalitarianism 2002, 606). 
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 This centering of History is the legacy of Hegel, who after the French Revolution 
introduced into the realm of human affairs the “old absolute of the philosophers” in the new form 
of a historical process.529 The dichotomy which Plato and Aristotle held between “seeing the 
truth in solitude and remoteness and being caught in the relationships and relativities of human 
affairs” was thereby retained but overturned by Hegel, by claiming that the absolute revealed 
itself historically.530 However, to Hegel the effect of the absolute was still meant to be the same: 
to replace the quest for meaning with the desire to know the truth. It was meant to “impose 
absolute standards on a realm which is made up of human affairs and relations.”531 
 This, according to Arendt, is a reformulation of Aristotle’s interpretation of the beginning 
of philosophy which Plato identified as wonder in his Theaetetus. In Theaetetus 155d, Plato 
wrote that “wonder is what the philosopher endures most; for there is no other beginning [ἀρχὴ] 
of philosophy.”532 Both Plato and Aristotle would take it as axiomatic that the pathos of 
speechless wonder was the beginning of philosophy. However, although Aristotle follows Plato 
in finding that the end of philosophy is a kind of speechless wonder, beholding ultimate truth for 
Plato and pure vision (νοῦς) for Aristotle, the interpretation that the two have of this path is quite 
different.533 For Plato, wonder is the true ἀρχὴ, which, Arendt points out, means both beginning 
and guiding principle. It is both the feeling which is at the origin of philosophizing as well as the 
                                                          
529 (Arendt, On Revolution 1963, 42). 
 
530 (Arendt, What is Authority? 2006, 115). This passage was originally in (Arendt, Tradition and the Modern Age 
1954, 74), but was relocated to “What is Authority?” in Between Past and Future to flesh out the “original 
philosophical experiences underlying the doctrine of ideas” which Arendt left open in (Arendt, What Was 
Authority? 1958, 93). 
 
531 (Arendt, What is Authority? 2006, 132). See also (Arendt, Denktagebuch 2002, 457). 
 
532 This is Arendt’s translation in (Arendt, Socrates 2005, 32). The Greek is “μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, 
τὸ θαυμάζειν: οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη.” 
 
533 (Arendt, The Concept of History 2006, 47). 
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feeling which always guides it. Politically speaking, Platonic wonder is blinding and disorienting 
to all those who experience it, since the field of human activities appears dim after beholding the 
light of the ideas.534 The “subjective act of vision…takes precedence over objective truth.”535 
 For Aristotle, Platonic wonder is no longer a principle, but merely a beginning.536 
According to Aristotle, “all men by nature desire to know” and take pleasure in exploring the 
sights presented to the senses.537 Wonder thus becomes “mere astonishment or puzzlement 
[aporein]” by which humans feel their lack of knowledge.538 When one “learns the cause” of 
things, wonder comes to an end in “the better state.”539 The object of wonder is an object of 
desire, and desiring wonder comes to an end when one knows.540 The subsumption of wonder 
under the ‘desire to know’ puts philosophy on the path of a “continuous flight from wonder.”541 
And it is this interpretation of wonder which becomes dominant in the tradition of philosophy.542 
In this Aristotelian interpretation, the quest for meaning which begins with wonder is subsumed 
in the desire to know. By this Aristotle “becomes the founder of impractical’ science, which in 
                                                          
534 See (Arendt, Denktagebuch 2002, 466 & 468). Arendt notes that this interpretation of Plato’s Allegory of the 
Cave from the Republic is based on the reading by Heidegger in (Heidegger, Plato's Doctrine of Truth (1931/32, 
1940) 1998). 
 
535 (Arendt, What is Authority? 2006, 112n.16). 
 
536 (Arendt, Thinking 1978, 114). 
 
537 (Aristotle, Metaphysica 2001, 980a). 
 
538 (Arendt, Thinking 1978, 114). 
 
539 (Aristotle, Metaphysica 2001, 983a). 
 
540 (Aristotle, Rhetorica 2001, 1371a). 
 
541 Arendt quoting Albert Einstein in (Arendt, Thinking 1978, 137). 
 
542 (Rubenstein 2008, 12-17). 
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the end proved so extraordinarily and disastrously practical.”543 This happened when Marx 
‘overturned’ Hegel by applying the laws of historical necessity to the course of human affairs, 
and in doing so making knowledge not just subsume, but utterly replace the meaning of practical 
affairs.544 
 Yet, to Plato wonder merely implied the need to think. In Arendt’s hands the 
interpretation of wonder by Plato is roughly as follows. One is forced to wonder at something 
ordinary that suddenly appears as extraordinary. Next, one confirms that admiring wonder by 
breaking out into affirming speech about what one observes. In the course of this experience, one 
is made aware of some harmonious order beyond the world.545 Although the Aristotelian path of 
wondering became more common in science and philosophy, Arendt notes that there have been 
examples of this kind of Platonic wonder throughout the past few centuries, including by 
Coleridge, Leibniz, and Schelling. And it “was revived in our own time” by Martin Heidegger.546 
 In Arendt’s 1969 text “Heidegger at 80” she examines Heidegger’s revival of Platonic 
wonder, and its political imbecility.547 She started her remarks by describing the reputation 
which Heidegger maintained for exhibiting and teaching thinking as a pathos:  
What was experienced was that thinking as pure activity – and this means impelled 
neither by the thirst for knowledge nor by the drive for cognition – can become a 
passion which not so much rules and oppresses all other capacities and gifts, as it 
                                                          
543 The German text is “[…] und wird zum Begründer der "unpraktischen" Wissenschaft, die sich dann am Ende so 
ausserordentlich und verhangnisvoll praktisch erwies. Mann beginnt zu forschen, eben zu philosophieren, um der 
Unwissenheit zu entfliehen. Die Unwissenheit, der man nicht entfliehen kann und die sich im - philosophische und 
einsamen - thaumazein" äußert, ist auber dieselbe die sich im politischen und handelnden "doxa" äußert,” in 
(Arendt, Denktagebuch 2002, 432). 
 
544 (Arendt, Thinking 1978, 139). 
 
545 (Arendt, Thinking 1978, 143). 
 
546 (Arendt, Thinking 1978, 145). 
 
547 See here (Taminiaux 1997, 168-198) and (Rubenstein 2008, 20-24). 
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orders them and prevails through them. We are so accustomed to the old opposition 
of reason versus passion, spirit versus life, that the idea of a passionate thinking, in 
which thinking and being alive become one, takes us aback.548 
This passionate thinking manifested itself to others as a “digging activity” in which Heidegger 
“penetrates to the depths” and remains there.549 From this point, Arendt notes explicitly that 
Heidegger follows Plato in “wondering at the simple” which is a part of everyday life, but that he 
goes far beyond Plato in “taking up and accepting this wondering as one’s abode.”550 In taking 
wondering as an abode, Heidegger extracts himself from the field of human affairs without, like 
Plato, finding and admiring some harmonious order giving form to the world, such as that 
expressed in the Ideas. Rather, Heidegger’s wondering is a continual burrowing and seeking 
without end. Arendt then recalls the tale told by Socrates in the Theaetetus of the Thracian 
peasant girl, who observed with laughter the sight of Thales, who stumbled into a well while his 
view was turned upwards to wonder at the stars. The point of Arendt’s telling of the tale is, 
obviously, that Heidegger’s taking up wondering of the Platonic kind as his exclusive activity, 
cut himself off from thinking about things that actually happen, and led him into practical 
disaster.551 In his winter 1924-1925 lecture course on Plato’s Sophist, which Arendt attended, 
Heidegger notes that both thaumazein and aporein are at the beginning of philosophy; both 
wondering and puzzling over difficulties through which one cannot see a way out.552 To Arendt, 
                                                          
548 (Arendt, Heidegger at Eighty 2018, 423). 
 
549 (Arendt, Heidegger at Eighty 2018, 422). 
 
550 Heidegger quoted in (Arendt, Heidegger at Eighty 2018, 426). See also (Arendt, Denktagebuch 2002, 730). 
 
551 As Heidegger surely did. It is most certainly not my interest to explore here the reasons for Heidegger’s joining 
the Nazi party, or whether his Nazism was more than a bumbling error and close to the center of his thought. 
However, given the recent publication of the Black Notebooks, which made Heidegger’s antisemitism quite explicit, 
I would say that we should save ourselves from error by approaching Heidegger’s works with skepticism, at our 
most generous, and dismissal, at our most prudent. Nevertheless, to continue the analysis of wonder in Arendt’s 
thought, I will dwell on Heidegger’s thought. 
 
552 (Heidegger, Plato's Sophist 1997, 86-88). 
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Heidegger adopted aporein as his dwelling place just as much as thaumazein. In this sense, the 
“true story of Heidegger the fox” is, politically speaking, that by taking wondering as his abode 
he “built a trap as his burrow.”553 
 Arendt would find that Heidegger’s mode of wonder, as well as his notion of history, 
would both be severely lacking, and would remain caught in the same philosophical conundrums 
of the age. In their discussion of Heidegger’s philosophy in their letters of 1952, Arendt and her 
husband Heinrich Blücher “agreed that the weakest point was his concept of historicity” and for 
her own part Arendt called it “pitiful”.554 For Arendt, this notion of historicity makes the thinker 
more “sensitive to general trends of the time” but it still holds to the fallacy of thinking that 
events and thoughts are the same, and that there is no struggle for meaning in comprehending 
events. Therefore “it never reaches but always misses the center of politics – man as an acting 
being.” 555 It still devalues the realm of human affairs and fails to retain a capacity to wonder at 
the things that people do, which are always unpredictable and appear at first without the fullness 
of meaning.556  
Here Arendt finds in her friend Walter Benjamin an example of what she was unable to 
find in Heidegger, whose wonder led him to take up residence in a Platonic stillness of thought 
and thereby underappreciated actions and events. Benjamin’s wonder, on the other hand, was 
concerned with “directly, actually demonstrable concrete facts, with single events and 
                                                          
553 (Arendt, Heidegger the Fox 1994, 361). 
 
554 (Young-Bruehl 1982, 302); and (Arendt and Blücher, Within Four Walls 1996, 188). For Heidegger’s early 
subsumption of the quest for the “meaning of being” under historicism, see (Heidegger, Being and Time 1962, 435). 
For his later subsumption of meaning under the historicized “truth of being,” see (Heidegger, On Time and Being 
1972, 9). 
 
555 (Arendt, Concern with Politics in Recent European Thought 1994, 433). 
 
556 (Arendt, Concern with Politics in Recent European Thought 1994, 445). 
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occurrences whose ‘significance’ is manifest” rather than based in a non-appearing theory or 
idea.557 As Benjamin wrote in thesis VIII of “On the Concept of History,” “The current 
amazement that the things we are experiencing are ‘still’ possible in the twentieth century is not 
philosophical. This amazement is not the beginning of knowledge – unless it is the knowledge 
that the view of history which gives rise to it is untenable.”558 Here Benjamin ruthlessly rejects 
the approach to thinking which begins with a wonder for an image of linear History. Where 
Heidegger was unable to be amazed by the events of his own century due to his wondering about 
a history of thinking, Benjamin’s model of history compels one to amazement towards the events 
that appear from out of that history and he is aimed at the apprehension of the significance of  
those events. To Benjamin, all “historicism offers the ‘eternal’ image of the past” whereas his 
manner of historical thinking is always concerned to “blast a specific era out of the homogenous 
course of history” and a “life out of the era, a specific work out of the lifework.”559 
As Arendt wrote in a 1954 lecture which she gave at Notre Dame University, “if 
philosophers, despite their necessary estrangement from the everyday life of human affairs, were 
ever to arrive at a true political philosophy, they would have to make the plurality of man, out of 
which arises the whole realm of human affairs – in its grandeur and misery – the object of their 
thaumazein.”560 And what “profoundly fascinated Benjamin from the beginning was never an 
idea, it was always a phenomenon.”561 Benjamin’s concern was with the “wonder of 
                                                          
557 (Arendt, Walter Benjamin: 1892-1940 1968, 164). 
 
558 (Benjamin 2003, 392). 
 
559 (Benjamin 2003, 396). 
 
560 (Arendt, Philosophy and Politics 1990, 103); and (Arendt, Socrates 2005, 38). On the original writing of the text, 
see (Arendt, Philosophy and Politics 1990, 73). I will have more to say in the fourth section about the importance of 
reading this text in the original setting. 
 
561 (Arendt, Walter Benjamin: 1892-1940 1968, 164). 
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appearance.”562 In directing his wonder not towards ideas, but the beauty of how everyday things 
appear, Benjamin points to a path which it had seemed that Plato and Aristotle foreclosed.563 
b. …to Ancient Greek History 
Following Benjamin’s lead in wondering at phenomena and rejecting the modern use of history 
to solve the question of meaning, Arendt would turn to the relation between wonder and history 
in ancient Greek thought before Aristotle and before Plato. This would allow her to dismantle 
some of the contradictions of modern history and wonder, which she found to be so pernicious. It 
was in the same month that “Ideology and Terror” was published in The Review of Politics that 
Arendt first wrote in her Denktagebuch about wonder. She did so, tellingly, in a discussion of 
how the ancient Greeks, particularly historians, assumed that in the immediate perception of 
things – most strongly felt in wonder – that the meaning of things would be immediately 
apparent:  
If one assumes, as the Greeks did with wonder, that the meaning of the sensible is 
immediately manifest – and here the world of sculptures is the most glorious proof 
– then our whole problem of subjective or objective historiography or the crazy 
conundrum of facts and meaning is omitted, whereby meaning supposedly is that 
which I attribute to facts. Then the problem of selection will be dashed, because 
only "the selected", namely, “what makes sense,” will be handed down. This is the 
historiography of Thucydides. It is "objective" and yet has proven to neglect many 
facts, because these problems could not be discussed at all. Facts are not history, 
and "interpretation" is not history. Only when the context of the event in which 
everything originally revealed its meaning has been destroyed, does the modern 
"problem of history " arise. Besides, there is, and has always been, the lament that 
what happens to man and what he does may not have meaning. “Vanitas vanitatum” 
vanishes.564 
                                                          
562 (Arendt, Walter Benjamin: 1892-1940 1968, 164). 
 
563 On this point, see (Markell, Arendt's Work: On the Architecture of The Human Condition 2011, 31, 40-41n.21). 
See also (Arendt, The Crisis in Culture: Its Social and Its Political Significance 2006, 211) where Arendt makes the 
difference between Platonic and Aristotelian wonder as “speechless beholding” and “love of beauty” explicit. 
 
564 The translations of passages from the Denktagebuch are mine unless otherwise indicated, such as here, where I 
benefitted greatly from the help of Alexander Lange. The original text for this quotation is: „Nimmt man an, wie die 
Griechen staunend taten, dass sich der Sinn im Sinnlichen unmittelbar zeige - und hierfür ist die Skulpturenwelt 
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Ancient Greek historiography, according to this reading, thought that in wonder the meaning of 
the sensible was directly manifest. It is only when the context shatters that the historical problem 
becomes meaningful; that is, that history can have a role in determining the meaning of an event 
rather than history cataloguing the chronicling the apparent meaning of wondrous events. This 
happens only after the context of the event has passed away. And this is not to say that the causes 
of the events recorded by history will be immediately apparent or that we may have precise 
knowledge of things without investigation, which Thucydides would certainly never believe. 
Rather, it is to say that when the great and wondrous deeds are laid out before us by the diligent 
historian, their meaning will be immediately apparent. In modernity this relation between 
meaning and context is inevitably shattered, since doubting the appearances is the beginning of 
thinking for moderns in the same way that wonder is for the ancients.565 The destruction of the 
context of meaning which Arendt describes resonates strongly with the point in the Act 1, scene 
4 of Goethe’s Faust which might have been on Arendt’s mind. After Faust declares that he 
“curse the glare of mere appearance / that presses hard on our senses” the chorus cries out “Woe! 
Woe! / You have destroyed / the beautiful world / with a heavy fist. / It falls, it is shattered. / 
Smashed by a demigod’s fist.”566 The historicism of German philosophy adopts this distant 
                                                          
herrlichster Beweis -, so entfällt unser ganzes Problem von subjektiver oder objektiver Geschichtsschreibung oder 
die verrückte Vexierfrage von Fakten und Bedeutung, wobei Bedeutung angeblich das ist, was ich den Fakten 
unterschiebe. Dann wird auch das Problem der Selektion zunichte, weil überhaupt nur "Ausgewähltes", nämlich 
das, "what makes sense", überliefert wird. Dies ist die Geschichtsschreibung des Thukydides'. Sie ist "objektiv" und 
vernachlässigt doch erwiesenermaßen viele Fakten, weil diese Problem gar nicht zur Diskussion stehen konnten. 
Fakten sind nicht Geschichte, und "Sinngebung" ist nicht Geschichte. Erst wenn wir den Geschehniszusammenhang, 
in welchem alles seinen Sinn ursprünglich offenbarte, zerschlagen haben, entsteht das moderne 
"Geschichtsproblem". Daneben gibt es, and hat es immer gegeben, die Klage, dass das, was dem Menschen 
geschieht und was er tut, vielleicht keinen Sinn habe. "Vanitas vanitatum" vanishes.“ (Arendt, Denktagebuch 2002, 
405). 
 
565 (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 272) 
 
566 “Verflucht das Blenden der Erscheinung, / die sich an unsere Sinne dränget!” and “Weh! weh! / Du hast sie 
zerstört, / Die schöne Welt, / Mit mächtiger Faust; / Sie stürzt, sie zerfällt!” in (Goethe 1985, 98 & 100). One finds 
similar references to this passage from Faust in other scholars from Germany of Arendt’s generation. See for 
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attitude to the deeds and events of the world. Although it starts from the premise of history, it 
does so in a way completely alienated from the meaning of deeds and events as they appeared in 
their own light, rather than in the light cast by History. 
 Arendt first recorded Plato’s and Aristotle’s interpretations of wonder in two consecutive 
notes in her Denktagebuch from September 1953, shortly after the note cited above.567 The note 
which immediately follows those on Plato and Aristotle is a quotation and translation of the first 
sentence of Herodotus’s Histories: “This is the demonstration of investigation of Herodotus, in 
order that neither what arose from man in time disappears again, nor the great and wonderful 
(μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά) works of both the Hellenes and the barbarians remain inglorious…”568  
Arendt goes on to interpret Herodotus’s manner of historical inquiry: “History is a) what has 
been investigated [erkundet worden ist] b) that which has its origin in men, c.) so that what has 
arisen does not disappear again, d. and that which was great did not remain without praise.”569 
This notion of historical inquiry as concerned with the μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά deeds of human 
                                                          
example (Strauss, Cohen's Analysis of Spinoza's Bible Science 2002). For another without the explicit citation of 
Goethe, but a very similar sentiment on the ancient Greeks, see (Voegelin 1952, 71). It is interesting to note here 
Voegelin’s reliance on Hans Jonas for his critique of modern Gnosticism, since it seems that, in her insistence on the 
need to redirect focus away from knowledge and towards meaning, Arendt is just as likely to have been affected by 
the writings of Jonas, her lifelong friend. See Jonas’s note on Goethe’s Faust as a modern gnostic parable in (Jonas 
1963, 111). 
 
567 (Arendt, Denktagebuch 2002, 430-434). 
 
568 Arendt’s German translation is “Diese Aufzeigung der Erkundung ist Herodots, damit weder das, was aus den 
Menschen in der Zeit entstanden, wieder verschwinde, noch die großen und wunderbaren Werken sowohl der 
Hellenen wie die Barbaren ruhmlos verblieben,” (Arendt, Denktagebuch 2002, 433). A common English translation 
has it as “Herodotus of Halicarnassus here displays his inquiry, so that human achievements may not become 
forgotten in time, and great and wondrous (μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά) deeds – some displayed by Greeks, some by 
barbarians may not be without their glory,” (Herodotus 1972, 3). On Herodotus and wonder, see (Greenblatt 2017, 
122-128); (Hunzinger, La notion de thôma chez Herodote 1995); (Kirkland 2018, 310-312); and (Priestley 2014, 51-
108). My thanks to Bryant Kirkland for our conversation and his guidance on Herodotean wonder. 
 
569 In German, “Geschichte ist a. was erkundet worden ist, b. das, was seinen Ursprung in Menschen hat, c. damit, 
wasenstanden ist, nicht wieder vergehe, d. und das, was groß war, nicht ungerühmt bleibe,” (Arendt, Denktagebuch 
2002, 433). 
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affairs would provide a way out of the various traps that the twentieth century fell into when it 
refused to endure in thought the field of human affairs– traps such as ideology (totalitarianism), 
the ‘scientific’ study of politics (following Aristotle), or the tradition of political philosophy’s 
wonder towards ideas (following Plato). It would be a practice which Arendt turned to in “The 
Concept of History” and “Understanding and Politics,” where Arendt notes that Herodotus is not 
only the ‘father of history’, but that history as we understand it only exists since Herodotus.570 
And although Arendt turns to Aristotle’s Poetics to make sense of action in The Human 
Condition, she does so through the historical lens of Herodotus, which is concerned with 
preserving the glory of wondrous deeds which “deserve to be, and, at least to a degree, are at 
home in everlastingness” through that preservation by historical inquiry.571 It is thus in the 
backwards glance of the historian that the full meaning of historical deeds and events may be 
revealed, rather than some truth which manifests itself from behind the backs of the agents 
engaged in those deeds and events.572 
 Herodotus here exemplifies the central pre-philosophical assumption of the Ancient 
Greeks which Arendt notes in The Life of the Mind: that all people have a “passion for seeing” 
and that it is “in the power of the spectator” to bestow a kind of immortality upon human beings 
through recognizing the wondrousness and greatness of their deeds.573 In turning to the ancient 
historians, Arendt thus turns to the experience and political importance of wonder prior to the 
legacies of Plato and Aristotle. In Aristotle’s description of wonder in his Metaphysics, there is 
an aside which makes more sense when we think of the chronological priority of the Herodotean 
                                                          
570 (Arendt, The Concept of History 2006, 40 & 64); and (Arendt, Understanding and Politics 1994, 319). 
 
571 (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 19, but see 181-192). 
 
572 (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 192). 
 
573 (Arendt, Thinking 1978, 130 & 131). See also (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 17-21). 
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understanding of wonder to the philosophical understanding. Aristotle writes that “even the lover 
of stories is in a sense a lover of wisdom, for a story (μῦθος) is composed of wonders.”574 
Following Plato, Aristotle distinguishes the philosopher from those who “love seeing for its own 
sake” in their capacity to endure wonder; yet, in this aside, following from the delight of seeing 
he notes at the beginning of Metaphysics, Aristotle recognizes this pre-philosophical background 
from which he and Plato depart.575 Stories are composed of wonders, since they are written by 
historians who aim to preserve those human deeds and events which incite wonder.  
 This tendency of ancient history to preserve the “great and wondrous” is not limited to 
Herodotus, but includes, despite his reluctance to include more wondrous material of a mythical 
past in his History, Thucydides, who thought that the greatness of the Peloponnesian War made 
it more worthy of remembrance and wonder (thaumazonton) than any other war in the past.576 
This tendency continued in the writings of the Greek-speaking historian of Rome, Polybius, who 
wrote that the history of Rome, particularly in its wars against Carthage, was an extraordinary 
and great spectacle (παράδοξον καὶ μέγα… θεώρημα).577 Livy, certainly influenced by Polybius, 
wrote that “in history you have a record of the infinite variety of human experience plainly set 
out for all to see”, which includes both “examples and warnings.”578 Following from this notion 
of the didactic possibility of history, Plutarch noted in his “Pericles” that in reading the “acts of 
virtues” of history, “admiration [θαυμάσαι] and liking of the thing done” is followed by a “strong 
                                                          
574 (Aristotle, Metaphysica 2001, 982b). See also (Aristotle, Rhetorica 2001, 1371b10-11). For a reading of 
Aristotle’s engagement with Herodotus, particularly in Aristotle’s biological works, see (Priestley 2014, 68-75). 
 
575 (Arendt, Socrates 2005, 31). 
 
576 See (Thucydides 1919, 1.1.1 & 1.21.2). On Thucydides and Herodotean wonder, see (Priestley 2014, 61-68) 
 
577 See the translation in (Polybius 2010, 3). Also see Polybius’s celebration of the “wonderful” “spectacle” of 
Roman funeral proceedings, which accomplish a similar task to that of the historian, (Polybius 2010, 409-410). 
 
578 (Livy 2002, 30). 
 199 
desire of doing the like.”579 And even Homer, whose poetic account of the great deeds of the 
Trojan War surely inspired Herodotus’s account of the Persian War, was concerned with 
preserving the great and wondrous.580 By following this path of the ancient historians, opened up 
by Benjamin, Arendt finds a way out of the legacies of Plato and Aristotle which find the 
meaning of politics in a location other than in politics itself. In doing so, she redirects political 
inquiry towards the wonders of the field of human affairs. 
 
3. Wonders and Miracles: The Passion of Political Theory 
Arendt once gently scolded a student on their term paper, by writing that, “[You accept] the old, 
well-worn opposition of passion to reason. But it would be unfair to charge you with this, since it 
is so deep in the Anglo-Saxon tradition and everything you were taught.”581 To take up the place 
of wonder – the pathos of thinking – in Arendt’s political writings, we must necessarily trouble 
this old, well-worn opposition. We must investigate what it means to approach the field of 
human affairs with a passionate thinking: to observe with wonder the plurality of human activity 
and, in a sense, to endure it. To do that we must reconstruct Arendt’s reflections on the passions. 
Doing so will help us to understand how the political thought of Hannah Arendt is animated by a 
pathos of wonder and will also help us to understand why it matters. 
                                                          
579 Line 1.4 in (Plutarch, Plutarch's Lives 2001, 201). See also Plutarch’s fascinating Table Talk, “On those who are 
said to cast an evil eye”, in which Plutarch, through the Roman character Mestrius Florus, defends maintaining 
wonder towards things by refraining from seeking the ‘logic’ by which they appear, (Plutarch, Table Talk V 1969, 
419). In the light of Arendt’s attack on the logicality of ideology which turns it away from the ‘miracle of being’, 
this is of great interest to us. My thanks to Bryant Kirkland for pointing me to this text. 
 
580 Arendt groups ancient poets with historians apart from the philosophers in this regard. See (Arendt, The Concept 
of History 2006, 47). 
 
581 Arendt in (Young-Bruehl 1982, 529). 
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 In a 1959 lecture given upon receiving the Lessing Prize from the Free City of Hamburg, 
Arendt recalled Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s account of “tragic pleasure.”582 And she appeared in 
her recollection of it to find some truth in this account’s depiction of pleasure and passion. 
Pleasure is “fundamentally the intensified awareness of reality, [which] springs from a 
passionate openness to the world and love of it.”583 In this interpretation, the closer to reality that 
a passion brings us, the more pleasurable it will be. The sensation of the world itself is a 
pleasurable one. Thus, under this interpretation, anger is a positive, or pleasurable, passion and 
hope is a negative one, for in anger one “reveals and exposes the world” and in hope “the soul 
overleaps it.”584 This interpretation would also find the tears which Odysseus sheds in the 
episode in the Odyssey when he hears his tale told back to him to be shed in a tragic pleasure, for 
Odysseus’s own reality is confirmed in the story which he hears. The sheer occurrence of his life 
is transformed into a story, through which he can encounter not only his deeds, but their meaning 
in the “tears of remembrance.”585 Although passions might arise in the darkness of the soul, 
which is a “more or less chaotic welter of happenings which we do not enact but suffer”, human 
beings can choose how they want to appear.586 And this is often done in order to please oneself, 
or “to persuade others to be pleased with what pleases us.”587 We can choose, in this sense, the 
passions which inspire our actions as a principle. This is opposed to the modern approach to the 
                                                          
582 (Curtis 1999, 7-10). For a sustained reading of Arendt’s engagement with ancient tragedy, see (Pirro 2001). 
 
583 (Arendt, On Humanity in Dark Times 1968, 6 & 20-21). See also Arendt’s definition of passion in (Arendt, 
Denktagebuch 2002, 525-526). 
 
584 (Arendt, On Humanity in Dark Times 1968, 6). 
 
585 (Arendt, The Concept of History 2006, 45); but see also (Arendt, Thinking 1978, 132). In (Arendt, On Humanity 
in Dark Times 1968, 20) and (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 181) describes also William Faulkner’s A Fable 
in these terms. See (Markell, Anonymous glory 2017). 
 
586 (Arendt, Thinking 1978, 72). 
 
587 (Arendt, Thinking 1978, 36). 
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passions of man, which views them under the paradigm of intimacy, and results in “the radical 
subjectivism of his emotional life.”588 In the modern approach, the proper place for the passions 
is in private life, sheltered from the corrupting influences of society. The immediacy which the 
passions designate are too dangerous for an isolated self to suffer except in relation to the very 
few people that one trusts enough to suffer. However, in the tragic as opposed to the modern 
approach to the passions, suffering coincides with doing things in the world – passion is 
fundamentally public. 
 The Isak Dinesen epigraph to the “Action” chapter, that “all sorrows can be borne if you 
put them into a story or tell a story about them,” makes this explicit. Hearing a story of oneself or 
one’s world turns one’s sorrows into something which one can endure (pathos) and encounter as 
one’s own reality. Thus, stories not only allow us to endure our pains, but also to take pleasure in 
them. This might help us to make sense of the rather odd statement in The Human Condition, 
where Arendt claims that pain is “the most intense feeling we know of,” but that it is also an 
experience that “deprives us of our feeling for reality.”589 Or it might explain the story of 
Demosthenes which Arendt relates: “A man once approached Demosthenes and related how 
terribly he’d been beaten. ‘But you,’ said Demosthenes, ‘suffered nothing of what you tell me.’ 
Whereupon the other raised his voice and cried out, ‘I suffered nothing!’ ‘Now,’ said 
Demosthenes, ‘I hear the voice of somebody who was injured and who suffered.’”590 The telling 
and enduring of the story transforms private feelings into a passion by which one gains a sense of 
reality. If all this is true, then wondering, in which we endure the shock of the world in thought, 
                                                          
588 (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 39). 
 
589 (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 50-51). See (Degerman 2019) on the unreality of compassion [Mitleid], 
and therefore Arendt’s rejection of it. 
 
590 (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 26n.8). 
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is the quintessence of tragic pleasure. In wondering we are brought to our “natural condition” 
which is, for Aristotle, taking part in political life.591  
 The sense of reality is in fact implied in the title of Arendt’s most famous work of 
political theory, The Human Condition. However, showing how this title indicates how human 
beings endure the world in thought will take some unpacking. In the first chapter of the book, 
also titled “The Human Condition”, one of the most important paragraphs for understanding the 
book occurs, and it begins with the sentence “the human condition comprehends more than the 
conditions under which life has been given to man.”592 It is the paragraph before the one which 
distinguishes Arendt’s notion of ‘the human condition’ from that of ‘human nature.’ The 
knowledge of the fundamental essence of human nature is something which Arendt notes will 
always elude us, since it only can treat individually unique and unpredictable human beings as a 
“what” rather than each of them a “who”. It would, according to Arendt, take some supernatural 
figure such as a god to ‘know’ human nature.593 The conditioning of human beings, on the other 
hand, is a question of meaning that causes us to think rather than to know. This is more or less 
familiar to readers of Arendt, but the preceding paragraph that explicates Arendt’s term ‘the 
human condition’ is still rather strange. Showing its difference from ‘human nature’ is necessary 
but not sufficient to explain what it means. 
                                                          
591 This fact is underscored by Aristotle’s discussion of wonder in the Rhetoric, which takes place in the 
consideration of pleasure. He writes that “Learning things and wondering at things are also pleasant as a rule; 
wondering implies the desire of learning, so that the object of wonder is also an object of desire; while in learning 
one is brought into one’s natural condition.,” (Aristotle, Rhetorica 2001, 1371a31-35). Arendt recorded this passage 
with an exclamation point in her Denktagebuch in August 1953, between the above cited passage on ancient history 
and the quotations on wonder in Herodotus, Plato, and Aristotle, (Arendt, Denktagebuch 2002, 413). 
 
592 (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 9). 
 
593 (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 10). 
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 The human condition is the sum of all the conditions of human existence. Here we need 
to think about condition less as a set of circumstances, but as conditioning. For Arendt, Human 
beings are conditioned in the fact that they are affected by everything which they encounter: 
“The impact of the world’s reality upon human existence is felt and received as a conditioning 
force.”594 A look at the German translation of Arendt’s text will help us to explore this point. In 
1960, Arendt translated The Human Condition into German as Vita activa: oder Vom tätigen 
Leben. The translation was not only a translation, but contains, as Roy T. Tsao notes in an 
exceptional article, a “large number of small but significant departures from the original, mostly 
in the form of discreet, clarifying additions.”595 The way that Arendt translates the phrase ‘the 
human condition’ is itself a crucial clarification across the editions of the text. Although the title 
of the section in which the paragraph under consideration occurs in the German translation, “Vita 
activa und Condition humaine”, is quite similar to that of the English text, “Vita Activa and the 
Human Condition” by taking the almost identical French translation of the phrase ‘the human 
condition,’ the German title of the first chapter of the book is a little odd: “Die menchliche 
Bedingtheit.” According to Arendt, “die Condition humaine,” is “die menscliche Bedingtheit im 
Ganzen.”596 Although one could translate “die menschliche Bedingtheit im Ganzen” as “the 
entire human condition,” why would Arendt say that the human condition is the whole human 
condition? Something is going on here. 
 In “Das Ding”, or “The Thing,” Heidegger explores the relation between thinking 
(Denken) and things (die Dinge). He writes, “in the strict sense of the German word bedingt, we 
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are the be-thinged, the conditioned ones.”597 A thing is “anything that in any way bears upon 
men, concerns them, and that accordingly is a matter for discourse.”598 In Arendt’s copy of the 
text, which Heidegger sent her, she underlined the words “Wir haben die Annmaβung alles 
Unbedingten hinter uns gelassen,” which is translated in the English publication as “We have left 
behind us the presumption of all unconditionedness.”599 The human condition is the manner in 
which human beings are affected by the things of the world – by the activities of human beings 
and the objects created by those activities. Working with the tragic understanding of the 
passions, we could say that “die menschiche Bedingtheit” is to be impassioned by the reality of 
the world. “Die Condition humaine” is the manner in which the sum total of the things of the 
world appear to us and affect us; and how they affect us through their manner of appearance to 
us.  
 If we read carefully the first chapter of The Human Condition, particularly in a way that 
reads it in light of the clarifications of Arendt’s German translation of the text, we see a text 
which would be right at home on a bookshelf beside much of contemporary Affect Theory. 
However, The Human Condition would be at home as a text which not only explicates the 
substratum of human passions and affects which are constitutive of human life on earth, but as 
one which endures that substratum of conditioning in thought – as a book of wonders. If wonder 
is the pathos of thought, then to think about the human condition is to wonder about the 
appearances of the world. When we look to Arendt’s writings around and about The Human 
Condition, we can see that it is not inaccurate to see a kind of wonder as the fundamental 
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experience of the book. In 1972, when working on The Life of the Mind, Arendt reflected on the 
viewpoint of The Human Condition. “The main flaw and mistake of The Human Condition is the 
following: I still was looking at what the tradition calls vita activa from the viewpoint of the vita 
contemplativa, without ever saying anything real about the vita contemplativa.”600 In “The 
Concept of History” of 1958, appearing in the Partisan Review during the same year in which 
The Human Condition was published, Arendt identified the “capacity for thought and wonder in 
contemplation” in the same sentence that she noted the capacities of homo faber and the human 
animal laborans.601 Therefore, Arendt wrote The Human Condition to not only to “think what we 
are doing”, but to wonder at those activities.602 To think what we are doing is to bring out, by 
wondering, the uncanny oddity of our usual sense of ordinary things. It forces us to think of the 
strangeness of the most ordinary terms which we use to describe political life – terms such as 
labor, work, and action – not to find the ‘truth’ or ‘essence’ of those terms, but to preserve the 
meaning of political life.603  
 From the very first page The Human Condition is a book of wonders. It begins with an 
analysis of the launching of Sputnik into the heavens in 1957. In the same way that Kant found 
the feelings that the French Revolution aroused in spectators most interesting in Conflict of the 
Faculties, Arendt places at the heart of her analysis the feelings that the launching of Sputnik 
incited. If one looked to the pages of the New Yorker in 1956, one would read the words of an 
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601 (Arendt, The Modern Concept of History 1958, 589). The essay would be revised and reprinted in Between Past 
and Future with the pertinent quotation appearing at (Arendt, The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern 2006, 
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602 (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 5). 
 
603 For an exceptional reading of the reading of the relation between those terms in Arendt’s thought, see (Markell, 
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American scientist working on a competing satellite project written in terms similar to Kant’s 
wonder for the ‘starry heavens above’: “Contemplate the satellite and you inevitably think about 
it in terms of yourself – that is, of your destiny, and of the transience of life. I’ve lived with it for 
almost three years now, and it still excited great curiosity in me – a curiosity that is both 
intellectual and spiritual.”604 This launching is certainly, according to Arendt’s fundamental 
analysis of human capabilities, an unrivaled example of a ‘great and wondrous deed’ by those 
“few who still know what it means to act” since, through Sputnik, scientists demonstrated their 
ability to act into nature.605 And this deed is surely a most significant wonder to behold, and an 
event “second in importance to no other.”606 This significance is primarily in the feeling which 
the event causes in those that witness it: a relief that it might be possible to escape the human 
condition of life on earth. The wonder which is experienced towards Sputnik is in the end not 
that of an admiration for the order of the world, but for the fact that human beings might alienate 
themselves from not only the world, but the earth, and take up a dwelling in the cosmos. 
 This event, however, is not a major part of the book beyond its appearance in the 
prologue. The events which are subjected to historical analysis in the book are the “three great 
events” which Arendt notes to stand at the threshold of the modern age and to determine its 
character through the processes which they unleashed: the discovery of America, the 
Reformation, and the invention of the telescope.607 To understand the condition of world – and 
ultimately earth – alienation in the modern world, Arendt explores how these three great events 
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started processes determinative of the modern age which could culminate in a condition in which 
man not only would want to escape from the world, but also, as the response to Sputnik 
demonstrates to Arendt, the earth itself.  
 In “Politics and Understanding”, Arendt writes that “whenever an event occurs that is 
great enough to illuminate its own past, history comes into being.”608 In a general sense, then, 
history came into being when Herodotus recorded in his Histories how “the Greek past became 
history through the light shed on it by the Persian Wars.”609 The event of the Persian Wars 
revealed to the historian beginnings which culminated in that event. The gaze of the historian 
crystallizes these structures after the detection of the significance of the unexpectedly new.610 
Thus, the event is great in the sense that it demands the attention of the historian, and wondrous 
in the sense that its novelty shines across historical time.611 However, one must not search for 
some sort of deep causality of events on a “deeper” strata, as that would extinguish the “light 
history itself offer.”612 As Plutarch wrote in one of his Table Talks, “the man who demands to 
see the logic (λόγος) of each and every thing destroys the wonder in all things.”613 Thus Arendt 
traces the events at the beginning of the modern age, now shown to the historian as beginnings, 
to better understand the most significant event of the modern world, the launching of Sputnik and 
its response in its observers, more significant even than the splitting of the atom. However, it is 
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Arendt’s account of action for which she is most notable as a political theorist; action which she 
describes most consistently as appearing to its observers as a miracle.614 
 As Margaret Canovan rightly notes, Arendt is “preeminently the theorist of beginnings” 
in that “reflections on the human capacity to start something new pervade her thinking.”615 This 
is primarily identified with political action, but Arendt also notes that initiative – starting 
something new – “is inherent in all activities.”616 However, whenever activity appears to us as 
new, it always appears against a background of sheer happenings. It “bursts into the context of 
predictable processes as something unexpected, unpredictable, and ultimately causally 
inexplicable – just like a miracle.”617 This “amazing and mysterious talent for working miracles” 
is called action.618 Indeed, Arendt makes a special point to identify the miraculous quality of 
action in every text in which she subjects the capacity to analysis.619 Given the entwined 
etymologies of ‘miracle’ and ‘wonder,’ it would make sense that they should be tied in Arendt’s 
thought on action.620 And we need not speculate on this matter, since in Arendt’s German 
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translation of The Human Condition, she consistently translates miracle as “Wunder.”621 To 
endure wonder is then, in some sense, to bear in thought the ‘glad tidings’ of action.  
 However, one must ask why Arendt uses the term ‘miracle’ for action and not wonder? I 
believe that there are at least two strong explanations. The first is the generality of wonder, 
especially under the philosophical interpretation. One wonders at a totality, whether one call it 
the kosmos, being, the world, or the human condition. Wonder is a shocked wonder, but to 
Arendt it is “the shocked wonder at the miracle of being”622 The ‘miracle’ of action, on the other 
hand, is always a particular deed, even if it is not always limited to the action of a single doer.623 
What strikes us about action is not only its novelty, but its particularity. However, the second 
reason that Arendt uses ‘miracle’ rather than ‘wonder’ is a little less apparent than the first. It 
seems to me that Arendt is here drawing on the pre-philosophical assumption of the Greeks, 
which she notes in The Human Condition, “The Concept of History,” and later in The Life of the 
Mind: that there is something of the divine which is conferred upon human beings when they are 
the subject of admiration.624 By using ‘miracle’ in this sense, Arendt bypasses the philosophical 
baggage of wonder, which has been its inheritance since Plato used this pre-philosophical 
assumption of the Greeks to his advantage in the ‘Allegory of the Cave’ to bestow a kind of 
everlasting divinity upon ideas of the mind. In seeing deeds as miracles – as worthy of a certain 
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kind of wonder which is owed to divinity– we feel that they deserve to last beyond their fleeting 
moment.625 In suffering the reality of others, we preserve for them that reality.  
 In seeing this side of action, the side which emphasizes the meaning of suffering others, 
we can see that Arendt’s writings on action are just as much about pathos as they are about 
prattein. By saturating her writings on action, which to Arendt is the enactment of freedom, with 
a clear concern with how it must be suffered, Arendt clearly stakes a claim: if we will not suffer 
one another, we shall not be free; and if we do not suffer the recognition of our actions offered to 
us by others, our freedom will be without meaning. It makes complete sense that Arendt’s 
preferred title for her book of wondering, The Human Condition, was Amor Mundi, or love of the 
world.626 Wonder is, in a sense, a kind of love. “The very fact of appearance – the urge to appear 
– shows a claim for recognition and praise. All that appears wants to be seen and recognized and 
praised. The highest form of recognition is love: volo ut sis [I will that you should be]. – The 
wonder implies affirmation.”627 Sometimes love is deluded or missed the mark. Or sometimes it 
turns itself over in us and leads us to see things as they aren't but how we imagine them to be. 
However, if we allow ourselves wonder and gratitude for the world and the people with whom 
we share it, we make ourselves open for surprise and novelty and a sustained dedication that 
demands our attention and common efforts for that which is or even might be. It demands that 
we allow the novelty of it to beckon our acknowledgement and support. And, in moments of 
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danger, defense. Our love of the world keeps itself from being calcified when it is enlivened by 
the unavoidable novelty of events of the world through our openness to wonder. Political theory 
must remain not only attentive to the world, but must affirm it, even when desiring to change it. 
Doing so reflects the fundamental worldliness of political theory.  
 
4. Novus Ordo Saeclorum: Wonder and Political Time  
According to Arendt, the tragedy of the American Revolution, or at least one of the tragedies, is 
that the foundational moment of the Constitution became an object of worship – a great deed 
worthy of remembrance – which foreclosed the space of freedom it meant to open. Indeed, it is a 
tragedy similar to that of the ‘Greek Solution’ to the “futility of action and speech”, that “without 
assistance from others, those who acted [would not] be able to establish together the everlasting 
remembrance of their good and bad deeds, to inspire admiration in the present and in future 
ages.”628 This ‘Greek Solution’ is captured for Arendt in the Funeral Oration of Pericles, who 
claimed that he and his fellow Athenians, “shall be the wonder not only of the men of today but 
of after times; we shall need no Homer to sing our praise nor any other poet whose verses may 
perhaps delight for the moment but whose presentation of the facts will be discredited by the 
truth.”629 To Arendt, this “supreme confidence” that Athenians could both “enact and save their 
greatness” in action has been forever after read with the knowledge that Pericles’ words were 
spoken when the freedom of Athens was at the beginning of the end.630 Greatness can only lie in 
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the performance itself, and “neither in its motivation nor achievement.”631 In the same way, the 
American revolution is seen as a monument of wondrous, noble deeds, but not as opening a 
space, according to Arendt, in which others could continue to appear in the same shining glory. 
Instead it foreclosed it as soon as it was opened. In doing so the ‘Founders’ created a republic 
whose citizens hold the “miracle of permanence” of the founding moment in reverence but have 
grown distant to the freedom which they venerate.632 Must then the affirmation of wonder always 
culminate in reverence, even when it begins in wonder towards a political event? 
 In Arendt’s analysis of the American and French Revolutions, she finds that the “problem 
of the absolute” is inherent in the revolutionary event.633 This problem was that revolutionaries 
could not help themselves from seeking some external, unqualified, and independent source of 
authority for their new institutions of freedom – an absolute. It was a problem which sent them 
searching for some principle of order only perceptible by the contemplation of the mind, 
analogous to the Ideas of Plato, which was ‘beyond’ their new revolutionary spaces of freedom. 
In France, this problem manifested itself in the tragic turning of the Revolution towards despotic 
dictatorships. However, Arendt argues that we would be wrong to find that this “problem of the 
absolute” is merely an unfortunate inheritance of the French revolutionaries from the antecedent 
absolute monarchy. Rather, the need for an absolute was also evident in the experiences of the 
American Revolution, where there was a need to both break the vicious circle of law-making by 
an to appeal to some ‘higher law’ as well as solve the problem of how to establish a new 
foundation which might have some stability and permanence to it. What solved these problems 
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for the Americans, according to Arendt, was contained in “the act of foundation itself.”634 It was 
not so much the Constitution from which the stability and authority of the American Republic 
derived, but from its beginning. However, the Constitution almost immediately came to be 
treated religiously as an object of “blind worship” with “sanctimonious reverence.”635 The 
founding, embedded in the Constitution, became a source of authority akin to the absolute ideas 
of Plato, who set them apart from political reality as things to admiringly behold. “For the 
beginning (ἀρχή), because it contains its own principle, is also a god who, as long he as dwells 
among men, as long as inspires their deeds, saves everything.”636 And this founding deed, 
admired as quasi-divine, was insufficient to sustain the revolutionary spirit of public freedom. 
 The challenge which Arendt confronts here is, as Patchen Markell has called it in a 
different setting, an “erosion of the contexts in which events call for responses and, thus, in 
which it makes sense to act at all.”637 If one takes the wondrousness of an event as demanding 
reverence, then it would seem utterly inappropriate to respond to it. Correspondingly, if one 
takes the origin of a political space to be an act of semi-divine authority, then any alteration of 
the contours of that space would be sacrilege. What is needed here, it to think of the beginning as 
a moment which calls for a response; the political space must be felt as a domain wherein the 
extraordinary is ordinary and vice versa. Maintaining these contexts is not an effort for single 
individuals. Rather, as constellations, they are sustained only as a fragile, intangible web of 
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human relations: from the doers to the sufferer, from the sufferer to the spectator, and from the 
spectator transformed into another doer to the sufferer, and so on.  
 In a similar fashion, during the modern age, events and deeds suffer a similar fate. Events 
“lose their significance, that is, their capacity to illuminate historical time.”638 Deeds become 
futile and are seen less under the criteria of deserving “public admiration” so much as “monetary 
reward”: “the futility of public admiration, which daily is consumed in ever greater quantities, on 
the contrary is such that monetary reward, one of the most futile things there is, can become 
more ‘objective’ and more real.”639 Once the view becomes dominant in society that monetary 
reward and success is the only point of respectability, there is no longer any meaning left to the 
common world. It becomes like a monoculture crop, easily devastated by pestilence or, 
effectually the same, it becomes like a gene pool which has completely lost its diversity and is 
already essentially extinct. This is precisely what Arendt indicates in Eichmann in Jerusalem of 
the susceptibility of “respectable European society” to total moral collapse under the Nazi rule. 
Regarding his willingly becoming a ‘joiner’ of the Nazi movement, Adolf Eichmann said of 
Hitler that “his success alone proved to me that I should subordinate myself to this man.” In this, 
Arendt writes, “his conscience spoke with a ‘respectable voice,’ with the voice of respectable 
society around him.”640 One can see something similar in the present day when, for example, the 
popular press turns to CEOs of major companies for their opinion on any matter besides 
increasing profit for stockholders. Moreover, Eichmann represented to Arendt the final 
culmination of the tendency to repeat “word for word the same stock phrases and self-invented 
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clichés” that have the effect of “protecting us from reality” and “any claim on our thinking 
attention that all events and facts make by virtue of their existence.”641 That is, Eichmann no 
longer allowed himself to respond to any claim of reality upon him and it endure that claim in 
thought. He had anesthetized himself, as is quite natural under conditions of ‘the social,’ against 
wondering.  
 The rise of the social, in this regard, diminishes the spaces towards which the sense-
making activity of wondering is ordinarily directed. These are spaces in which it simply doesn’t 
matter if deed accompanies action – that we mean what we say – but only that one is 
‘successful.’ This effect permeates all aspects of everyday affairs so that “the ubiquitous 
functionalization of modern society has deprived [life] of one of its most elementary 
characteristics – the instilling of wonder at that which is as it is.”642 And as there are no contexts 
in which events and deeds can appear and be appreciated as wondrous, they cannot be examined 
for the purpose of understanding their meaning. “Everything” under this condition “exists in an 
opaque, meaningless thereness which spreads obfuscation and causes disgust.”643 We can take no 
pleasure in our appreciation of public life. It is, in all senses of the term, dull.  
 It is likely no coincidence that Athenian philosophy flourished at a time of declining 
public freedom – a time in which there was a space for things to appear publicly as objects of 
surprise, admiration, and wonder. The enactment of public freedom depends on thinking for its 
meaning, and thinking depends on public freedom for its appearance as speech, which it needs 
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“to be activated at all.”644 For this reason, thought is only possible as an activity, as opposed to a 
merely subjective experience, when “men live under conditions of political freedom.”645 Action 
and thinking may not be the same activities, but they need one another; and the passion of 
wonder is the medium tethering them together. It is only when a space of public freedom has 
ossified that wondering appears to us as ‘philosophic’ and futile, rather than an everyday activity 
of a free, thinking people. The quest for meaning which begins with wonder is as fragile and 
potentially futile as action. Although thinking is most likely coextensive with human life, for it to 
appear in the world in a manner similar to that of Socrates, it requires a space – a space in which 
sensibilities are open to being regularly disordered – in which the “pillars of truth” are not also 
the stultifying “pillars of order.”646 “Thinking is out of order because the quest for meaning 
produces no end result that will survive the activity, that will make sense after the activity has 
come to its end.”647  
 Indeed, it is Socrates to whom Arendt turns for a model of wondering citizenship due to 
his example as one who wonders about meaning without the need of an absolute or the tendency 
to reverence as well as his willingness to engage others in the public space of the agora.648 It is, 
in a way, unfortunate that the essay which first appeared in Social Research in 1990 as 
“Philosophy and Politics” and in The Promise of Politics in 2005 as “Socrates” appeared in the 
form in which it did. In truth, the essay which appeared in these places was a part of a lecture 
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series from 1954 titled: “Philosophy and Politics: the Problem of Action and Thought after the 
French Revolution.”649 By setting apart the third of the lectures, which was focused on Socrates, 
it makes it seem as if this text is solely concerned with finding in the abstract a mode of 
philosophy which is compatible with politics, rather than concerned with reconciling thought and 
action in contemporary republics. In fact, the other lectures from this series were used as material 
that would ultimately appear in On Revolution. Thus, it is only right to think of Arendt’s 
interpretation of Socrates in the context of the problem of the maintaining the spaces freedom in 
modern republics. 
 For Arendt, what sets Socrates apart from his fellow citizens isn’t what he possesses – or 
what he beholds – but rather what he doesn’t have: Socrates is the one who only knows that he 
does not know. He has no absolutes or rules of conduct to offer his fellow Athenians. During his 
Apology he even tells his jury that he has no teaching (33b). He has no access to the mysteries of 
the universe or an ‘idea’ of the ‘logic’ of history. Instead, his “distinction from his fellow citizens 
is not that he possesses any special truth from which the multitude is excluded, but that he 
remains always ready to endure the pathos of wonder and thereby avoid the dogmatism of mere 
opinion holders.”650 Yet after his experience of the pathos of wonder – which often left him 
standing utterly still in the agora – he would always return to the world in speech.651 In this he 
experienced wonder in a way completely different from that of Plato and Aristotle’s 
interpretations, which both end in a kind of speechlessness. Upon returning from his shock of 
wonder, Socrates’s speech would take the form of questions; questions which would seek, as 
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650 (Arendt, Socrates 2005, 36). 
 
651 (Arendt, Socrates 2005, 33). 
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Arendt would say, “meaning, which we originate in the process of living insofar as we reconcile 
ourselves to what we do and what we suffer.”652 This wondering produces no final results, and 
always seems to end in aporia. Beginning from the presupposition that he had no knowledge, he 
would always end with the conclusion that “I have failed utterly to discover what it is.”653  
 Thought and action are by themselves futile, yet their union is the only basis for any 
possibility of meaning in politics. Accordingly, even though Arendt might think that those who 
act “know not what they do,” we should not see Arendtian action as thoughtless. We should not 
only have Pericles, or characters from Sophoclean tragedies, as our paradigmatic figures of 
Arendtian politics. Socrates in the agora is perhaps even more appropriate. From this 
perspective, the degree to which political spaces have occasions for questioning – and power 
granted to the questioners to respond to the answerers – is the degree to which those spaces are 
free. The Prime Minister’s Question Time in the House of Commons of the United Kingdom is 
one favorable example. 
 If the wonder of the ancient historians might seem to us too self-assured in always 
directly revealing the meaning of the “great and wondrous deeds” which they remember, then the 
wonder of Socrates must strike us as absolutely humble in taking meaning as a problem which he 
is simply unable to permanently solve. However, together they are essential activities for 
sustaining political life. If historians did not provide for the public a record of deeds and events 
which are worth wondering over, then the Socratic kind of wondering would only concern itself 
with trifles. If there were no ‘objectivity’ to our wondering, then thinking would always be an 
anatomized, rather than truly public activity. For Socrates, “admiring wonder at just or 
                                                          
652 (Arendt, Understanding and Politics 1994, 309). 
 
653 (Arendt, Thinking 1978, 165). 
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courageous deeds seen by the eyes of the body gives birth to such questions as What is courage? 
What is Justice?” The basic Socratic question is “what do we mean when we use this class of 
words, later called “concepts”?” The inquiries which arise out of this are never resolved, but 
always leave Socrates open to return to wondering, to return to the marvelous – even if terrible – 
deeds of his fellows to understand what they could possibly mean.654 In this way, Socratic 
wondering is the opposite of the socialized thoughtlessness of an Eichmann, whose clichés 
insulated him against the “words and the presence of others, and hence against reality as 
such.”655 Socrates desperately sought to connect meaning between the deeds and words of his 
fellow Athenians, and his quest for meaning leads him to endlessly examine the opinions of his 
fellow citizens. He would find the intent of his fellow Athenians endlessly beguiled by 
misleading understandings of words, and that they desperately needed the jolt of his questioning 
to begin the quest for meaning on their own. As a collective, public practice, one way to 
summarize the basic line of questioning which Socrates put to his fellow citizens might be, ‘Must 
we mean what we say?’656  
 Although Arendt does not say so explicitly, I believe that we can fruitfully consider the 
problems of the absolute and of reverence for action in the light of the Socratic model of the 
wondering citizen. One such as Socrates will be quick to endure the miracle of action. New 
beginnings with be apparent to her, as she will be “ready to endure the pathos of wonder.” 
However, she will endure the ἀρχή of action like Socrates – questioningly. She will observe it, 
                                                          
654 (Arendt, Thinking 1978, 166). 
 
655 (Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem 1964, 49). 
 
656 The activities of Arendt’s Socrates are quite close to that of Cavellian ordinary language philosophy. See (Cavell, 
Must we mean what we say? 2002); (Cavell, The Claim of Reason 1979); and (Norris 2017, especially 5-6, 38-39, 
46, & 139). 
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feel the reality of it, and question the meaning of it. However, she will also go beyond Socrates 
to respond to it in kind with action. Socrates to us represents an example of the activity of 
wondering in a free society, but still represents only one kind of activity. In this manner, she will 
have unified in her “person two apparently contradictory passions, for thinking and acting.”657 
This implies that the miracle of action will be endured not with stultifying, reverent awe, but 
with the active questioning which is appropriate for political life. One must admit, in this respect, 
that there was some merit to the charge against Socrates for impiety, since there was no matter 
about which he was unwilling to wonder. A practice of questioning citizenship might help us to 
think about how the two different aspects of action, archein and prattein, might coincide.658 
Political action which appears to us as new (archein) makes a demand on us to respond to it by 
passionately seeking the meaning of it. There is no absolute sovereign or ancient document that 
can endure without question a passionately wondering citizenry. In an epistemological sense, a 
practice of political wondering is a practice of equals.659 Through our wondering we may then 
estimate whether new beginnings (arche) should be carried through (prattein).660 
 For the preservation of a space in which archein and prattein coincide – where ruling and 
being ruled are not forms of domination of one group over another, but of beginnings emerging 
out of the chains of ongoing events – we must allow ourselves to be shocked into acknowledging 
the new beginnings which occur all the time in order to be able to respond to them.661 We must 
                                                          
657 (Arendt, Thinking 1978, 167). 
 
658 On archein and prattein, see (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 189 & 222-223); (Arendt, What is Freedom? 
2006, 164); (Arendt, The Promise of Politics 2005, 45-46); and (Arendt, On Revolution 1963, 205). 
 
659 (Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation 1991). 
 
660 As this last sentence is meant to indicate, this interpretation of wondering citizenship is meant to compliment the 
model of democratic judgment offered in (Zerilli, A Democratic Theory of Judgment 2016). 
 
661 (Markell, The Rule of the People: Arendt, Archê, and Democracy 2010). 
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forgo the Platonic model of “identification of knowledge with command and rulership and action 
with obedience with execution” which replaces wondering about that which appears with 
beholding some measure, whether it is some version of Plato’s paradigm (παράδειγμα) of 
Kallipolis or a historical scheme of ideology.662 To be free, we must maintain spaces where we 
may expect the shock of finding disorder in order, and, for better or worse, endure new 
beginnings in time. In this respect, even in political orders conducive to its appearance, thinking 
is always out of order. 
5. Wonder for the World 
Of all the theorists surveyed in this dissertation, Arendt is the most resolute in acknowledging 
wonder as a problem for modern political thought. In response to experiences of new institutions 
and ways of being in the world, modern thinkers have suggested that wonder is intertwined with 
the new orders of modernity congealed in the state, the universal capacity of freedom, and the 
market economy. Each of these thinkers have reached back into ancient thought to help make 
sense of these new experiences, whether they be the ancient historians, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, 
the Epicureans, or the Stoics. Of these modern thinkers, Arendt stands apart. As she would write 
in The Life of the Mind, she joined the company of “those who for some time now have been 
attempting to dismantle metaphysics, and philosophy with all its categories, as we have known 
them from their beginning in Greece until today.”663 As Hobbes, Kant, and Marx each in their 
own ways found themselves more tethered to the past as they attempted to grasp the present in 
                                                          
662 (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 225); and (Plato 1945, 592b). Although it is not the focus of this chapter, I 
hope that I have shown above that the transformation of wonder by Plato is the pathetic side to the loss of the 
connection between archein and prattein explored by Arendt in The Human Condition as well as in other places. See 
also, (Arendt, What is Authority? 2006, 115), where Arendt claims that the capacity to endure and remain devoted to 
a prolonged feeling of θαυμάζειν, subordinating action to thought, is what Plato, and the tradition that followed him, 
held to be the principle of rulership. In The Human Condition, Arendt calls this “the supreme criterion of fitness for 
ruling others…in the aristocratic tradition of the West,” (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 224). 
 
663 (Arendt, Thinking 1978, 212). 
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thought, Arendt tested the tensile strength of those ties, and saw what resonance they might have 
when plucked. As such, she offers not so much a prescriptive account of wonder, but descriptive, 
so to speak. There is no single ‘proper’ experience of wonder for Arendt, even if there might be 
some primordial description of it as a historical experience which we might draw from the 
etymologically originary uses of thauma, mira, or, most mysterious of all, wunder. However, 
Arendt acknowledges that human beings will wonder and think about an unpredictable variety of 
things and will continue to do so as long as they dwell on the earth, for “the capacity for wonder 
and thought” is a fundamental capacity of the human condition.664   
 Arendt turns to Ancient Greek thought to examine the possibilities of wonder, and how 
those different genres of responses to it have persisted throughout the tradition of Western 
thought. Yet that tradition, insofar as it ever existed, is broken, as Arendt continually remarks. It 
offers itself to us in the present as “rich and strange” “thought fragments”, from which we may 
learn the range of human capacities and experiences.665 Yet it will not teach us of any proper 
functioning of our capacities, or, even less, ‘what is to be done.’666 “Our inheritance was left to 
us by no testament.”667 Insofar as political theorists are guided towards finding meaning in the 
tragic arena of politics, they must allow themselves to wonder. To do so, they must, 
metaphorically speaking, first direct the entirety of their attention to the phenomena of practical 
affairs, and, second, search within them for meaning. The modes of wondering which Arendt is 
                                                          
664 (Arendt, The Concept of History 2006, 62). 
 
665 (Arendt, Walter Benjamin: 1892-1940 1968, 206) and (Arendt, Thinking 1978, 212). The phrase “rich and 
strange” is from Shakespeare’s The Tempest, a play absolutely obsessed with the experience of wonder. 
666 (Arendt, Walter Benjamin: 1892-1940 1968, 205-206). See also (Arendt, Thinking 1978, 212) and (Benhabib 
1990). 
 
667 The original text, “Notre heritage n’est précédé d’aucun testament” by René Char and this translation are found 
in (Arendt, Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future 2006, 3). 
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most desperate to recover from the ancients are not the scientistic wonder of Aristotle, or the 
virtue-bound wonder of the Stoics, but rather a delicate balance of the meaning-directed 
wonderings of the ancient historians for the ‘great and wondrous’ deeds and events of human 
affairs and the aporetic wonder of Socrates. Political theorists must carefully draw themselves 
towards the unexpected, incredible events of the present, while also retaining the Socratic refusal 
of the dangerous, and usually incorrect, assumption that we will immediately understand the 
significance and meaning of what is happening. This is not the Epoché of the Stoics, a 
withholding of judgement as to certainty, but the Socratic bafflement at the ceaselessly aporetic, 
slipperiness of meaning which occurs whenever we attempt to meaningfully say something about 
the world as it presents itself to us. 
 Even though the grace of universals might have left political theory, the needful quest of 
the general is imperative. The world, if not experienced as a pathos, as something worthy to be 
suffered in thought, will not forever suffer us. As I finish these pages, the condition could not be 
more dire, or impassioned thought more needful. The gigantic catastrophes of the earth brought 
on by climate change open up not so much a perceptual gap between the potential political orders 
of the world and an order in which human flourishing is possible, but a gaping, screaming 
chasm, which, if we do not have the intellectual courage to experience in wonder, will swallow 
us whole. “The earth is the very quintessence of the human condition, and earthly nature, for all 
we know, may be unique in providing human beings with a habitat in which they can move or 
breath without artifice.”668 That “quintessence”, that there should be a world in which there 
might be human things, in whatever ordering that they may take, is still a great wonder. That this 
                                                          
668 (Arendt, The Human Condition 1958, 2). For an exciting new reading on the political significance of the earth for 
Arendt, see (Ephraim 2017, 34-67). 
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condition might soon end, should be a wonder as well. Wonder might not help us to prevent 
disasters, but it will force us to try to understand them. To not respond would then be 
thoughtless. 
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Conclusion 
Politics and Wondering: From the Rainbow to the Tempest 
 
 Marveling, thus, at his goodness and prudence, the Roman people 
yielded to his every decision. 
- Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy 
My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings; 
Look on my Works, ye Mighty, and despair! 
- Percy Bysshe Shelley, Ozymandias 
 
1. An Ethic of Political Wondering? 
Wonder is a passion implicated in power. Whether it should be towards the sovereign state, the 
dream of a world ordered accorded to freedom, the overwhelming inundation of new 
commodities produced by capitalism, or political action as such, wonder attaches us to a 
particular ordering of the world. In modernity, wonder is incorporated into the ‘brave new world’ 
that is primarily ordered according to human initiative. In the preceding chapters, we saw 
theorists follow various paths to turn their gaze away from the events and deeds of men and 
women. In the penultimate chapter, we saw Arendt repudiate that choice. Rather than turn her 
gaze towards the gigantic structure of the modern state, the unseen capacity for freedom, or the 
process of production, Arendt finds the field of human affairs to be worthy of wonder, and 
recovers from the roots of western thinking some forgotten resources for making sense of that 
underexplored path of wonder.  
 Additionally, Arendt analyzes the temporal dimension of wonder, which bestows upon a 
perceived object a permanence in time that may serve as the basis of a reliable ordering of the 
world. This had been an effect of the use of wonder by previous theorists, but Arendt allows us 
to see this effect more clearly. To Arendt, the fact that wonder is a pathos means not only that it 
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is a feeling which crosses the boundaries between, metaphorically speaking, the mind and the 
heart, but it is something which is endured in time. However, Arendt was not alone in 
recognizing this temporal dimension to political wonder. Previous theorists also responded to the 
precarity of secular time by transferring wonder from the sense of the world as divinely ordered 
to new phenomena in political life in order to ‘reoccupy’ the need for a sense of order. Thus 
Hobbes found the wonder towards the sovereign to create an enduring sense of statist order; Kant 
found the wonder towards the capacity for freedom to create an enduring resource for the 
republican project; and Marx found the wonder for commodities and their production to create a 
feeling that capitalism would endure, no matter what internal contradictions it might contain. In 
the preceding chapter, I showed that Arendt ‘dismantles’ the connection between wonder and 
endurance in time to show the root it has in experiencing the unexpected novelty of deeds and 
events. By doing so, Arendt helps us better understand the temporal aspect of the previous 
treatments of wonder. And in that root, Arendt finds a sensorial basis for meaning in politics. In 
the modern history of political wonder Arendt appears less as one whose project is concerned 
with a prescriptive project of order, and more as one who implores us to think about how our 
suffering of the world engenders how we construct meaning within it.  
 However, there is a lingering issue in Arendt’s account of wonder, which is revealed by 
the fact that the problem which led her to reconsider wonder was the historical task of 
understanding evil. It is also a significant issue for the rest of the theorists in this dissertation: 
whether wondering has any moral content. In 1945, Arendt proclaimed that “the problem of evil 
will be the fundamental question of postwar intellectual life in Europe.”669 In Origins of 
Totalitarianism, Arendt confronts this problem of the radical evil of totalitarianism, which not 
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only systematically destroys human life, but attempts to destroy “the fact of existence itself.”670 
Totalitarianism as a ‘novel form of government’ is a monstrous horror, yet “‘dwelling on 
horrors’ would seem indispensable for the understanding of totalitarianism.”671 Indeed, Arendt 
made the point emphatically in 1954, that “the speechless horror at what man may do and what 
the world may become is in many ways related to the speechless wonder of gratitude from which 
the questions of philosophy spring.”672 The problem of evil and its relation to wonder would 
remain a conundrum for Arendt even after she altered her assessment of totalitarian crimes from 
‘radical’ to ‘banal.’ “Evil”, she would say, “is never ‘radical,’ that it is only extreme, and that it 
possesses neither depth nor any demonic possession.”673 It appears to me that in the course of 
searching for the meaning of the evils of totalitarianism, that Arendt held more closely to her 
understanding of wonder in politics: that wonder must remain on the level of appearance and 
interrogate the meaning of deeds. To assume that something which appears is supernatural, and 
beyond the powers of comprehension, is to cut short thinking.  
 Wonder is then implicated in Arendt’s greatest controversy: her account of Adolf 
Eichmann as not a superhuman monster, but a fool who didn’t allow himself to think about what 
he was doing – a guilty and responsible fool, but a fool, nonetheless. Quite reasonably, this 
deeply offended many by apparently exculpating Eichmann of his monstrousness and trivializing 
the horror of the Holocaust.674 But isn’t there something deeply troubling from the beginning 
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671 (Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 1968, 441). 
 
672 (Arendt, Concern with Politics in Recent European Thought 1994, 445). 
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674 Writings from the controversy, which remains no less controversial today (Aharony 2019), over Arendt’s 
coverage of Eichmann’s trial, and studies of the controversy are seemingly endless. A few of those studies include 
(Berkowitz 2013); (Golan and Misemer 2017); (Lipstadt 2010); and (Stangneth 2014). 
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about thinking about the evil of totalitarianism in a similar manner to how Herodotus wrote 
about the Ancient Greeks and Persians in their wars against one another – certainly not as 
glorious for Arendt, but as a novel wonder to be understood?675 Here Arendt’s controversy 
brings to light a central problem of wonder, and perhaps exaggerates it. That problem is in the 
fact that when we perceive something in wonder, we can value objects without moral evaluation. 
Consider how Hobbes shows that the wonder for state, which Nietzsche rightly called the 
“coldest of all cold monsters,”676 does not require that we think of the Leviathan as supremely 
good, but only as sovereign; how Marx relentlessly shows how the wonder of the commodity 
form that structures capitalism displaces or confuses questions of whether capitalism is truly 
conducive to the flourishing of those who live under it; or even how Kant’s wonder at the 
possibility of universal freedom could realize itself historically as “the fury of destruction,” 
according to Hegel,677 in such as events as The Terror during the French Revolution. It is not my 
intention to resolve the Eichmann controversy, but rather to acknowledge the moral problem of 
wondering which the controversy brings to light. It is a problem that it is perhaps impossible to 
resolve but must be acknowledged if we are to cope with the tensions of wondering in 
modernity. 
 These tensions have occurred to others. In Martha C. Nussbaum’s theory of the passions 
as moral evaluations, “wonder is exceptional: the intensity of my wonder seems proportional 
only to the value that I see in the object, not to its value for me in my scheme of goals or 
                                                          
675 My thanks to Joshua Dienstag for pressing me to bring these concerns to the forefront of this conclusion. See also 
Arendt’s rejection of seeking historical ‘causes’ of totalitarianism in her work in (Arendt, Totalitarianism 2018, 
157). My thanks to Kirstie McClure for drawing my attention to this passage. 
 
676 (Nietzsche 1966, 48). 
 
677 (Hegel 1977, 359). 
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ends.”678 The moral theory which Nussbaum offers is eudaimonistic, which means that it is 
concerned chiefly with the achievement of human flourishing.679 Within the structure of this 
ethical theory to say that wonder doesn’t value an object with regards to one’s own scheme of 
goals or ends is to say that it is experienced in an amoral sense. As Descartes wrote, wondering 
“is focused not on good or bad but only on the knowledge of the thing that has given rise to 
it.”680 In Milton’s Paradise Lost, the greatness of Satan is depicted as sublime, but certainly not 
as good.681 In wondering we find significance in objects, but we do so without necessarily 
evaluating the moral quality of the object. William Shakespeare’s play, The Tempest, provides 
another extreme example. The character Miranda had lived out nearly her entire life on an island 
populated only by herself, her father, and two inhuman creatures, Ariel and Caliban. After her 
father caused a storm that shipwrecked a ship with a handful of men onto the shores of the 
island, Miranda came into contact with more humans than just her father. When she encounters a 
group of these men, she is astounded by so many new people: “O, wonder! / How many goodly 
creatures are there here! / How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world, / That has such people 
in't!” To this her father responds, “'Tis new to thee.”682 What Miranda did not know was that 
these “goodly creatures” were in fact responsible for why she and her father were stranded on 
this island in the first place. Prospero points out that the novelty of these men to Miranda, and 
her ignorance as to how they fit into the possibility of her happiness, gives her a completely 
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681 See (Burke 1990, 57). For a political reading of Burke’s notion of the sublime, see (Frank 2014). 
 
682 Act V, Scene 1, (Shakespeare 1959, 78). 
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misleading understanding of them. Wonder, in this instance, utterly misses the moral quality of 
the object. 
 Arendt is aware of these problems and provides an answer to them.683 Whether the 
answer is adequate, is another issue. When Arendt saw Eichmann on trial she found that “the 
deeds were monstrous, but the doer – at least the very effective one on trial – was quite ordinary, 
commonplace, and neither demonic nor monstrous.”684 What she found remarkable about the 
man was not “stupidity but thoughtlessness.”685 Arendt wonders at one who evidently never took 
part in wondering. From this point she asked whether this “activity could be among the 
conditions that make men abstain from evil-doing or even actually ‘condition’ them against 
it?”686 The answer that she finds is what she calls the “two-in-one” – the fact that whenever we 
stop to think about a matter, we engage in an inner dialogue with ourselves. We experientially 
split into a duality. To wonder, in this sense, is to ask oneself questions and to attempt to answer 
them honestly. “The only criterion,” according to Arendt, “of Socratic thinking is agreement, to 
be consistent with oneself.”687 The point for Arendt is that thinking might keep us from doing 
things that we couldn’t accept in a friend. For that is what the other in one’s silent dialogue must 
be to keep the dialogue going: a friend. Arendt’s answer to the ‘banality’ of Eichmann is then a 
                                                          
683 This is the answer we have given the fact that the third part of The Life of the Mind, on the faculty of judgment, 
was never completed. Thinking and judging are intricated connected for Arendt, especially in the way that one 
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‘depth’ of internal dialogue – an opening to wonder about things in silent discourse with oneself, 
with the moral demand that one be able to live with oneself and one’s deeds. Eichmann’s refusal 
to think what he was doing shows what can happen if one is unwilling to confront evil in 
thought: one might commit it. 
 In the introduction I responded to the question of whether it is good that we wonder by 
saying that wondering is simply something that we do. It is a fact with which we can live well or 
poorly. I stated my aspirational faith in the capacity of citizens for a more reflective sense of 
wonder, which might express itself through a thoughtful responsiveness and a bit of cunning. I 
would add that, given that in modernity political wonder is mostly directed towards objects 
which are the artifacts of human freedom, bringing wonder under our own reflective control is to 
further complete the ‘unfinished project of modernity.’688 Wonder is a passion – it is something 
that happens to us. But we can develop an ethic in how we cope with it. According to Arendt, 
when “everybody is swept away unthinkingly by what everybody else does and believes in, those 
who think are drawn out of hiding because their refusal to join is conspicuous and becomes a 
kind of action.”689 To translate this into the terms which I’ve been using in this dissertation, 
wonder presses upon us certain views of things that correspond to the orders that they represent, 
but, if we activate our wonder as thought, we can choose to extricate ourselves from those 
orders. We can say no. What happens next, of course, is anyone’s guess. 
 Given the condition of modernity as being a result of human initiative, we might revise 
Arendt’s answer to the problem of wonder. We should instead ask ourselves: could I live with 
                                                          
688 See (Habermas, Modernity versus Postmodernity 1981), (Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 
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myself if this world, the wonder that it is, were ordered as it is by my hands? Of course, every 
time when we act our individual designs fall to pieces in our hands, but that by no means 
diminishes the fact that the world is nothing more than the cumulative effect of all our designs. 
In the same way that courage is simply a manner of coping with fear, there might be a virtuous 
way to cope with wonder. To Arendt, it involves a silent dialogue with oneself that can only 
continue as long as you can live with yourself. If we were to consider political wonder within the 
framework of a virtue ethics, we might say that the deficiency of wonder is thoughtlessness and 
the excess to be endlessly baffled. The mean, then, would be to puzzle over the significance of 
those things which elude one’s grasp in search of a full, flourishing life, but to not forget to also 
live. Rather than venerate those things that strike us as great, we would question what 
significance that supposed greatness has for our own collective happiness. Rather than 
venerating human institutions as hallowed or natural, we would question the purpose that they 
serve and whether that purpose is conducive to our flourishing. When we think of wonders in 
this critical manner, we might allow ourselves to recognize the difference between wonders and 
calamities. 
2. From the Rainbow to the Tempest  
At the end of the previous chapter, I ended with some rather abrupt musings on the significance 
of wondering for confronting climate change, especially in light of Arendt’s analysis of political 
wonder. To end this dissertation, I want to briefly reconsider the relation between wonder and 
nature given the political conditions of modernity. Classically, the rainbow has been the natural 
event which most draws our wonder. According to Philip Fisher, “the rainbow is a central 
instance of the aesthetics of wonder.”690 As I noted in the introduction, in the biblical tradition, 
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the rainbow was sent by God to mark the end of the Flood and to signify God’s covenant to 
never again destroy the earth in such a deluge. The wonder of the rainbow, in this sense, is a 
wonder of an earth blessed by the divine as a place fit for humans to “be fruitful and multiply, 
and replenish the earth.”691 However, if we return to Hesiod’s genealogy of the god Thaumas 
(wonder), we can see that the ancient Greeks wisely not only called Iris, the goddess of the 
rainbow, his daughter, but also the Harpies, “who race with the gusts of the wind and the birds 
on swift wings, for they hurl on high.”692 To the ancient Greeks, the harpies were the spirits of 
storms, who were often tasked with snatching humans and carrying them off to the 
underworld.693 Both the delightfully admirable rainbow and the terrors of the storm were 
emblematic of wonder for the ancient Greeks, and both shows a form of communication between 
humans and the supernatural. In light of the horrors of climate change, perhaps it is appropriate 
to consider a different natural phenomenon to encapsulate the wonder towards the natural world. 
The sights of melting icecaps, raging wildfires, drought-desiccated landscapes, and 
unprecedented hurricanes caused and intensified by climate change have perhaps made the spirits 
of the storm more appropriate. Perhaps we should shift our lens from the sign of the rainbow to 
that of the tempest.  
 In these last few pages I would like to dwell further on William Shakespeare’s play, The 
Tempest, which of all Shakespeare’s plays – and perhaps of all literary works – is the one most 
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concerned with wonder.694 However, I before I being to dwell on the metaphor of the tempest 
and Shakespeare’s play of the same title I want to bring to the foreground the fact that the year in 
which Shakespeare is believed to have started writing The Tempest has also been recently 
suggested as the first year of the Anthropocene.695 The concept of the Anthropocene epoch, the 
age of humans, was originally suggested by Eugene Stoermer in the 1980s to capture the 
ecological effect of human beings on the earth and the concept has risen in prominence rapidly in 
the 2000s.696 According to Jedediah Purdy, “the Anthropocene finds its most radical expression 
in our acknowledgement that the familiar divide between people and the natural world is no 
longer useful or accurate.”697 The order of nature then is also subject in a material sense to the 
political condition of modernity which I outlined in the introduction to this dissertation – that all 
order is understood as constituted primarily by human initiative. Marking the beginning of the 
Anthropocene at 1610 implies, according to the scientists who suggested this year,  
that colonialism, global trade and coal brought about the Anthropocene. Broadly, 
this highlights social concerns, particularly the unequal power relationships 
between different groups of people, economic growth, the impacts of globalized 
trade, and the current reliance on fossil fuels.698  
The Tempest is a remarkable text for our purposes, not only in how it reflects on how wonder is a 
technique of power, but also in how it reflects on the involvement of wonder in undercurrents of 
modernity – domination, inequality, and economic exploitation – which are displaced from view 
                                                          
694 On wonder in The Tempest, see (A. M. Cohen 2012, 9-16); and (Fisher, Wonder, the Rainbow, and the Aesthetics 
of Rare Experiences 2003). On wonder in Shakespeare’s plays more generally see also (Bishop 1996); and 
(Cunningham 1951). 
 
695 (Lewis and Maslin 2015). 
 
696 (Purdy, After Nature 2015, 1). 
 
697 (Purdy, After Nature 2015, 2). 
 
698 (Lewis and Maslin 2015, 177). 
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by techniques of wonder in the preceding chapters. And it reflects on all of this from the 
threshold of the epoch in which nature itself is predominantly determined by human activity. The 
image of modernity which the play suggests is not simply one in which political space is carved 
out of nature by human initiative, but one in which wonder politicizes nature itself. 
 If one were so inclined, one could boil the plot of The Tempest down to say that a 
formerly deposed Italian duke maintains power on an island by, and then successfully mounts a 
coup to regain his power through, the effects of his wondrous control over natural phenomena. 
To give a bit more detail of the plot, the play is named after a storm which Prospero, the deposed 
Duke of Milan, conjures to shipwreck those who exiled him to his island and to engineer a plot 
that would return him to power.699 Those who were on the ship included the King of Naples, the 
son of the King, the King’s councilor who saved Prospero from an even worse fate, the son of 
the King, and Prospero’s brother, who usurped him as the Duke of Milan. Prospero’s rule as 
duke was usurped by his brother, as Prospero neglected worldly ends, according to his own 
telling, for “the bettering of the mind” which made him “reputed / in dignity, and for the liberal 
arts” but susceptible to the plots of one so nefarious as his brother.700 Prospero’s humanistic 
learning failed him in Milan, but would come to bring him great power on the island. 
 Prospero is not alone on the island, but is there with his daughter, Miranda, and two 
others. The first of the others is Caliban, a deformed creature who is the son of the previous ruler 
of the island, and the second is Ariel, a spirit of the air. Both of them are subjected to Prospero, 
                                                          
699 Of interest on this point are Arendt’s reflections on the turn in late antiquity to thinking of the joys of 
spectatorship as being due to being able to observe the travails of life, like a shipwreck, from a secure shore or haven 
in (Arendt, Thinking 1978, 139-141). See also Hans Blumenberg’s account of this ‘existential metaphor’ in 
(Blumenberg, Shipwreck with Spectator 1996), an account to which Arendt acknowledges a debt, (Arendt, Thinking 
1978, 233n.39). 
 
700 Act I, Scene 2, (Shakespeare, The Tempest 1959, 9). 
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and Caliban sees Prospero’s power as based in his books, the symbol of Prospero’s humanistic 
learning.701 Their characters have given rise to interpretations, such as in Aimé Césaire’s 
retelling, Une Tempête, as two responses to the condition of colonization; collaboration in the 
case of Ariel and resistance in Caliban, whose name bears a striking resemblance to both Carib 
and cannibal, demonstrating that this character is a literary reflection by Shakespeare of the 
relations between the peoples of the Old and New Worlds.702 By the conjurings of Prospero, 
primarily through the aid of Ariel, Prospero is able to regain the Dukedom of Milan. The story 
concludes with Prospero setting Ariel free, abandoning his magic charms, and leaving the island 
with Miranda, who has married the son of the King of Naples, thereby solidifying Prospero’s 
return with a powerful alliance. 
 The prevalence of wonder in the play is too rich and polyvalent to discuss in detail here. 
But it is clear that wonder is a technique of power in the employ of Prospero, “who is a 
Thaumaturge, a producer of wonders,” that regains his power through wonders beyond that of 
the eponymous tempest.703 Ariel is not only an airy spirit who conjure the tempest, but he also 
appears later in the play to the conspirators against Prospero “like a harpy” to terrify them into 
guilt.704 After the success of Ariel’s appearance to the conspirators, Prospero remarks to himself 
that “my high charms work, / And these, mine enemies, are all knit up / In their distractions; they 
are now in my power.”705 Yet the power of Prospero’s wonders do not end with Ariel, but also 
                                                          
701 Act III, Scene 2, (Shakespeare, The Tempest 1959, 53). 
 
702 Caliban has been an extremely rich character for thinking about the processes of racialization and colonization. 
For two prominent examples, see (Federici 2014); and (Henry 2000). 
 
703 (Fisher, Wonder, the Rainbow, and the Aesthetics of Rare Experiences 2003, 14). 
 
704 Act III. Scene 3, (Shakespeare, The Tempest 1959, 58). 
 
705 Act III, Scene 3, (Shakespeare, The Tempest 1959, 59). 
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include the way that he includes his daughter in his political machinations. His daughter’s name, 
Miranda, is the feminine form of the Latin mirandus, meaning ‘worthy of wonder.’ And we see 
Miranda not only wondering at the new people who arrive on the island, but also as an object of 
wonder to the son of the King of Naples, Ferdinand, who exclaims “O you wonder” upon 
meeting her.706 Ferdinand and Miranda accede to the designs of Prospero, fall in love, and 
Prospero marks their union with a play of spirits, including Iris, the spirit of the rainbow. In the 
end, Prospero sets Ariel free, proclaiming “my charms are all o’erthrown, / and what strength I 
have my own”, which appears to fulfill his promise to “break [his] staff” and “drown [his] book” 
to abjure the magic of his island kingdom.707 The magic of humanist learning is set aside for the 
worldly art of politics as he prepares to resume him place in Milan.  
 We think of modernity as if Prospero really did put away his magic: that his mysticism 
was replaced with reasonable statecraft in his return to Milan; that the hierarchical order of the 
island is replaced with universal freedom and equality revealed to reason; and that the political 
economy of modernity replaces the early colonial exploitation of the island with the equal 
cooperation of the market. Yet, as we’ve seen, that is simply not the case. We’ve seen since the 
first chapter, not only statecraft, but politics in general is infused with wonder in modernity. 
Prospero brought his wonders. Even more, the wonders can, for better or worse, confuse our 
evaluation of the domination, inequality, and exploitation which still too often pattern modern 
political life. If we are to make sense of the wonders of modernity and their dangers, we must not 
follow Prospero in putting aside the humanist texts. To do would be to bear the conjurings of 
                                                          
706 Act I, Scene 2, (Shakespeare, The Tempest 1959, 23). 
 
707 Epilogue (Shakespeare, The Tempest 1959, 83); and Act V, Scene 1, (Shakespeare, The Tempest 1959, 73). 
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modernity without any knowledge of them. If anything, this is the option against which the 
humanist spirit of this dissertation has contended. 
 The wonders of The Tempest are also striking in how they show how what is initially 
perceived as a wonder of nature, can in fact be a wonder of humanity. This is not only true of the 
magic of Ariel, but also of how Caliban is depicted as both natural and a curiosity. Such a 
depiction is used by Prospero, and others, as the legitimation of his domination, mirroring the 
colonial history of Western empires. In this, the play is significant in aiding us in thinking about 
wonder in the natural world, given the modern politics of wonder. Take, for example, this 
passage from an article, selected almost at random, published in May 2019 in the New York 
Magazine:  
In the mythology of Los Angeles, fires are an eternal feature of the landscape — 
more permanent than any human settlement and an intimation that the city and its 
people remain rugged, no matter how comfortably plastic and protected life in its 
wealthy canyon sprawl might seem. But in a time of environmental panic, last 
year’s fires played more like a portent of something new, even an End of Days. The 
same resident of Inglewood or West Hollywood or Culver City who might once 
have looked up from his driveway to see the same smoke plume suspended above 
the city’s flatlands or driven past the same flickering flames along the 405 and 
thought, California, now sees them and thinks, Climate change.708 
What was once seen in nature as eternal, or at least moving at a temporality that was geological 
rather than human, now moves in sync with human activity. The temporality of wonder is here 
stark. The natural world is moving at a speed determined in part by the interference of human 
action.709 The Tempest imitates this synchronicity of human and natural time in the unity of time 
in the play: the actions depicted in the play are meant to take as long as the performance of the 
play itself. Secular time is also the time of the natural world. The calamitous difficulties that this 
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presents are indeed a marvel. Moreover, humans now see wondrous portents in natural signs of a 
terrible, brave new world to come. This is the case even in the most privileged parts of the globe, 
like Los Angeles. It is the case that to “a large extent the future of the only place where life is 
known to exist is being determined by the actions of humans. Yet, the power that humans wield 
is unlike any other force of nature, because it is reflexive and therefore can be used, withdrawn 
or modified.”710 Yet, as long as we fail to wonder about it, we let that movement intensify 
without significance. Wondering about the fact that the natural world, for better or worse, 
confronts us as a wonder in the modern sense, gives us a chance to order it in such a way that it 
might endure. 
 How then might thinking about wonder be significant for ecological thinking? I may 
know – as much as one can know these sorts of things – that global temperatures “are on course 
for a 3-5 degrees (5.4-9.0 degrees Fahrenheit) rise this century,” but that knowledge doesn’t 
mean anything until I endure the sheer horror of it, which leads one to such questions as “What is 
necessary for a flourishing life?” or “Can an ostensibly democratic people save itself from its 
own desires?” which have no final, knowable answers. But they are utterly foundational 
questions for political theory.711 In this sense, although the new phenomena of the political world 
may perplex us, we cannot turn away from them and lose a sense of their significance for us. 
Given that the wondrous order of modernity touches upon every domain necessary for any 
possibility of flourishing, questioning is a matter of grave priority. 
 To extend the metaphor, modernity itself confronts us as a tempest. Its movements 
terrible, but wondrous to behold; its movements overpowering and self-reinforcing; and its 
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global scope expanding seemingly without end. The metaphor which Arendt uses for certain 
movements of modernity – those which isolate and terrify subjects into political formations in 
which they have no freedom at all – is the sandstorm.712 There is some truth to this. However, if 
we should have any hope of managing the storm of our own conjuring, with its all encompassing 
and seemingly endless movements, we must remember that its origin was in nothing more than 
clever moments of conjuring. The tempest we confront is of our own making. Today, when we 
see a hurricane, we partly see ourselves. About that we can still wonder. It is a mistake to see 
ourselves as being in the condition Miranda, who cried out at the tempest, “Had I been a god of 
power, I would / Have sunk the sea within the earth or ere / It should the good ship so have 
swallowed and / The frightening souls within her.”713 We cry this out if we fail to acknowledge 
that the wonders we see are our own. Our powers are those of Prospero, insofar as we control the 
powers of the state and the economic order. In our failure to acknowledge ourselves and our 
powers in our wonders we weep where we could act. Given the fact of the Anthropocene, we 
might acknowledge that wonder towards nature should include in it a feeling of responsibility for 
a natural world which does not confront us untouched, but as formed by human initiative. Any 
response to this wonder will be political and contentious, but so it must be.714  
  
                                                          
712 (Arendt, The Promise of Politics 2005, 201-204). 
 
713 Act I, Scene 2, (Shakespeare, The Tempest 1959, 6). 
 
714 Purdy stages a potential democratic Anthropocene against the already incipient neoliberal alternative: “The 
politics of the Anthropocene will be either democratic or horrible. That alternative is no guarantee that a democratic 
Anthropocene would be decorous, pleasant, or admirable, but only that it would be a shared effort to shape our 
more-than-human future with human hands,” (Purdy, The New Nature 2016). 
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Appendix - Abbreviations of Works  
Kant 
AP Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) 
CPR Critique of Practical Reason (1788) 
A/B Critique of Pure Reason 
CPJ Critique of the Power of Judgment 
DS Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics (1766) 
EM Essay on the Maladies of the Head (1764) 
GM Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1785) 
IUH Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim (1784) 
OBS Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764) 
ONA On a Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy 
OCS On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice 
(1793) 
OE Other Exaltations 
R Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793) 
CF The Conflict of the Faculties (1798) 
MM The Metaphysics of Morals (1797) 
OPA The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God 
(1763) 
Q The Question, Whether the Earth is Ageing, Considered from a Physical Point of View 
(1754) 
PP Toward Perpetual Peace (1795) 
UNH Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens or Essay on the Constitution and 
the Mechanical Origin of the Whole Universe (1755) 
OT What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking (1786) 
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